(A1) Individuals in the reference class really are always better off with the truth, with sufficient probability that the alternative does not bear investigating;
(A2) Humans are so unreliable as judges of what we would and would not benefit from being deceived about that the heuristic “we’re always better off with the truth” is more accurate than the available alternatives;
(B) Individuals must adopt the Noble Might-be-truth “I’m always better off with the truth” to have a chance at the Crisis of Faith technique?
Eliezer, what do you mean here? Do you mean:
(A1) Individuals in the reference class really are always better off with the truth, with sufficient probability that the alternative does not bear investigating;
(A2) Humans are so unreliable as judges of what we would and would not benefit from being deceived about that the heuristic “we’re always better off with the truth” is more accurate than the available alternatives;
(B) Individuals must adopt the Noble Might-be-truth “I’m always better off with the truth” to have a chance at the Crisis of Faith technique?