I think socially embedding the decision would actually help us understand the issue.
Say that people were going door-to-door making this offer. Which would you choose? Before you answer, consider this: everyone you know and everyone you will ever meet was given the same choice. Are you willing to be the one person in the room who “missed out on this golden opportunity”?
You probably feel uncomfortable, you’re probably already rubbing the Bayesian keys in your pocket to make your escape from the question. Because you know, even if you know you’re right, that this won’t look good. Talking about bias won’t help you, you have only three seconds to make a reply, just not enough time.
I think this is why even perfectly good, stone-cold rationalists will have trouble with the Allais Paradox. Part of you is making this social calculation as it goes.
But this might also make it meta rational: if you can’t deny the offer was made, it might be better to take the certain route if your social circle is more likely to respect you for it. The $3,000 might not be worth as much as the social reward.
Well yeah, but it’s a different question then. If I suggest you should fast for three days so the Sun God will make your crops flourish (or give you a raise, whatever’s applicable), you’re going to refuse. If you know your peers will stone you if you don’t fast, you’re going to accept, even though you still don’t believe in the Sun God.
It is a different question, which is the main feature of it. The problem seems to be to that the Allais Paradox bothers people. By changing the question we can often get more traction than by throwing ourselves relentlessly at something we’re having difficulty accepting.
In such social situations, you should choose 1A and 2A, and have a consistent preference for certainty; there’s nothing irrational about a preference for certainty. The irrationality is choosing 1A and 2B.
But when you reframe it socially, taking 1A and 2B becomes rational: under 1A you don’t lose socially, under 2B you gain more money but will still have defenders at the party. All that matters in the social situation is whether you’ll meet the defender threshold.
Depends on whether it’s revealed that you lost because of a bad decision or not—if there were public lists of people who took 2B and rolled a 67, thus forfeiting all their winnings, then I think you’d be right back in the same situation. If it’s totally unknown then, yeah, that’s the same reasoning I used to take 1A and 2B internally − 1B doesn’t give me a convenient excuse to say the loss wasn’t really my fault, whereas with 2B I can rationalize that I was going to lose anyways and it therefore doesn’t feel as bad.
I think socially embedding the decision would actually help us understand the issue.
Say that people were going door-to-door making this offer. Which would you choose? Before you answer, consider this: everyone you know and everyone you will ever meet was given the same choice. Are you willing to be the one person in the room who “missed out on this golden opportunity”?
You probably feel uncomfortable, you’re probably already rubbing the Bayesian keys in your pocket to make your escape from the question. Because you know, even if you know you’re right, that this won’t look good. Talking about bias won’t help you, you have only three seconds to make a reply, just not enough time.
I think this is why even perfectly good, stone-cold rationalists will have trouble with the Allais Paradox. Part of you is making this social calculation as it goes.
But this might also make it meta rational: if you can’t deny the offer was made, it might be better to take the certain route if your social circle is more likely to respect you for it. The $3,000 might not be worth as much as the social reward.
Well yeah, but it’s a different question then. If I suggest you should fast for three days so the Sun God will make your crops flourish (or give you a raise, whatever’s applicable), you’re going to refuse. If you know your peers will stone you if you don’t fast, you’re going to accept, even though you still don’t believe in the Sun God.
It is a different question, which is the main feature of it. The problem seems to be to that the Allais Paradox bothers people. By changing the question we can often get more traction than by throwing ourselves relentlessly at something we’re having difficulty accepting.
In such social situations, you should choose 1A and 2A, and have a consistent preference for certainty; there’s nothing irrational about a preference for certainty. The irrationality is choosing 1A and 2B.
But when you reframe it socially, taking 1A and 2B becomes rational: under 1A you don’t lose socially, under 2B you gain more money but will still have defenders at the party. All that matters in the social situation is whether you’ll meet the defender threshold.
Depends on whether it’s revealed that you lost because of a bad decision or not—if there were public lists of people who took 2B and rolled a 67, thus forfeiting all their winnings, then I think you’d be right back in the same situation. If it’s totally unknown then, yeah, that’s the same reasoning I used to take 1A and 2B internally − 1B doesn’t give me a convenient excuse to say the loss wasn’t really my fault, whereas with 2B I can rationalize that I was going to lose anyways and it therefore doesn’t feel as bad.