It’s a well known argument, I learned it from Shalizi’s note. There’s other work trying to justify Occam’s razor when the set of hypotheses is finite, e.g. Kevin Kelly’s work.
Bayesian explanations of Ockham’s razor are based on a circular appeal to a prior bias toward simple possibilities.
I think it is possible to appeal to simpler principles, modifying some of the points I made above.
Indeed, I think it is possible to non-circularly explain why
the Razor is the rule which says “among the theories compatible with the evidence, chose the simplest”, and the question is why this leads to the truth better than a rule like “among the theories compatible with the evidence, chose the one whose statement involves the fewest occurrences of the letter ‘e’”, or even “the one which most glorifies Divine Providence”.
It’s a well known argument, I learned it from Shalizi’s note. There’s other work trying to justify Occam’s razor when the set of hypotheses is finite, e.g. Kevin Kelly’s work.
Thanks for the very interesting papers.
In Kelly’s page, this
I think it is possible to appeal to simpler principles, modifying some of the points I made above.
Indeed, I think it is possible to non-circularly explain why