The recurrent findings in these studies are (1) a reasonable degree of between-group consistency, combined with (2) a high degree of within-group variability. In other words, mean estimates of “very probable”, “doubtful” and “improbable” are reasonably similar from study to study, supporting the claim that probability words are translatable; but, at the same time, the interindividual variability of estimates is large enough to represent a potential communication problem. If, for instance, the doctor tells the patient that a cure is “possible”, she may mean a 5 per cent chance, but it may be interpreted to mean a 70 per cent chance, or vice versa. This variability is typically underestimated by the participants themselves. Brun and Teigen (1988) asked medical doctors to specify a range within which would fall 90 per cent of other doctors’ interpretations. This interval included on the average (for 14 verbal phrases) less than 65 per cent of the actual individual estimates. Amer, Hackenbrack and Nelson (1994) found that auditors’ 90 per cent ranges included, on average, only 56 per cent of the individual estimates (for 23 phrases). In other words, the problem posed by interindividual variability appears to be aggravated by a low degree of variability awareness.
...several attempts have been made to construct standard lists of verbal expressions, where each phrase is coordinated with an appropriate numeric probability (Beyth-Marom, 1982; Hamm, 1991; Tavana, Kennedy & Mohebbi, 1997; Renooij & Witteman, 1999)
...Verbal phrases are, furthermore, parts of ordinary language, and thus sensitive to conversational implicatures. So I may say that a particular outcome is somewhat uncertain, not because I think it has a low probability of occurring, but because I want to modify some actual, imagined or implied belief in its occurrence. Such modifications can go in two directions, either upwards or downwards on the probability scale. Verbal probability expressions can accordingly be categorised as having a positive or a negative directionality. They determine whether attention should be directed to the attainment or the non-attainment of the target outcome, and, in doing so, they have the ability to influence people’s judg- ments and decisions in an unambiguous way. Words may be denotatively vague, but they are argumentatively precise. If you tell me that success is “possible”, I know I am being encouraged, even if I do not know whether you have a probability of 30 per cent or of 70 per cent in mind. If you say it is “not certain”, I know I am advised to be careful and to think twice. But if you tell me there is a 45 per cent probability I will not know what to think. The information is precise, but its pragmatic meaning is undecided. Do you mean uncertainty (I have only a 45 per cent chance) or possibility (at least I have a 45 per cent chance)? Likelihood or doubt? Or both?
Notes from Teigen & Brun: