I see your point. I wasn’t thinking of models where you have one preference per object feature. I was thinking of more abstract examples, like trying to be a cheek-turning enemy-loving Christian and a soldier at the same time.
I don’t think of choosing an object whose feature vector has the maximum dot product with your preference vector as conflict resolution; I think of it (and related numerical constraint problems) as simplex optimization. When you want to sum a set of preferences that are continuous functions of continuous features, you can generally take all the preferences and solve directly (or numerically) to find the optimum.
In the “moral values” domain, you’re more likely to have discontinuous rules (e.g., “X is always bad”, or “XN is not”), and be performing logical inference over them. This results in situations that you can’t solve directly, and it can result in circular or indeterminate chains of reasoning, and multiple possible solutions.
My claim is that more conflicts is worse, not that conflicts can or should be eliminated. But I admit that aspect of my model could use more justification.
Is there a way to distinguish moral values from other kinds of values? Coming up with a theory of values that explains both the process of choosing who to vote for, and threading a needle, as value-optimization, is going to be difficult.
In the “moral values” domain, you’re more likely to have discontinuous rules (e.g., “X is always bad”, or “XN is not”), and be performing logical inference over them. This results in situations that you can’t solve directly, and it can result in circular or indeterminate chains of reasoning, and multiple possible solutions.
This line of thinking is setting off my rationalization detectors. It sounds like you’re saying, “OK, I’ll admit that my claim seems wrong in some simple cases. But it’s still correct in all of the cases that are so complicated that nobody understands them.”
I don’t know how to distinguish moral values from other kinds of values, but it seems to me that this isn’t exactly the distinction that would be most useful for you to figure out. My suggestion would be to figure out why you think high IC is bad, and see if there’s some nice way to characterize the value systems that match that intuition.
I think a natural intuition about a moral values domain suggests that things are likely to be non-linear and discontinuous.
I don’t think its so much saying the claim is wrong in simple cases, but its still correct in cases no one understands.
It’s more saying the alternative claims being proposed are a long ways from handling any real world example, and I’m disinclined to believe that a sufficiently complicated system will satisfy continuity and linearity.
Also, we should distinguish between “why do I expect that existing value systems are energy-minimized” and “why should we prefer value systems that are energy-minimized”.
The former is easier to answer, and I gave a bit of an answer in “Only humans can have human values”.
The latter I could justify within EY-FAI by therefore claiming that being energy-minimized is a property of human values.
My suggestion would be to figure out why you think high IC is bad, and see if there’s some nice way to characterize the value systems that match that intuition.
That’s a good idea. My “final reason” for thinking that high IC is bad may be because high-IC systems are a pain in the ass when you’re building intelligent agents. They have a lot of interdependencies among their behaviors, get stuck waffling between different behaviors, and are hard to debug. But we (as designers and as intelligent agents) have mechanisms to deal with these problems; e.g., producing hysteresis by using nonlinear functions to sum activation from different goals.
My other final reason is that I consciously try to energy-minimize my own values, and I think other thoughtful people who aren’t nihilists do too. Probably nihilists do too, if only for their own convenience.
My other other final reason is that energy-minimization is what dynamic network concepts do. It’s how they develop, as e.g. for spin-glasses, economies, or ecologies.
I see your point. I wasn’t thinking of models where you have one preference per object feature. I was thinking of more abstract examples, like trying to be a cheek-turning enemy-loving Christian and a soldier at the same time.
I don’t think of choosing an object whose feature vector has the maximum dot product with your preference vector as conflict resolution; I think of it (and related numerical constraint problems) as simplex optimization. When you want to sum a set of preferences that are continuous functions of continuous features, you can generally take all the preferences and solve directly (or numerically) to find the optimum.
In the “moral values” domain, you’re more likely to have discontinuous rules (e.g., “X is always bad”, or “XN is not”), and be performing logical inference over them. This results in situations that you can’t solve directly, and it can result in circular or indeterminate chains of reasoning, and multiple possible solutions.
My claim is that more conflicts is worse, not that conflicts can or should be eliminated. But I admit that aspect of my model could use more justification.
Is there a way to distinguish moral values from other kinds of values? Coming up with a theory of values that explains both the process of choosing who to vote for, and threading a needle, as value-optimization, is going to be difficult.
This line of thinking is setting off my rationalization detectors. It sounds like you’re saying, “OK, I’ll admit that my claim seems wrong in some simple cases. But it’s still correct in all of the cases that are so complicated that nobody understands them.”
I don’t know how to distinguish moral values from other kinds of values, but it seems to me that this isn’t exactly the distinction that would be most useful for you to figure out. My suggestion would be to figure out why you think high IC is bad, and see if there’s some nice way to characterize the value systems that match that intuition.
I disagree with this.
I think a natural intuition about a moral values domain suggests that things are likely to be non-linear and discontinuous.
I don’t think its so much saying the claim is wrong in simple cases, but its still correct in cases no one understands.
It’s more saying the alternative claims being proposed are a long ways from handling any real world example, and I’m disinclined to believe that a sufficiently complicated system will satisfy continuity and linearity.
Also, we should distinguish between “why do I expect that existing value systems are energy-minimized” and “why should we prefer value systems that are energy-minimized”.
The former is easier to answer, and I gave a bit of an answer in “Only humans can have human values”.
The latter I could justify within EY-FAI by therefore claiming that being energy-minimized is a property of human values.
That’s a good idea. My “final reason” for thinking that high IC is bad may be because high-IC systems are a pain in the ass when you’re building intelligent agents. They have a lot of interdependencies among their behaviors, get stuck waffling between different behaviors, and are hard to debug. But we (as designers and as intelligent agents) have mechanisms to deal with these problems; e.g., producing hysteresis by using nonlinear functions to sum activation from different goals.
My other final reason is that I consciously try to energy-minimize my own values, and I think other thoughtful people who aren’t nihilists do too. Probably nihilists do too, if only for their own convenience.
My other other final reason is that energy-minimization is what dynamic network concepts do. It’s how they develop, as e.g. for spin-glasses, economies, or ecologies.