Abandoning your previous position can also be a way of saving face, in at least two ways:
Being wrong is embarrassing, yes; but being wrong for a short period of time is less embarrassing than being wrong for an extended period of time. Best to stop the bleeding as quickly as possible.
You signal that you are a reasonable person who does not let emotional attachment to a position cloud his judgment. If you’re dealing with someone of higher status, you show that your mistake doesn’t matter that much because you corrected yourself quickly. If you are dealing with someone who is lower status than you, you come off appearing magnanimous.
You signal that you are a reasonable person who does not let emotional attachment to a position cloud his judgment. If you’re dealing with someone of higher status, you show that your mistake doesn’t matter that much because you corrected yourself quickly. If you are dealing with someone who is lower status than you, you come off appearing magnanimous.
In many cases this is true, but someone could also interpret this as you as being loose with your morals, one who betrays one’s own ideals in a flash (and so are untrustworthy). Or maybe interpret it as you being a follower, who only thinks what people tell you to.
I frequently hear people (especially public figures) criticized for “changing their opinions too much.” Obviously, taking on the opinion of whoever you happen to be talking to at the moment is a bad thing, but it’s difficult enough to distinguish between the two at the drop of a hat that I think such criticism is definitely problematic.
Ideally, public figures who changed their minds about something would state that they had done so and explain what information changed their opinion. This would let observers gauge whether the person had really changed their mind or was just saying whatever was most expedient. The problem with this is that it takes a long time, and would ideally involve questioning by others (“You used to say X was good because of Y—do you still believe Y?”). If you’re making speeches where your goal is to say lots of things that make you look good in the amount of time people will listen, you don’t want to spend time on this sort of thing because most of the audience will tune out before they’ve heard you say much that sounded impressive.
Sure. As you say though, that would be a difficult sell.
I think part of the problem is that “they’re changing their opinions too much” is usually a snap judgment. It tends to be applied to everyone that doesn’t have a firmly fixed campaign platform (and isn’t protected by party affiliation).
People who actually sit down and look over the available history tend to, just as a trend, come back with more concrete issues. More along the lines of “this guy’s had a different opinion on foreign policy to go with every speech he’s ever made, and it always lines up with the majority opinion of the audience.”
I assume that we’re talking about opinions on factual matters, not personal values. Yes, one’s fundamental (terminal) values I would expect to be pretty stable. Instrumental values are more fluid because they are a function of both one’s terminal values and one’s state of information about factual matters. It seems to me that one’s morals and ideals are tied more closely to terminal values than to instrumental values.
I assume that we’re talking about opinions on factual matters, not personal values. Yes, one’s fundamental (terminal) values I would expect to be pretty stable.
To my thinking, this stance forfeits rational reflection where it really counts most. You’re saying, if I understand you, that you respect people who change their opinions on factual matters, but not on questions of fundamental ethics. This seems to assume, among other things, that people’s values are much more coherent than they are (leaving little leverage for change).
You lose much more status, it is true, when you re-evaluate your terminal values than your factual contentions. That just means the problems of self-confirmation are compounded in ethics, not that they should be ignored there. You can’t be rational yet rigidly maintain your terminal values’ immunity to rational argument.
You can’t be rational yet rigidly maintain your terminal values’ immunity to rational argument.
Any argument that my terminal values should be one thing or another will itself be founded on certain assumed values. You can’t start from a value-neutral position and get to a value system from there.
If rational argument alone is enough to cause a change in one’s values, I can see only a few possibilities:
The changed values were instrumental values rather than terminal values. It makes perfect sense to modify instrumental values if one no longer believes that they serve the attainment of one’s terminal values.
The values were incoherent. The rational argument has shown that they are in conflict with each other, making it clear that a choice among them is necessary.
I was going to add the possibility of a value whose subject matter is found not to exist, such as religious values founded on a belief in a god. Some of those values may evaporate after one becomes convinced that there is no god. But even in that case I think one can argue that the religious values really served a more fundamental value—the desire for self-respect.
Though it is remarkable how few philosophers of ethics have understood terminal values to be subject to rational argument or change on the basis of such argument. Plato is the only one I can think of.
Abandoning your previous position can also be a way of saving face, in at least two ways:
Being wrong is embarrassing, yes; but being wrong for a short period of time is less embarrassing than being wrong for an extended period of time. Best to stop the bleeding as quickly as possible.
You signal that you are a reasonable person who does not let emotional attachment to a position cloud his judgment. If you’re dealing with someone of higher status, you show that your mistake doesn’t matter that much because you corrected yourself quickly. If you are dealing with someone who is lower status than you, you come off appearing magnanimous.
In many cases this is true, but someone could also interpret this as you as being loose with your morals, one who betrays one’s own ideals in a flash (and so are untrustworthy). Or maybe interpret it as you being a follower, who only thinks what people tell you to.
I frequently hear people (especially public figures) criticized for “changing their opinions too much.” Obviously, taking on the opinion of whoever you happen to be talking to at the moment is a bad thing, but it’s difficult enough to distinguish between the two at the drop of a hat that I think such criticism is definitely problematic.
Ideally, public figures who changed their minds about something would state that they had done so and explain what information changed their opinion. This would let observers gauge whether the person had really changed their mind or was just saying whatever was most expedient. The problem with this is that it takes a long time, and would ideally involve questioning by others (“You used to say X was good because of Y—do you still believe Y?”). If you’re making speeches where your goal is to say lots of things that make you look good in the amount of time people will listen, you don’t want to spend time on this sort of thing because most of the audience will tune out before they’ve heard you say much that sounded impressive.
Sure. As you say though, that would be a difficult sell.
I think part of the problem is that “they’re changing their opinions too much” is usually a snap judgment. It tends to be applied to everyone that doesn’t have a firmly fixed campaign platform (and isn’t protected by party affiliation).
People who actually sit down and look over the available history tend to, just as a trend, come back with more concrete issues. More along the lines of “this guy’s had a different opinion on foreign policy to go with every speech he’s ever made, and it always lines up with the majority opinion of the audience.”
Or worse … a flip-flopper!
I assume that we’re talking about opinions on factual matters, not personal values. Yes, one’s fundamental (terminal) values I would expect to be pretty stable. Instrumental values are more fluid because they are a function of both one’s terminal values and one’s state of information about factual matters. It seems to me that one’s morals and ideals are tied more closely to terminal values than to instrumental values.
To my thinking, this stance forfeits rational reflection where it really counts most. You’re saying, if I understand you, that you respect people who change their opinions on factual matters, but not on questions of fundamental ethics. This seems to assume, among other things, that people’s values are much more coherent than they are (leaving little leverage for change).
You lose much more status, it is true, when you re-evaluate your terminal values than your factual contentions. That just means the problems of self-confirmation are compounded in ethics, not that they should be ignored there. You can’t be rational yet rigidly maintain your terminal values’ immunity to rational argument.
Any argument that my terminal values should be one thing or another will itself be founded on certain assumed values. You can’t start from a value-neutral position and get to a value system from there.
If rational argument alone is enough to cause a change in one’s values, I can see only a few possibilities:
The changed values were instrumental values rather than terminal values. It makes perfect sense to modify instrumental values if one no longer believes that they serve the attainment of one’s terminal values.
The values were incoherent. The rational argument has shown that they are in conflict with each other, making it clear that a choice among them is necessary.
I was going to add the possibility of a value whose subject matter is found not to exist, such as religious values founded on a belief in a god. Some of those values may evaporate after one becomes convinced that there is no god. But even in that case I think one can argue that the religious values really served a more fundamental value—the desire for self-respect.
Though it is remarkable how few philosophers of ethics have understood terminal values to be subject to rational argument or change on the basis of such argument. Plato is the only one I can think of.