I also see that the alleged ‘gains’ from morality are frequently self-inflated, if not false to begin with; while the alternative—intellectual consistency and a recognition of purposeful action as aimed at subjective satisfaction—is vastly underrated, even by people of a ‘libertarian’ bent.
* we recognize that the optimal long-term strategy can differ greatly from the optimal one-shot analysis, and
* we have preferences about some anticipated world-states rather than just anticipated mind-states.
In response to this I say there is nothing about subjectivist satisfaction which prevents taking these (or anything else) into consideration. Further, I do not mean this in a utility-function sense, but rather ‘actual wants derived from valuation forecasts which result in intentionality’.
Most of this is less controversial here than elsewhere, with the exception of the reduction of all our goals to “subjective satisfaction”. Many LWers aspire to rational pursuit of our preferences, but with the important distinctions that
we recognize that the optimal long-term strategy can differ greatly from the optimal one-shot analysis, and
we have preferences about some anticipated world-states rather than just anticipated mind-states.
In response to this I say there is nothing about subjectivist satisfaction which prevents taking these (or anything else) into consideration. Further, I do not mean this in a utility-function sense, but rather ‘actual wants derived from valuation forecasts which result in intentionality’.