Really negative events can affect people’s lives for a long time afterward.
From that model, it’s easier to have utility effects by, say, reducing extreme negative events, than say, making someone who is ‘happy’ a little bit happier. So while the second thing may seem easier to do (cost), the first thing may still be more impactful even if you divide by its cost.
The obvious connection is how things play out within a person’s life. If, say, you break your arm, maybe it’ll be harder to do other things because:
it’s in a cast and you can’t use it while it heals
You’re in pain. Maybe you don’t enjoy things like, like watching a movie, as much, when you’re in a lot of pain.
[Insert argument for wearing a helmet while riding a bike or motorcycle even if it’s mildly inconvenient—because it helps reduce/prevent stuff that’s way more inconvenient.]
and pleasure doesn’t scale to the same degree
It’s easy to scale pain? This just seems like an argument that ‘Becoming slightly happier’ is less pressing morally than ‘reducing the amount of torture* in the world’.
*Might be worth noting that if this is about extreme pain, then this implies ‘improving access to medical care’ can be a very powerful intervention, i.e., effective altruism.
Thanks for the response; I’m still somewhat confused though. The question was to do with the theoretical best/worst things possible, so I’m not entirely sure whether parallels to (relatively) minor pleasures/pains are meaningful here.
Specifically I’m confused about:
Then you end up into well, to what extent is that a debunking explanation that explains why humans in terms of their capacity to experience joy and suffering are unbiased but the reality is still biased
I’m not really sure what’s meant by “the reality” here, nor what’s meant by biased. Is the assertion that humans’ intuitive preferences are driven by the range of possible things that could happen in the ancestral environment & that this isn’t likely to match the maximum possible pleasure vs. suffering ratio in the future? If so, how does this lead one to end up concluding it’s worse (rather than better)? I’m not really sure how these arguments connect in a way that could lead one to conclude that the worst possible suffering is a quadrillion times as bad as the best bliss is good.
so I’m not entirely sure whether parallels to (relatively) minor pleasures/pains are meaningful here.
Ah. I suggested them because I figured that such ‘(relatively) minor’ things are what people have experienced and thus are the obvious source for extrapolating out to theoretical maximum/s.
I don’t know what’s meant by ‘reality’ there. Your guess seems reasonable (and was more transparent than what you quoted).
I’m not sure how to guess the maximum ratio.
I’m not really sure how these arguments connect in a way that could lead one to conclude that the worst possible suffering is a quadrillion times as bad as the best bliss is good.
Likewise. (A quadrillion seems like a lot—I’d need a detailed explanation to get why someone would choose that number.)
I think...it makes sense less as emotion, than as a utility function—but that’s not what is being talked about.
Part of it is...when people are well off do they pursue the greatest pleasure? I think negative extremes prompt a focus on basics. In better conditions, people may pursue more complicated things. Overall, there’s something about focus I guess:
‘I don’t want to die’ versus ‘I’m happy to be alive!’. Which sentiment is stronger? It’s easy to pull that up for a thought experiment, that’s extreme, but, if people don’t have that as a risk in their lives then maybe the second thing, or the absence of the risk doesn’t have as much salience, because the risk isn’t present? (Short version: a) it’s hard to reason about scenarios outside of experience*, b) this might induce asymmetry in estimates or intuition.)
*I have experienced stuff and found ‘wow, that was way more intense than I’d expected’ - for stuff I had never experienced before.
Here’s a model that might simplify things:
Really negative events can affect people’s lives for a long time afterward.
From that model, it’s easier to have utility effects by, say, reducing extreme negative events, than say, making someone who is ‘happy’ a little bit happier. So while the second thing may seem easier to do (cost), the first thing may still be more impactful even if you divide by its cost.
The obvious connection is how things play out within a person’s life. If, say, you break your arm, maybe it’ll be harder to do other things because:
it’s in a cast and you can’t use it while it heals
You’re in pain. Maybe you don’t enjoy things like, like watching a movie, as much, when you’re in a lot of pain.
[Insert argument for wearing a helmet while riding a bike or motorcycle even if it’s mildly inconvenient—because it helps reduce/prevent stuff that’s way more inconvenient.]
It’s easy to scale pain? This just seems like an argument that ‘Becoming slightly happier’ is less pressing morally than ‘reducing the amount of torture* in the world’.
*Might be worth noting that if this is about extreme pain, then this implies ‘improving access to medical care’ can be a very powerful intervention, i.e., effective altruism.
Thanks for the response; I’m still somewhat confused though. The question was to do with the theoretical best/worst things possible, so I’m not entirely sure whether parallels to (relatively) minor pleasures/pains are meaningful here.
Specifically I’m confused about:
I’m not really sure what’s meant by “the reality” here, nor what’s meant by biased. Is the assertion that humans’ intuitive preferences are driven by the range of possible things that could happen in the ancestral environment & that this isn’t likely to match the maximum possible pleasure vs. suffering ratio in the future? If so, how does this lead one to end up concluding it’s worse (rather than better)? I’m not really sure how these arguments connect in a way that could lead one to conclude that the worst possible suffering is a quadrillion times as bad as the best bliss is good.
Ah. I suggested them because I figured that such ‘(relatively) minor’ things are what people have experienced and thus are the obvious source for extrapolating out to theoretical maximum/s.
I don’t know what’s meant by ‘reality’ there. Your guess seems reasonable (and was more transparent than what you quoted).
I’m not sure how to guess the maximum ratio.
Likewise. (A quadrillion seems like a lot—I’d need a detailed explanation to get why someone would choose that number.)
I think...it makes sense less as emotion, than as a utility function—but that’s not what is being talked about.
Part of it is...when people are well off do they pursue the greatest pleasure? I think negative extremes prompt a focus on basics. In better conditions, people may pursue more complicated things. Overall, there’s something about focus I guess:
‘I don’t want to die’ versus ‘I’m happy to be alive!’. Which sentiment is stronger? It’s easy to pull that up for a thought experiment, that’s extreme, but, if people don’t have that as a risk in their lives then maybe the second thing, or the absence of the risk doesn’t have as much salience, because the risk isn’t present? (Short version: a) it’s hard to reason about scenarios outside of experience*, b) this might induce asymmetry in estimates or intuition.)
*I have experienced stuff and found ‘wow, that was way more intense than I’d expected’ - for stuff I had never experienced before.