A few additions: Adams points out that it’s possible that affirmations work via selection bias: if you’re capable of actually having the self-discipline to use them consistently, it may simply mean you also have the self-discipline to achieve the goal involved.
Other factors that play into affirmations have to do with whether you consciously reject the belief in the affirmations; many books mention the importance of noting your automatic responses (like “yeah, right!”) to an affirmation and addressing whatever conflicting belief is involved. If not, the process can actually reinforce one’s conflicting beliefs, due to retrieval practice! (This would explain, btw, a lot of individual variation in success at affirmation usage.)
Finally:
He suggests using imagination and self-deception to trick the subconscious mind into adopting the necessary role.
Actors are not practicing self-deception, any more than a child is practicing self-deception when he or she says, “I’m a fireman!” Congruent role play in both cases consists merely of adopting the role without signaling pretense!
Notice that children have to be taught to say, “I’m pretending to be a fireman”, and that only “ham” actors attempt to draw attention to their acting. Unskilled actors are likewise too conscious of the fact they are “acting”, and thus “act”, instead of simply assuming the role.
Another way of putting it might be that “acting as if” (of which affirmations are actually just one manifestation) is like crossing a girder between skyscrapers—you can do it confidently as long as you can avoid thinking too much about what you’re doing. Children do this easily, because they haven’t learned to second-guess themselves yet. Adults have it a little bit harder, but they can still learn to ignore their second guesses or find something that draws their focus in so they can’t pay attention to the second-guessing.
Notice, too, that placebos, affirmations, and priming are all able to work as long as there is no conflicting information present to cause active disbelief or rejection of the suggestion. This strongly suggests that they are all operating via the exact same mechanism, despite our differing names for the phenomena.
A few additions: Adams points out that it’s possible that affirmations work via selection bias: if you’re capable of actually having the self-discipline to use them consistently, it may simply mean you also have the self-discipline to achieve the goal involved.
Other factors that play into affirmations have to do with whether you consciously reject the belief in the affirmations; many books mention the importance of noting your automatic responses (like “yeah, right!”) to an affirmation and addressing whatever conflicting belief is involved. If not, the process can actually reinforce one’s conflicting beliefs, due to retrieval practice! (This would explain, btw, a lot of individual variation in success at affirmation usage.)
Finally:
Actors are not practicing self-deception, any more than a child is practicing self-deception when he or she says, “I’m a fireman!” Congruent role play in both cases consists merely of adopting the role without signaling pretense!
Notice that children have to be taught to say, “I’m pretending to be a fireman”, and that only “ham” actors attempt to draw attention to their acting. Unskilled actors are likewise too conscious of the fact they are “acting”, and thus “act”, instead of simply assuming the role.
Another way of putting it might be that “acting as if” (of which affirmations are actually just one manifestation) is like crossing a girder between skyscrapers—you can do it confidently as long as you can avoid thinking too much about what you’re doing. Children do this easily, because they haven’t learned to second-guess themselves yet. Adults have it a little bit harder, but they can still learn to ignore their second guesses or find something that draws their focus in so they can’t pay attention to the second-guessing.
Notice, too, that placebos, affirmations, and priming are all able to work as long as there is no conflicting information present to cause active disbelief or rejection of the suggestion. This strongly suggests that they are all operating via the exact same mechanism, despite our differing names for the phenomena.