I’m surprised at your reaction. Let me illustrate my examples: for “minors,” think “five year olds.” For “incompetents” think “people in comas.” For criminals...well, just think about convicted criminals. You can’t seriously be arguing that criminals should never be punished. There is no society on Earth that does not restrict the rights of minors, convicted criminals, and adults who have been found mentally incompetent.
I’m not arguing that (see replies to Davids). But I also note that I am not a minor, convicted criminal, or mentally incompetent and therefore expect I may be biased. I certainly don’t trust everything I think, and I note that as long as I’m running on hostile hardware it can be in my best interest to follow certain rules proven to protect me against myself.
Of course you start with biases. We all do. But we seek to overcome these biases in order to become less wrong. So, I ask you, in light of the responses you have received, and as one aspiring rationalist to another: is it not true that some groups of humans must be excluded from rights that other humans have?
No. There may be good reasons for certain individuals to have their rights violated. Entire groups cannot be excluded from the rest of humanity.
I don’t think it’s sufficient to simply note “I may have these biases, and I should seek to overcome them”. This may make one seem less biased without actually changing anything. The rest of the tribe applauds your self-awareness and wisdom, and then continues to preferentially hire white people. Actually overcoming a bias means doing the work of imposing rules we find inconvenient. Rules like “I will not take leadership for the good of the tribe, even when it’s for the good of the tribe” or “I will not exclude groups of humans from certain rights, even when they should be excluded from those rights.”
I buy that human rights might well be an example of how ends don’t justify the means for humans. But what do you mean by ‘groups’. Criminals could be considered to be (maybe even defined as?) ‘individuals whose rights we’re justified in violating’.
It’s trivially true that you could identifiy a set of ‘individuals whose rights we should violate’. They’d also have common qualities such as criminality, insanity etc. So what defines a ‘group’ for your purposes? Is the point simply that you can’t take rights from a whole group based on a undeserving minority?
Yes, I specifically avoid identifying groups who’s rights we can take away because once we do that it becomes very tempting, and very easy, to define anyone you dislike as belonging to such a group. One can quickly find themselves in Ray Comfort territory.
But failing to identify such groups, while permitting ourselves to take freedoms away from individuals (as you do here), isn’t clearly an improvement.
If I trust myself to evaluate individuals justly before depriving them of freedoms, it’s not clear to me why I don’t trust myself to evaluate them justly before assigning them to groups.
Conversely, if I don’t trust myself to deal justly with individuals I dislike, it’s not clear to me why I trust myself to deprive them of freedoms.
It seems to me that this problem is hard enough to require better tools than the ones you seem to be attempting to solve it with.
I think that it’s much harder to prove an individual’s guilt of a crime in a court of law than it is to assign someone to a group.
If I trust myself to evaluate individuals justly before depriving them of freedoms, it’s not clear to me why I don’t trust myself to evaluate them justly before assigning them to groups.
I really hope I don’t live in society where you can deprive someone of freedoms on your own for any reason. :) (or any one person, for the record—I don’t have anything against you personally). I advocate “individual guilt” over “group affiliations” as criteria specifically because it requires much stronger standards of evidence.
As the most egregious example of this—it would be very hard to prove Anwar al-Awlaki has done anything illegal. And yet he’s been condemned to death simply by having the president place him in the group “terrorist”.
So, I guess my hope has been shattered, actually. :( I meant that “I really hope” sentence more as an aspiration statement, really.
I agree with you that some people in the US are being deprived of freedoms without legal recourse because powerful people have declared them to have certain group affiliations, like “terrorist,” and that in many cases this is a mistake.
I also suspect that some people in the US are being mistakenly deprived of their freedoms in courts of law, despite nominal legal recourse, without any particular group affiliation being asserted, because powerful people desire it.
I’d say (90+% confidence) there’s at least an order of magnitude more people in the second group than the first.
At this point I think the discussion gets murky, because legal recourse is often intentionally biased and group affiliation is often implicit. The drug war comes to mind. I’d assert that there’s a lot of overlap and we could reduce the second group a great deal by strengthening popular support of universal rights.
I certainly agree that the group/individual distinction gets murky when you get into the specifics of how societies actually make the choice to grant and withhold freedoms… that’s why I was questioning the distinction in the first place.
I agree that if there were strong and pervasive support for a common understanding of what freedoms people are entitled to by default (which is more or less what I understand by “universal rights”), there would be fewer cases of people being deprived of those freedoms, all else being equal.
It’s not clear to me that all else can be equal, though.
It’s also not clear to me that encouraging everyone to support universal rights, without at the same time encouraging us to support a specific model of universal rights, is anywhere near as effective.
That’s a disturbing page in several ways, but I don’t see anything on it which implies actively violating anyone’s rights, unless you interpret security from proselytism as a fundamental right.
I used it as an example because a favorite tactic of Ray Comfort is to ask someone “Have you ever told a lie?”. Which is tantamount to asking “Are you a human?”. After receiving an affirmative answer he asks “Well, doesn’t that make you a liar? And god says no liar can enter heaven.”
It’s tricky for me to wrap my head around the logic of faith and repentance descended from Calvinism, but there’s some pretty clever Dark Arts in there. “Your salvation-state has been predetermined by God, and there’s nothing you can do about it—but God only assigns salvation to people he expects to join his church and believe really hard. Do you think you’re smarter than God?”
I wonder if Calvinists would be unusually disposed toward one-boxing on Newcomb’s Problem?
Maybe “violating” is the wrong word to use in this context. I would rather say that everyone has certain rights—such as freedom from imprisonment—conditioned on (for example) not violating other people’s rights—as in killing or assaulting them.
P.S. Also, societies deprive minors and the incompetent from some rights for their own protection. I don’t think we want to live in a world in which a slick salesperson could commit a ten year old or an advanced Alzheimer’s patient to an expensive fifty year contract.
And we also deprive everyday people of certain rights for their own protection: the right of free contract is limited. For instance, I can’t sign a contract with a clause saying that if I break it the other party has the right to my unpaid labour in perputuity. Similarly, I can’t sell my organs, at least in this country.
I find talk of rights is often very confused, with no one entirely sure what even they themselves mean by the term, much less the others in the conversation. It may be a good time to taboo the word.
The best explanation I’ve found for “right” that seems to apply in the real world is “an extremely strong aversion to punishing acts of X with violence”, which is based off the Desirist model. What that means in practice is that to assert that people have a right to freedom of movement is to say that everyone should have a very strong aversion to punishing free movement with violence. Sometimes a person’s right to free movement will be violated because “a very strong aversion” is not infinite for good reason. When there are enough counter-weighing reasons (the person is assaulting someone, or the person has committed a crime and taking away this freedom will prevent others from committing a similar crime in the future) then that person’s right is violated. But the reasons must be strong reasons, and provably demonstrated, in order to out-weigh a very strong aversion.
And it remains the case that the right still exists. Everyone should still have a strong aversion to restricting the movements of others, even as we acknowledge that in this one case we have enough countervailing reasons to violate that right for this person.
The best explanation I’ve found for “right” that seems to apply in the real world is “an extremely strong aversion to punishing acts of X with violence”.
I don’t think this definition conforms with what most people mean by “rights.” Assume an entirely nonviolent society. You try to vote. I throw your ballot away—nonviolently. What right do you have? I sell you a boat or a car or a house. You pay me money. I take the money and laugh in your face. Nonviolently. What recourse do you have?
Consider the example of criminal law. X has murdered someone. If X (predictably) resists imprisonment, I would say, use violence to subdue X. Would you not? X is in the group of humans who are “convicted criminals.” How does this conform with your original assertion that “When someone expresses doubts that a particular group of humans should be allowed certain rights they are attacking the concept of universal human rights in its entirety?”
This is not how the United Nations, for example, uses the term “universal human rights.”
I don’t see how any of those apply. In the first two, there are no rights on the part of the transgressor. No society recognizes a person’s right to throw away official ballots or to cheat others of their money, so there is no prohibition on using violence to prevent that. Rights never come into the picture at all, so I think we’ve had some miscommunication along the way.
In the third case, we use violence to subdue X not because he belongs to a group, but because we have determined (hopefully in a fair trial) that he has murdered someone. We now have strong enough justification to outweigh our aversion to taking away his freedom. The statement “We should always have an aversion to taking away freedom, but in this case we have important reasons to do so, and here they are” is not anywhere in the same category as “I doubt group Y should have a right to freedom”
On the one hand, a small part of me would like to discuss this further. On the other, I think this is becoming less relevant to the original post. Also—and this is critical for me personally—I’ve got some stuff to do in the real world now. I note that we cannot agree to disagree. But I gotta go. Best wishes (and I mean that totally sincerely, without sarcasm).
I think some of the confusion here might come from the fact that freedom from violence is often cast as a right—in which case we either have to make some awkward exceptions, or to draw an initiation/reaction distinction. This doesn’t seem like an insurmountable hurdle, though; societies frequently do both.
I’m surprised at your reaction. Let me illustrate my examples: for “minors,” think “five year olds.” For “incompetents” think “people in comas.” For criminals...well, just think about convicted criminals. You can’t seriously be arguing that criminals should never be punished. There is no society on Earth that does not restrict the rights of minors, convicted criminals, and adults who have been found mentally incompetent.
I’m not arguing that (see replies to Davids). But I also note that I am not a minor, convicted criminal, or mentally incompetent and therefore expect I may be biased. I certainly don’t trust everything I think, and I note that as long as I’m running on hostile hardware it can be in my best interest to follow certain rules proven to protect me against myself.
Of course you start with biases. We all do. But we seek to overcome these biases in order to become less wrong. So, I ask you, in light of the responses you have received, and as one aspiring rationalist to another: is it not true that some groups of humans must be excluded from rights that other humans have?
No. There may be good reasons for certain individuals to have their rights violated. Entire groups cannot be excluded from the rest of humanity.
I don’t think it’s sufficient to simply note “I may have these biases, and I should seek to overcome them”. This may make one seem less biased without actually changing anything. The rest of the tribe applauds your self-awareness and wisdom, and then continues to preferentially hire white people. Actually overcoming a bias means doing the work of imposing rules we find inconvenient. Rules like “I will not take leadership for the good of the tribe, even when it’s for the good of the tribe” or “I will not exclude groups of humans from certain rights, even when they should be excluded from those rights.”
I buy that human rights might well be an example of how ends don’t justify the means for humans. But what do you mean by ‘groups’. Criminals could be considered to be (maybe even defined as?) ‘individuals whose rights we’re justified in violating’.
It’s trivially true that you could identifiy a set of ‘individuals whose rights we should violate’. They’d also have common qualities such as criminality, insanity etc. So what defines a ‘group’ for your purposes? Is the point simply that you can’t take rights from a whole group based on a undeserving minority?
Yes, I specifically avoid identifying groups who’s rights we can take away because once we do that it becomes very tempting, and very easy, to define anyone you dislike as belonging to such a group. One can quickly find themselves in Ray Comfort territory.
But failing to identify such groups, while permitting ourselves to take freedoms away from individuals (as you do here), isn’t clearly an improvement.
If I trust myself to evaluate individuals justly before depriving them of freedoms, it’s not clear to me why I don’t trust myself to evaluate them justly before assigning them to groups.
Conversely, if I don’t trust myself to deal justly with individuals I dislike, it’s not clear to me why I trust myself to deprive them of freedoms.
It seems to me that this problem is hard enough to require better tools than the ones you seem to be attempting to solve it with.
I think that it’s much harder to prove an individual’s guilt of a crime in a court of law than it is to assign someone to a group.
I really hope I don’t live in society where you can deprive someone of freedoms on your own for any reason. :) (or any one person, for the record—I don’t have anything against you personally). I advocate “individual guilt” over “group affiliations” as criteria specifically because it requires much stronger standards of evidence.
As the most egregious example of this—it would be very hard to prove Anwar al-Awlaki has done anything illegal. And yet he’s been condemned to death simply by having the president place him in the group “terrorist”.
So, I guess my hope has been shattered, actually. :( I meant that “I really hope” sentence more as an aspiration statement, really.
I agree with you that some people in the US are being deprived of freedoms without legal recourse because powerful people have declared them to have certain group affiliations, like “terrorist,” and that in many cases this is a mistake.
I also suspect that some people in the US are being mistakenly deprived of their freedoms in courts of law, despite nominal legal recourse, without any particular group affiliation being asserted, because powerful people desire it.
I’d say (90+% confidence) there’s at least an order of magnitude more people in the second group than the first.
At this point I think the discussion gets murky, because legal recourse is often intentionally biased and group affiliation is often implicit. The drug war comes to mind. I’d assert that there’s a lot of overlap and we could reduce the second group a great deal by strengthening popular support of universal rights.
I certainly agree that the group/individual distinction gets murky when you get into the specifics of how societies actually make the choice to grant and withhold freedoms… that’s why I was questioning the distinction in the first place.
I agree that if there were strong and pervasive support for a common understanding of what freedoms people are entitled to by default (which is more or less what I understand by “universal rights”), there would be fewer cases of people being deprived of those freedoms, all else being equal.
It’s not clear to me that all else can be equal, though.
It’s also not clear to me that encouraging everyone to support universal rights, without at the same time encouraging us to support a specific model of universal rights, is anywhere near as effective.
Eek… Who writes this stuff? This is definitely the negative side of Christianity, although hopefully not an influential sect...
That’s a disturbing page in several ways, but I don’t see anything on it which implies actively violating anyone’s rights, unless you interpret security from proselytism as a fundamental right.
I used it as an example because a favorite tactic of Ray Comfort is to ask someone “Have you ever told a lie?”. Which is tantamount to asking “Are you a human?”. After receiving an affirmative answer he asks “Well, doesn’t that make you a liar? And god says no liar can enter heaven.”
It’s tricky for me to wrap my head around the logic of faith and repentance descended from Calvinism, but there’s some pretty clever Dark Arts in there. “Your salvation-state has been predetermined by God, and there’s nothing you can do about it—but God only assigns salvation to people he expects to join his church and believe really hard. Do you think you’re smarter than God?”
I wonder if Calvinists would be unusually disposed toward one-boxing on Newcomb’s Problem?
Maybe “violating” is the wrong word to use in this context. I would rather say that everyone has certain rights—such as freedom from imprisonment—conditioned on (for example) not violating other people’s rights—as in killing or assaulting them.
P.S. Also, societies deprive minors and the incompetent from some rights for their own protection. I don’t think we want to live in a world in which a slick salesperson could commit a ten year old or an advanced Alzheimer’s patient to an expensive fifty year contract.
And we also deprive everyday people of certain rights for their own protection: the right of free contract is limited. For instance, I can’t sign a contract with a clause saying that if I break it the other party has the right to my unpaid labour in perputuity. Similarly, I can’t sell my organs, at least in this country.
You’re saying some individuals should have their rights violated? What do you think a “right” is?
I find talk of rights is often very confused, with no one entirely sure what even they themselves mean by the term, much less the others in the conversation. It may be a good time to taboo the word.
The best explanation I’ve found for “right” that seems to apply in the real world is “an extremely strong aversion to punishing acts of X with violence”, which is based off the Desirist model. What that means in practice is that to assert that people have a right to freedom of movement is to say that everyone should have a very strong aversion to punishing free movement with violence. Sometimes a person’s right to free movement will be violated because “a very strong aversion” is not infinite for good reason. When there are enough counter-weighing reasons (the person is assaulting someone, or the person has committed a crime and taking away this freedom will prevent others from committing a similar crime in the future) then that person’s right is violated. But the reasons must be strong reasons, and provably demonstrated, in order to out-weigh a very strong aversion.
And it remains the case that the right still exists. Everyone should still have a strong aversion to restricting the movements of others, even as we acknowledge that in this one case we have enough countervailing reasons to violate that right for this person.
I don’t think this definition conforms with what most people mean by “rights.” Assume an entirely nonviolent society. You try to vote. I throw your ballot away—nonviolently. What right do you have? I sell you a boat or a car or a house. You pay me money. I take the money and laugh in your face. Nonviolently. What recourse do you have?
Consider the example of criminal law. X has murdered someone. If X (predictably) resists imprisonment, I would say, use violence to subdue X. Would you not? X is in the group of humans who are “convicted criminals.” How does this conform with your original assertion that “When someone expresses doubts that a particular group of humans should be allowed certain rights they are attacking the concept of universal human rights in its entirety?”
This is not how the United Nations, for example, uses the term “universal human rights.”
I don’t see how any of those apply. In the first two, there are no rights on the part of the transgressor. No society recognizes a person’s right to throw away official ballots or to cheat others of their money, so there is no prohibition on using violence to prevent that. Rights never come into the picture at all, so I think we’ve had some miscommunication along the way.
In the third case, we use violence to subdue X not because he belongs to a group, but because we have determined (hopefully in a fair trial) that he has murdered someone. We now have strong enough justification to outweigh our aversion to taking away his freedom. The statement “We should always have an aversion to taking away freedom, but in this case we have important reasons to do so, and here they are” is not anywhere in the same category as “I doubt group Y should have a right to freedom”
On the one hand, a small part of me would like to discuss this further. On the other, I think this is becoming less relevant to the original post. Also—and this is critical for me personally—I’ve got some stuff to do in the real world now. I note that we cannot agree to disagree. But I gotta go. Best wishes (and I mean that totally sincerely, without sarcasm).
I think some of the confusion here might come from the fact that freedom from violence is often cast as a right—in which case we either have to make some awkward exceptions, or to draw an initiation/reaction distinction. This doesn’t seem like an insurmountable hurdle, though; societies frequently do both.