I was just lamenting that the answer to “why truth” was not very well spelled out in Post 1. Of course EY is a step ahead of me.
The official answers: because we’re curious, because it’s necessary to get certain things done, and (more weakly endorsed) because it’s the right thing to do. I thought this recent remark
I admit that the original Less Wrong sequences did not heavily emphasize the benefits for everyday life (as opposed to solving ridiculously hard scientific problems).
from EY here was interesting. Did the focus on movement building and self improvement come later?
A couple of skeptical thoughts about those reasons:
Some people feel curiosity less often and less intensely than others, just as some people feel angry less often—why truth for the uncurious? Conversely it’s possible to sate curiosity by studying and accepting lies and not truths. Ron Hubbard and Saint Augustine strike me as very curious folks.
I can’t dispute the instrumental value of a rational approach to building airplanes. But the instrumental value of a rational approach to religion is less clear to me.
Some people feel curiosity less often and less intensely than others, just as some people feel angry less often—why truth for the uncurious? Conversely it’s possible to sate curiosity by studying and accepting lies and not truths. Ron Hubbard and Saint Augustine strike me as very curious folks.
I agree with this. The post annoyed me with how it treated curiosity as one of the main reason to seek truth, when there are so many better reasons, at least in the current era. My attitude toward curiosity is similar to the attitude that Eliezer expresses, for example, here toward intellectual competitivism. (See in particular the part where he says “I’m happy to accept my ignoble motivations as a legitimate part of myself, so long as they’re motivations to learn math”.)
I can’t dispute the instrumental value of a rational approach to building airplanes. But the instrumental value of a rational approach to religion is less clear to me.
Waste of time, money, and lives that could be devoted to useful things like science and rational charity. Could be justified by egoism if not for the potential for greatly prolonged lifespans/greatly improved lives from technology, but people aren’t egoists and religion prevents people from learning about exactly those benefits that destroy even the egoistic reasons.
I can’t dispute the instrumental value of a rational approach to building airplanes. But the instrumental value of a rational approach to religion is less clear to me.
It is difficult to estimate the instrumental value of anything when terminal values are unknown/unspecified.
If one starts with absolute certainly that a particular religion is true, then rationality may have little instrumental value with regards to religion for that person (except to help them realize that absolute certainty is problematic). On the other hand, if one is deciding whether to join or leave a religion, then epistemic rationality would likely be extremely useful in making the right choice.
I was just lamenting that the answer to “why truth” was not very well spelled out in Post 1. Of course EY is a step ahead of me.
The official answers: because we’re curious, because it’s necessary to get certain things done, and (more weakly endorsed) because it’s the right thing to do. I thought this recent remark
from EY here was interesting. Did the focus on movement building and self improvement come later?
A couple of skeptical thoughts about those reasons:
Some people feel curiosity less often and less intensely than others, just as some people feel angry less often—why truth for the uncurious? Conversely it’s possible to sate curiosity by studying and accepting lies and not truths. Ron Hubbard and Saint Augustine strike me as very curious folks.
I can’t dispute the instrumental value of a rational approach to building airplanes. But the instrumental value of a rational approach to religion is less clear to me.
I agree with this. The post annoyed me with how it treated curiosity as one of the main reason to seek truth, when there are so many better reasons, at least in the current era. My attitude toward curiosity is similar to the attitude that Eliezer expresses, for example, here toward intellectual competitivism. (See in particular the part where he says “I’m happy to accept my ignoble motivations as a legitimate part of myself, so long as they’re motivations to learn math”.)
Waste of time, money, and lives that could be devoted to useful things like science and rational charity. Could be justified by egoism if not for the potential for greatly prolonged lifespans/greatly improved lives from technology, but people aren’t egoists and religion prevents people from learning about exactly those benefits that destroy even the egoistic reasons.
It is difficult to estimate the instrumental value of anything when terminal values are unknown/unspecified. If one starts with absolute certainly that a particular religion is true, then rationality may have little instrumental value with regards to religion for that person (except to help them realize that absolute certainty is problematic). On the other hand, if one is deciding whether to join or leave a religion, then epistemic rationality would likely be extremely useful in making the right choice.