To me, both the original tweet and your reply seem to miss the point entirely. I didn’t sign this petition out of some philosophical position on what petitions should or shouldn’t be used for. I did it because I see something very harmful happening and think this is a way to prevent it.
Of course, anyone is free to look at this and try to judge it by abstracting away details and looking at the underlying principle. Since the tweet does that, it’s fine to make a counter-argument by doing the same. But it doesn’t mean anything to me, and I doubt that most people who signed the petition can honestly say that it has much to do with why they signed it.
To me, both the original tweet and your reply seem to miss the point entirely. I didn’t sign this petition out of some philosophical position on what petitions should or shouldn’t be used for. I did it because I see something very harmful happening and think this is a way to prevent it.
I think it is very important to have things that you will not do, even if they are effective at achieving your immediate goals. That is, I think you do have a philosophical position here, it’s just a shallow one.
I disagree with the position Callard has staked out that petitions are inconsistent with being a philosophical hero, but for reasons that presumably we could converge on; hence the reply, and a continuing conversation in the comments.
I think it is very important to have things that you will not do, even if they are effective at achieving your immediate goals. That is, I think you do have a philosophical position here, it’s just a shallow one.
I think the crux may be that I don’t agree with the claim that you ought to have rules separate form an expected utility calculation. (I’m familiar with this position from Eliezer but it’s never made sense to me.) For the “should-we-lie-about-the-singularity” example, I think that adding a justified amount of uncertainty into the utility calculation would have been enough to preclude lying; it doesn’t need to be an external rule. My philosophical position is thus just boilerplate utilitarianism, and I would disagree with your first sentence if you took out the “immediate.”
In this case, it just seems fairly obvious to me that signing this petition won’t have unforeseen long term consequences that outweigh the direct benefit.
And, as I said, I think responding to Callard in the way you did is useful, even if I disagree with the framework.
You signed the position purely out of instrumental concerns and any principles about petitions and how news organizations should or should not respond to them is entirely independent? Admitting that – even judged just instrumentally – seems counter-productive.
The relevant principle seems pretty clear (to me): of course people should be generally open to being swayed by (reasoned) argumentation, e.g. via petition – unless there’s some concern(s) that override it, like a principled pre-commitment to ignore some types of influence (for very good reasons).
You signed the position purely out of instrumental concerns and any principles about petitions and how news organizations should or should not respond to them is entirely independent? Admitting that – even judged just instrumentally – seems counter-productive.
Yes. My mind didn’t go there when I decided to sign, and, on reflection, I don’t think it should have gone there. I’m not sure if “instrumental” is the right word, but I think we mean the same thing.
I don’t think it is counter-productive. I think it’s important to realize that there is nothing wrong with supporting X even if the generalized version of supporting X is something you oppose. Do you disagree with that?
I agree that there might not be anything wrong with supporting a specific X without also supporting (or with opposing) all X in general. But that all depends on the reasons why you support the specific X but don’t support (or oppose) the general X. Why did you sign the petition but the general policy? (Also, what do you think the general policy is exactly?)
I don’t personally have strong feelings or convictions pertaining to all of this. I don’t want the NYT to publish Scott’s full legal name, but I don’t have any particular strong objections about them or anyone else doing that in general. I do oppose the specific politics that I think is motivating them publishing his name. I also don’t think there are any good reasons to publish his name that aren’t motivated to hurt or harm him.
I agree that there might not be anything wrong with supporting a specific X without also supporting (or with opposing) all X in general. But that all depends on the reasons why you support the specific X but don’t support (or oppose) the general X.
Well, in that case, I don’t think there’s much left to hash out here. My main point would have been that I think it’s a bad idea to tie your decision to a generalizable principle.
To me, both the original tweet and your reply seem to miss the point entirely. I didn’t sign this petition out of some philosophical position on what petitions should or shouldn’t be used for. I did it because I see something very harmful happening and think this is a way to prevent it.
Of course, anyone is free to look at this and try to judge it by abstracting away details and looking at the underlying principle. Since the tweet does that, it’s fine to make a counter-argument by doing the same. But it doesn’t mean anything to me, and I doubt that most people who signed the petition can honestly say that it has much to do with why they signed it.
I think it is very important to have things that you will not do, even if they are effective at achieving your immediate goals. That is, I think you do have a philosophical position here, it’s just a shallow one.
I disagree with the position Callard has staked out that petitions are inconsistent with being a philosophical hero, but for reasons that presumably we could converge on; hence the reply, and a continuing conversation in the comments.
I think the crux may be that I don’t agree with the claim that you ought to have rules separate form an expected utility calculation. (I’m familiar with this position from Eliezer but it’s never made sense to me.) For the “should-we-lie-about-the-singularity” example, I think that adding a justified amount of uncertainty into the utility calculation would have been enough to preclude lying; it doesn’t need to be an external rule. My philosophical position is thus just boilerplate utilitarianism, and I would disagree with your first sentence if you took out the “immediate.”
In this case, it just seems fairly obvious to me that signing this petition won’t have unforeseen long term consequences that outweigh the direct benefit.
And, as I said, I think responding to Callard in the way you did is useful, even if I disagree with the framework.
You signed the position purely out of instrumental concerns and any principles about petitions and how news organizations should or should not respond to them is entirely independent? Admitting that – even judged just instrumentally – seems counter-productive.
The relevant principle seems pretty clear (to me): of course people should be generally open to being swayed by (reasoned) argumentation, e.g. via petition – unless there’s some concern(s) that override it, like a principled pre-commitment to ignore some types of influence (for very good reasons).
Yes. My mind didn’t go there when I decided to sign, and, on reflection, I don’t think it should have gone there. I’m not sure if “instrumental” is the right word, but I think we mean the same thing.
I don’t think it is counter-productive. I think it’s important to realize that there is nothing wrong with supporting X even if the generalized version of supporting X is something you oppose. Do you disagree with that?
I agree that there might not be anything wrong with supporting a specific X without also supporting (or with opposing) all X in general. But that all depends on the reasons why you support the specific X but don’t support (or oppose) the general X. Why did you sign the petition but the general policy? (Also, what do you think the general policy is exactly?)
I don’t personally have strong feelings or convictions pertaining to all of this. I don’t want the NYT to publish Scott’s full legal name, but I don’t have any particular strong objections about them or anyone else doing that in general. I do oppose the specific politics that I think is motivating them publishing his name. I also don’t think there are any good reasons to publish his name that aren’t motivated to hurt or harm him.
Well, in that case, I don’t think there’s much left to hash out here. My main point would have been that I think it’s a bad idea to tie your decision to a generalizable principle.