I’m still not sure why you think that non-FOOV value systems would lead to mental problems, and would like to hear more about that line of reasoning.
I’m pretty sure I’ve over-thought this whole thing, and my answer may not have been as natural as it would have been a week ago, but I don’t predict improvement in another week and I would like to do my best to answer.
I would define “mental problems” as either insanity (an inability or unwillingness to give priority to objective experience over subjective experience) or as a failure mode of the brain in which adaptive behavior (with respect to the goals of evolution) does not result from sane thoughts.
I am qualifying these definitions because I imagine two ways in which assimilating a non-FOOV value system might result in mental problems—one of each type.
First, extreme apathy could result. True awareness that no state of the universe is any better than any other state might extinguish all motivation to have any effect upon empirical reality. Even non-theists might imagine that by virtue of ‘caring about goodness’, they are participating in some kind of cosmic fight between good and evil. However, in a non-FOOV value system, there’s absolutely no reason to ‘improve’ things by ‘changing’ them. While apathy might be perfectly sane according to my definition above, it would be very maladaptive from a human-being-in-the-normal-world point of view, and I would find it troubling if sanity is at odds with being a fully functioning human person.
Second, I anticipate that if a person really assimilated that there was no objective value, and really understood that objective reality doesn’t matter outside their subjective experience, they would have much less reason to value objective truth over subjective truth. First, because there can be no value to objective reality outside subjective reality anyway, and second because
they might more easily dismiss their moral obligation to assimilate objective reality into their subjective reality. So that instead of actually saving people who are drowning, they could just pretend the people were not drowning, and find this morally equivalent.
I realize now in writing this that for the second case sanity could be preserved – and FOOV morality recovered – as long as you add to your moral obligations that you must value objective truth. This moral rule was missing from my FOOV system (that is, I wasn’t explicitly aware of it) because objective truth was seen as valued in itself, and moral obligation was seen as being created by objective reality.
I’m pretty sure I’ve over-thought this whole thing, and my answer may not have been as natural as it would have been a week ago, but I don’t predict improvement in another week and I would like to do my best to answer.
I would define “mental problems” as either insanity (an inability or unwillingness to give priority to objective experience over subjective experience) or as a failure mode of the brain in which adaptive behavior (with respect to the goals of evolution) does not result from sane thoughts.
I am qualifying these definitions because I imagine two ways in which assimilating a non-FOOV value system might result in mental problems—one of each type.
First, extreme apathy could result. True awareness that no state of the universe is any better than any other state might extinguish all motivation to have any effect upon empirical reality. Even non-theists might imagine that by virtue of ‘caring about goodness’, they are participating in some kind of cosmic fight between good and evil. However, in a non-FOOV value system, there’s absolutely no reason to ‘improve’ things by ‘changing’ them. While apathy might be perfectly sane according to my definition above, it would be very maladaptive from a human-being-in-the-normal-world point of view, and I would find it troubling if sanity is at odds with being a fully functioning human person.
Second, I anticipate that if a person really assimilated that there was no objective value, and really understood that objective reality doesn’t matter outside their subjective experience, they would have much less reason to value objective truth over subjective truth. First, because there can be no value to objective reality outside subjective reality anyway, and second because they might more easily dismiss their moral obligation to assimilate objective reality into their subjective reality. So that instead of actually saving people who are drowning, they could just pretend the people were not drowning, and find this morally equivalent.
I realize now in writing this that for the second case sanity could be preserved – and FOOV morality recovered – as long as you add to your moral obligations that you must value objective truth. This moral rule was missing from my FOOV system (that is, I wasn’t explicitly aware of it) because objective truth was seen as valued in itself, and moral obligation was seen as being created by objective reality.