>You lack imagination, its painfully easy, also cost + required IQ has been dropping steadily every year.
Conversely, it’s possible that doomers are suffering from an overabundance of imagination here. To be a bit blunt, I don’t take it for granted that an arbitrarily smart AI would be able to manipulate a human into developing a supervirus or nanomachines in a risk-free fashion.
The fast takeoff doom scenarios seem like they should be subject to Drake equation-style analyses to determine P(doom). Even if we develop malevolent AIs, I’d say that P(doom | AGI tries to harm humans) is significantly less than 100%… obviously if humans detect this it would not necessarily prevent future incidents but I’d expect enough of a response that I don’t see how people could put P(doom) at 95% or more.
Well, as Eliezer said, today you can literally order custom DNA strings by email, as long as they don’t match anything in the “known dangerous virus” database.
And the AIs task is a little easier than you might suspect, because it doesn’t need to be able to fool everyone into doing arbitrary weird stuff, or even most people. If it can do ordinary Internet things like “buy stuff on Amazon.com”, then it just needs to find one poor schmuck to accept deliveries and help it put together its doomsday weapon.
>then it just needs to find one poor schmuck to accept deliveries and help it put together its doomsday weapon.
Yes, but do I take it for granted that an AI will be able to manipulate the human into creating a virus that will kill literally everyone on Earth, or at least a sufficient number to allow the AI to enact some secondary plans to take over the world? Without being detected? Not with anywhere near 100% probability. I just think these sorts of arguments should be subject to Drake equation-style reasonings that will dilute the likelihood of doom under most circumstances.
This isn’t an argument for being complacent. But it does allow us to push back against the idea that “we only have one shot at this.”
I mean, the human doesn’t have to know that it’s creating a doomsday virus. The AI could be promising it a cure for his daughter’s cancer, or something.
Or just promising the human some money, with the sequence of actions set up to obscure that anything important is happening. (E.g., you can use misdirection like ‘the actually important event that occurred was early in the process, when you opened a test tube to add some saline and thereby allowed the contents of the test tub to start propagating into the air; the later step where you mail the final product to an address you were given, or record an experimental result in a spreadsheet and email the spreadsheet to your funder, doesn’t actually matter for the plan’.)
Getting humans to do things is really easy, if they don’t know of a good reason not to do it. It’s sometimes called “social engineering”, and sometimes it’s called “hiring them”.
You have to weigh the conjunctive aspects of particular plans against the disjunctiveness of ‘there are many different ways to try to do this, including ways we haven’t thought of’.
To be a bit blunt, I don’t take it for granted that an arbitrarily smart AI would be able to manipulate a human into developing a supervirus or nanomachines in a risk-free fashion.
How did you reach that conclusion? What does that ontology look like?
The fast takeoff doom scenarios seem like they should be subject to Drake equation-style analyses to determine P(doom). Even if we develop malevolent AIs, I’d say that P(doom | AGI tries to harm humans) is significantly less than 100%… obviously if humans detect this it would not necessarily prevent future incidents but I’d expect enough of a response that I don’t see how people could put P(doom) at 95% or more.
What is your p(doom)? Is that acceptable? If yes, why is it acceptable? If no, what is the acceptable p(doom)?
I outlined my expectations, not a “plan”.
>You lack imagination, its painfully easy, also cost + required IQ has been dropping steadily every year.
Conversely, it’s possible that doomers are suffering from an overabundance of imagination here. To be a bit blunt, I don’t take it for granted that an arbitrarily smart AI would be able to manipulate a human into developing a supervirus or nanomachines in a risk-free fashion.
The fast takeoff doom scenarios seem like they should be subject to Drake equation-style analyses to determine P(doom). Even if we develop malevolent AIs, I’d say that P(doom | AGI tries to harm humans) is significantly less than 100%… obviously if humans detect this it would not necessarily prevent future incidents but I’d expect enough of a response that I don’t see how people could put P(doom) at 95% or more.
Well, as Eliezer said, today you can literally order custom DNA strings by email, as long as they don’t match anything in the “known dangerous virus” database.
And the AIs task is a little easier than you might suspect, because it doesn’t need to be able to fool everyone into doing arbitrary weird stuff, or even most people. If it can do ordinary Internet things like “buy stuff on Amazon.com”, then it just needs to find one poor schmuck to accept deliveries and help it put together its doomsday weapon.
>then it just needs to find one poor schmuck to accept deliveries and help it put together its doomsday weapon.
Yes, but do I take it for granted that an AI will be able to manipulate the human into creating a virus that will kill literally everyone on Earth, or at least a sufficient number to allow the AI to enact some secondary plans to take over the world? Without being detected? Not with anywhere near 100% probability. I just think these sorts of arguments should be subject to Drake equation-style reasonings that will dilute the likelihood of doom under most circumstances.
This isn’t an argument for being complacent. But it does allow us to push back against the idea that “we only have one shot at this.”
I mean, the human doesn’t have to know that it’s creating a doomsday virus. The AI could be promising it a cure for his daughter’s cancer, or something.
Or just promising the human some money, with the sequence of actions set up to obscure that anything important is happening. (E.g., you can use misdirection like ‘the actually important event that occurred was early in the process, when you opened a test tube to add some saline and thereby allowed the contents of the test tub to start propagating into the air; the later step where you mail the final product to an address you were given, or record an experimental result in a spreadsheet and email the spreadsheet to your funder, doesn’t actually matter for the plan’.)
Getting humans to do things is really easy, if they don’t know of a good reason not to do it. It’s sometimes called “social engineering”, and sometimes it’s called “hiring them”.
You have to weigh the conjunctive aspects of particular plans against the disjunctiveness of ‘there are many different ways to try to do this, including ways we haven’t thought of’.
How did you reach that conclusion? What does that ontology look like?
What is your p(doom)? Is that acceptable? If yes, why is it acceptable? If no, what is the acceptable p(doom)?