But what if you can’t make a good decision theory that works the same with or without MWI?
This contradicts the premise that MWI is untestable experimentally, and is only a Bayesian necessity, the point of view Eliezer seems to hold. Indeed, if an MWI-based DT suggests a different course of action than a single-world one, then you can test the accuracy of each and find out whether MWI is a good model of this world. If furthermore one can show that no single-world DT is as accurate as a many-world one, I will be convinced.
The fact that the universe apparently exists, and is apparently consistent with MWI, seems to indicate that an MWI universe is at least possible.
it is also consistent with Christianity and invisible pink unicorns, why do you prefer to be MWI-mugged rather than Christ-mugged or unicorn-mugged?
This contradicts the premise that MWI is untestable experimentally, and is only a Bayesian necessity, the point of view Eliezer seems to hold. Indeed, if an MWI-based DT suggests a different course of action than a single-world one, then you can test the accuracy of each and find out whether MWI is a good model of this world. If furthermore one can show that no single-world DT is as accurate as a many-world one, I will be convinced.
it is also consistent with Christianity and invisible pink unicorns, why do you prefer to be MWI-mugged rather than Christ-mugged or unicorn-mugged?