Does this apply only to humans, or are there also some non-human beings such that any amount of human suffering is preferable to accepting one of their deaths? Is there a clear cut-off, or is it possible that there could be beings for which some amount of human suffering would be worth more than the death of such a being?
Are there humans sufficiently brain damaged such that while their bodies are still alive, their minds are sufficiently poorly recoverable (even in theory) that the moral imperative isn’t as clear?
Is it ethically mandatory that we invent caretakers that can imprison all humans in padded rooms (or vats) for their whole lives whether they want this or not, to ensure that they can never trip over and bash their brains out?
How does this theory handles cases where death is inevitable, such as (say) universes in which total computation is finite?
Is a far enough divergence from a previous mental state, such that the previous one can’t even be approximated any more, equivalent to death of the previous person?
Interesting concept, I have a few questions:
Does this apply only to humans, or are there also some non-human beings such that any amount of human suffering is preferable to accepting one of their deaths? Is there a clear cut-off, or is it possible that there could be beings for which some amount of human suffering would be worth more than the death of such a being?
Are there humans sufficiently brain damaged such that while their bodies are still alive, their minds are sufficiently poorly recoverable (even in theory) that the moral imperative isn’t as clear?
Is it ethically mandatory that we invent caretakers that can imprison all humans in padded rooms (or vats) for their whole lives whether they want this or not, to ensure that they can never trip over and bash their brains out?
How does this theory handles cases where death is inevitable, such as (say) universes in which total computation is finite?
Is a far enough divergence from a previous mental state, such that the previous one can’t even be approximated any more, equivalent to death of the previous person?