If I’m still following the thread of this conversation correctly, the major alternative on the table is the behavior of the hypothetical economist, who presumably chooses to aggregate individual utilities via free-market interactions.
By what standard—that is to say, by what utility function—are we judging whether the economist or the naive-ethicist-who-aggregates-by-addition is right (or if both are totally wrong)?
I’m not sure there is anything (yet?) available for the naive-ethicist to sum. The economist’s argument, generally construed, may be that we do not know how to and possibly cannot construct a consistent function for individuals, the best we can do is to allow those individuals to search for local maxima under conditions that mostly keep them from inhibiting the searches of others.
In some sense, the economist is advocating a distributed computation of the global maximum utility.
It’s not clear that we can talk meaningfully about a meta-utility function over using the economist’s or ethicist’s aggregative functions. Wouldn’t determining that meta-function be the same question as determining the correct aggregative function directly?
In short, absent better options, I think there’s not much to do other than structure the system as best we can to allow that computation—and at most, institute targeted programs to eliminate the most obvious disutilities at the most minimal impact to others’ utilities.
These constructions deal in should-judgment, implying that the economist, the ethicist, and we are at least attempting to discuss a meta-utility function, even if we don’t or can’t know what it is.
Wouldn’t determining that meta-function be the same question as determining the correct aggregative funciton directly?
Yes.
Just because the question is very, very hard doesn’t mean there’s no answer.
Just because the question is very, very hard doesn’t mean there’s no answer.
Definitely true. That’s why I said “yet?” It may be possible in the future to develop something like a general individual utility function, but we certainly do not have that now.
Perhaps I’m confused. The meta-utility function—isn’t that literally identical to the social utility function? Beyond the social function, utilitarianism/consequentialism isn’t making tradeoffs—the goal of the whole philosophy is to maximize the utility of some group, and once we’ve defined that group (a task for which we cannot use a utility function without infinite regress), the rest is a matter of the specific form.
The meta-utility function—isn’t that literally identical to the social utility function?
Yes. The problem is that we can’t actually calculate with it because the only information we have about it is vague intuitions, some of which may be wrong.
I agree that correct aggregation is nontrivial.
If I’m still following the thread of this conversation correctly, the major alternative on the table is the behavior of the hypothetical economist, who presumably chooses to aggregate individual utilities via free-market interactions.
By what standard—that is to say, by what utility function—are we judging whether the economist or the naive-ethicist-who-aggregates-by-addition is right (or if both are totally wrong)?
Ah yes, there’s the key.
I’m not sure there is anything (yet?) available for the naive-ethicist to sum. The economist’s argument, generally construed, may be that we do not know how to and possibly cannot construct a consistent function for individuals, the best we can do is to allow those individuals to search for local maxima under conditions that mostly keep them from inhibiting the searches of others.
In some sense, the economist is advocating a distributed computation of the global maximum utility.
It’s not clear that we can talk meaningfully about a meta-utility function over using the economist’s or ethicist’s aggregative functions. Wouldn’t determining that meta-function be the same question as determining the correct aggregative function directly?
In short, absent better options, I think there’s not much to do other than structure the system as best we can to allow that computation—and at most, institute targeted programs to eliminate the most obvious disutilities at the most minimal impact to others’ utilities.
These constructions deal in should-judgment, implying that the economist, the ethicist, and we are at least attempting to discuss a meta-utility function, even if we don’t or can’t know what it is.
Yes.
Just because the question is very, very hard doesn’t mean there’s no answer.
Definitely true. That’s why I said “yet?” It may be possible in the future to develop something like a general individual utility function, but we certainly do not have that now.
Perhaps I’m confused. The meta-utility function—isn’t that literally identical to the social utility function? Beyond the social function, utilitarianism/consequentialism isn’t making tradeoffs—the goal of the whole philosophy is to maximize the utility of some group, and once we’ve defined that group (a task for which we cannot use a utility function without infinite regress), the rest is a matter of the specific form.
Yes. The problem is that we can’t actually calculate with it because the only information we have about it is vague intuitions, some of which may be wrong.
If only we were self-modifying intelligences… ;)