Rooney, where there isn’t any evidence, then indeed it may be appropriate to suspend judgment over a large hypothesis space, which indeed is not the same as being able to justifiably adopt a random such judgment—anyone who wants to assign more than default probability mass is being irrational.
I concur that Bell’s theorem is a terrible hypothetical, because the whole point is that, in real life, without evidence, there’s absolutely no way for Archimedes to just accidentally hit on Bell’s theorem—in his lifetime he will not reach that part of the search space; anything he tries without evidence will be wrong. It’s exactly like saying, “But what if you did buy the winning lottery ticket? Then it would have high expected utility.”
I don’t think that 50% is a distinguished threshold for probability. Heck, I don’t think 1 in 20 is a distinguished threshold for probability. The point of a binary decision space is that it is small and discrete, not that it is binary.
Rooney, where there isn’t any evidence, then indeed it may be appropriate to suspend judgment over a large hypothesis space, which indeed is not the same as being able to justifiably adopt a random such judgment—anyone who wants to assign more than default probability mass is being irrational.
I concur that Bell’s theorem is a terrible hypothetical, because the whole point is that, in real life, without evidence, there’s absolutely no way for Archimedes to just accidentally hit on Bell’s theorem—in his lifetime he will not reach that part of the search space; anything he tries without evidence will be wrong. It’s exactly like saying, “But what if you did buy the winning lottery ticket? Then it would have high expected utility.”
I don’t think that 50% is a distinguished threshold for probability. Heck, I don’t think 1 in 20 is a distinguished threshold for probability. The point of a binary decision space is that it is small and discrete, not that it is binary.