IAWYC, but I don’t think Aurini was necessarily making that mistake.
I read their comment as stating that, even when their “shut up and multiply” answer would or should be the same, people are wired to behave differently towards gambles when the stakes are higher. Not that they should, but that they do.
For example, my conscious dollars-to-utility function is nearly linear in small increments from my present position; if I had a 1-in-5 chance of turning $10 into $100, I’d go for it. However, my conscious (lives saved)-to-utility function is practically linear in small populations; but if I had a chance to gamble 10 lives against 100 at 1-in-5 odds, it would be psychologically more difficult to make the clearly correct choice. Or any choice at all; decisive paralysis is a probable actual outcome.
There are sensible evolutionary reasons for this to be the case, but it raises the question of what to do about it for people in positions of power.
IAWYC, but I don’t think Aurini was necessarily making that mistake.
I read their comment as stating that, even when their “shut up and multiply” answer would or should be the same, people are wired to behave differently towards gambles when the stakes are higher. Not that they should, but that they do.
For example, my conscious dollars-to-utility function is nearly linear in small increments from my present position; if I had a 1-in-5 chance of turning $10 into $100, I’d go for it. However, my conscious (lives saved)-to-utility function is practically linear in small populations; but if I had a chance to gamble 10 lives against 100 at 1-in-5 odds, it would be psychologically more difficult to make the clearly correct choice. Or any choice at all; decisive paralysis is a probable actual outcome.
There are sensible evolutionary reasons for this to be the case, but it raises the question of what to do about it for people in positions of power.