What is the rational significance (significance in the context of rationality) of a belief being rational or irrational if it has no correlation with rational or irrational outcomes?
[I qualify here that I am referring to some kind of theism which is consistent with, though not supported by, all empirical evidence.]
What is the rational significance (significance in the context of rationality) of a belief being rational or irrational if it has no correlation with rational or irrational outcomes?
[I really should qualify here that I am referring to some kind of theism which is consistent with, though not supported by, all empirical evidence.]
I’m not sure what you mean by rational or irrational outcomes; there are only outcomes that a belief predicts. If a belief predicts results identical to its own negation (that is, does not correlate with results at all), it is useless and can be safely culled by Occam’s Razor.
Also, the only theistic hypotheses thus far that have not produced poorer results than some non-theistic hypothesis are ones positing supernatural entities that either do not interact measurably with the universe or do so only in ways indistinguishable from random chance, neither of which is a particularly common idea among actual theists, so it’s something of a distraction to limit ourselves only to theistic beliefs that are not reflective of a typical theist.
If a belief predicts results identical to its own negation (that is, does not correlate with results at all), it is useless and can be safely culled by Occam’s Razor.
I believe that of the last 100 people I’ve friended on Facebook, at least one was conceived with a sperm cell originating from their father’s left testicle and at least one was conceived with a sperm cell originating from their father’s right testicle.
This belief does not correlate with results, and I agree it’s useless, but I don’t think it “can be safely culled by Occam’s Razor”.
so it’s something of a distraction to limit ourselves only to theistic beliefs that are not reflective of a typical theist.
When you defend an assertion X=Y, you must defend it for the most difficult case. I have no objections to the claim that most religious views are irrational.
When you defend an assertion X=Y, you must defend it for the difficult case. I have no objections to the claim that some religious views are irrational.
And I said above why even so the views would be irrational. Do you disagree that it is not rational to hold beliefs with no predictive power?
Do you disagree that it is not rational to hold beliefs with no predictive power?
Well, I did yesterday. What I mean is, I sat with that idea for a while and believed it the extent that it was convincing, but now I would like to challenge/test it more carefully.
So right now I am considering the hypothesis that it makes no difference to being rational if you hold certain beliefs, if they hold no predictive power.
I always feel uncomfortable with anything relying on Occam’s Razor: Occam’s Razor is meant to indicate the probability of something, it doesn’t have the power to decide things one way or the other. (For example the probability of picking a number from an infinite set is 0 -- not close to 0, but actually 0 -- but that doesn’t mean it would be impossible to pick a number from an infinite set if there was such a thing as an infinite set. I’m just not sure.)
What convinced me before, instead, was the argument that if there is no reason to believe something, then it is irrational to unnecessarily assume it. Now I am wondering if there could be any harm in doing so.
What is the rational significance (significance in the context of rationality) of a belief being rational or irrational if it has no correlation with rational or irrational outcomes?
[I qualify here that I am referring to some kind of theism which is consistent with, though not supported by, all empirical evidence.]
I’m not sure what you mean by rational or irrational outcomes; there are only outcomes that a belief predicts. If a belief predicts results identical to its own negation (that is, does not correlate with results at all), it is useless and can be safely culled by Occam’s Razor.
Also, the only theistic hypotheses thus far that have not produced poorer results than some non-theistic hypothesis are ones positing supernatural entities that either do not interact measurably with the universe or do so only in ways indistinguishable from random chance, neither of which is a particularly common idea among actual theists, so it’s something of a distraction to limit ourselves only to theistic beliefs that are not reflective of a typical theist.
I believe that of the last 100 people I’ve friended on Facebook, at least one was conceived with a sperm cell originating from their father’s left testicle and at least one was conceived with a sperm cell originating from their father’s right testicle.
This belief does not correlate with results, and I agree it’s useless, but I don’t think it “can be safely culled by Occam’s Razor”.
But in the interest of truth?
When you defend an assertion X=Y, you must defend it for the most difficult case. I have no objections to the claim that most religious views are irrational.
And I said above why even so the views would be irrational. Do you disagree that it is not rational to hold beliefs with no predictive power?
Well, I did yesterday. What I mean is, I sat with that idea for a while and believed it the extent that it was convincing, but now I would like to challenge/test it more carefully.
So right now I am considering the hypothesis that it makes no difference to being rational if you hold certain beliefs, if they hold no predictive power.
I always feel uncomfortable with anything relying on Occam’s Razor: Occam’s Razor is meant to indicate the probability of something, it doesn’t have the power to decide things one way or the other. (For example the probability of picking a number from an infinite set is 0 -- not close to 0, but actually 0 -- but that doesn’t mean it would be impossible to pick a number from an infinite set if there was such a thing as an infinite set. I’m just not sure.)
What convinced me before, instead, was the argument that if there is no reason to believe something, then it is irrational to unnecessarily assume it. Now I am wondering if there could be any harm in doing so.