This is a great post because it shows just how hard one has to stretch the meaning of “win” to find a way in which atheism always “wins.” In the example, it seems that Wedesday “wins” by remaining a Mormon, unless she just happens to place some kind of high personal value on metaphysical truth that can only be satisfied by holding the epistemically correct belief. There’s no reason why that should be for everyone, though—there’s a pretty strong case both for not caring at all about these questions, as well accepting one’s “default” view if it’s too costly to shed. Say Wednesday never becomes a philosopher, but instead, goes into business, or becomes a journalist, or a doctor. It’s difficult to imagine how the “less wrong” position of atheism would help her “win” in any of these endeavors, and, in all likelihood, the practical costs incurred by deconverting would swamp any marginal gains she’d get from changing her metaphysical stance on God.
I think people on LW are very hesitant to admit that their strong attachment to “true” metaphysical beliefs may have nothing to do with “winning,” but rather, could just be an idiosyncratic personal preference (which is perfectly OK).
Personally I would consider the debilitating sexist and sex-negative messages packaged with Mormonism to be a profound sort of losing in and of themselves, but that’s beyond the scope of this blog.
I agree that there is no reason atheists always “win”. Maybe becoming a theist while holding all other beliefs constant will be an improvement, but I don’t think this is a practical analysis. Ceteris paribus, Wednesday should stay Mormon, but the cognitive algorithms would make her stay Mormon are very likely to have detrimental effects on net.
human beings are capable of having domain and context-specific cognitive algorithms. preferring comforting but false metaphysical truths does not mean she will prefer (more than others) reassuring but maladaptive beliefs about her local environment. her incentives to believe in some fanciful anthropomorphized abstraction are of an entirely different type than her incentives to believe true or false things about the intentions and motives of those she will interact with professionally, say.
are theists more or less likely to demonstrate competence on card-selection tasks or other tests of rational belief formation?
I agree people are capable of partitioning. Theists likely do the same as atheists in emotionally disconnected circumstances like a card-selection task. But this doesn’t establish Wednesday is better off as a theist than as an atheist overall. And at least in the Mormon case, where decisions can be fully justified by “I felt good about it, ergo God endorses it”, I am willing to claim that theists are less likely to engage in something even as basic as cost-benefit analysis.
i did not say it established she was better off as a theist than as an atheist. i was merely pointing out that being a theist does not make anyone more or less likely (as far as i know) to believe things which are false about their local environment (beyond those things which necessarily follow from their beliefs, e.g., this priest sure is wise in the ways of the Lord! he must be wise about other things, too!).
do we have any data suggesting atheists hold more accurate beliefs than theists about phenomena that they experience firsthand?
This is a great post because it shows just how hard one has to stretch the meaning of “win” to find a way in which atheism always “wins.” In the example, it seems that Wedesday “wins” by remaining a Mormon, unless she just happens to place some kind of high personal value on metaphysical truth that can only be satisfied by holding the epistemically correct belief. There’s no reason why that should be for everyone, though—there’s a pretty strong case both for not caring at all about these questions, as well accepting one’s “default” view if it’s too costly to shed. Say Wednesday never becomes a philosopher, but instead, goes into business, or becomes a journalist, or a doctor. It’s difficult to imagine how the “less wrong” position of atheism would help her “win” in any of these endeavors, and, in all likelihood, the practical costs incurred by deconverting would swamp any marginal gains she’d get from changing her metaphysical stance on God.
I think people on LW are very hesitant to admit that their strong attachment to “true” metaphysical beliefs may have nothing to do with “winning,” but rather, could just be an idiosyncratic personal preference (which is perfectly OK).
Personally I would consider the debilitating sexist and sex-negative messages packaged with Mormonism to be a profound sort of losing in and of themselves, but that’s beyond the scope of this blog.
I agree that there is no reason atheists always “win”. Maybe becoming a theist while holding all other beliefs constant will be an improvement, but I don’t think this is a practical analysis. Ceteris paribus, Wednesday should stay Mormon, but the cognitive algorithms would make her stay Mormon are very likely to have detrimental effects on net.
human beings are capable of having domain and context-specific cognitive algorithms. preferring comforting but false metaphysical truths does not mean she will prefer (more than others) reassuring but maladaptive beliefs about her local environment. her incentives to believe in some fanciful anthropomorphized abstraction are of an entirely different type than her incentives to believe true or false things about the intentions and motives of those she will interact with professionally, say.
are theists more or less likely to demonstrate competence on card-selection tasks or other tests of rational belief formation?
I agree people are capable of partitioning. Theists likely do the same as atheists in emotionally disconnected circumstances like a card-selection task. But this doesn’t establish Wednesday is better off as a theist than as an atheist overall. And at least in the Mormon case, where decisions can be fully justified by “I felt good about it, ergo God endorses it”, I am willing to claim that theists are less likely to engage in something even as basic as cost-benefit analysis.
i did not say it established she was better off as a theist than as an atheist. i was merely pointing out that being a theist does not make anyone more or less likely (as far as i know) to believe things which are false about their local environment (beyond those things which necessarily follow from their beliefs, e.g., this priest sure is wise in the ways of the Lord! he must be wise about other things, too!).
do we have any data suggesting atheists hold more accurate beliefs than theists about phenomena that they experience firsthand?
Pretty doubtful, especially controlling for IQ and education...