Looking at the PhilPapers.orgsurvey of philosophers, the pattern of views in the main sequences can be predicted rather well with one heuristic: select the option that (religious) philosophers of religion disproportionately reject. Or, alternatively, the option most compatible with Dennett-style naturalism. Exceptions include one-boxing on Newcomb, and perhaps personal identity (which is somewhat tied up with transhumanism, but judged differently by philosophers of computing vs biology).
However, the conjunction of all of these naturalist-favored views has to be less plausible than any of its components. How much less plausible depends on how tightly interconnected these views are, and how much of our evidence pushes on that common core. I.e. to what extent do libertarian free will, moral realism with supernatural moral properties, non-physicalist accounts of consciousness, and so forth stand or fall together?
Looking at the PhilPapers.org survey of philosophers, the pattern of views in the main sequences can be predicted rather well with one heuristic: select the option that (religious) philosophers of religion disproportionately reject. Or, alternatively, the option most compatible with Dennett-style naturalism. Exceptions include one-boxing on Newcomb, and perhaps personal identity (which is somewhat tied up with transhumanism, but judged differently by philosophers of computing vs biology).
However, the conjunction of all of these naturalist-favored views has to be less plausible than any of its components. How much less plausible depends on how tightly interconnected these views are, and how much of our evidence pushes on that common core. I.e. to what extent do libertarian free will, moral realism with supernatural moral properties, non-physicalist accounts of consciousness, and so forth stand or fall together?