I’m sorry to see such wrongheaded views of frequentism here. Frequentists also assign probabilities to events where the probabilistic introduction is entirely based on limited information rather than a literal randomly generated phenomenon. If Fisher or Neyman was ever actually read by people purporting to understand frequentist/Bayesian issues, they’d have a radically different idea. Readers to this blog should take it upon themselves to check out some of the vast oversimplifications… And I’m sorry but Reichenbach’s frequentism has very little to do with frequentist statistics--. Reichenbach, a philosopher, had an idea that propositions had frequentist probabilities. So scientific hypotheses—which would not be assigned probabilities by frequentist statisticians—could have frequentist probabilities for Reichenbach, even though he didn’t think we knew enough yet to judge them. He thought at some point we’d be able to judge of a hypothesis of a type how frequently hypothesis like it would be true. I think it’s a problematic idea, but my point was just to illustrate that some large items are being misrepresented here, and people sold a wrongheaded view. Just in case anyone cares. Sorry to interrupt the conversation (errorstatistics.com)
I’m sorry to see such wrongheaded views of frequentism here. Frequentists also assign probabilities to events where the probabilistic introduction is entirely based on limited information rather than a literal randomly generated phenomenon. If Fisher or Neyman was ever actually read by people purporting to understand frequentist/Bayesian issues, they’d have a radically different idea. Readers to this blog should take it upon themselves to check out some of the vast oversimplifications… And I’m sorry but Reichenbach’s frequentism has very little to do with frequentist statistics--. Reichenbach, a philosopher, had an idea that propositions had frequentist probabilities. So scientific hypotheses—which would not be assigned probabilities by frequentist statisticians—could have frequentist probabilities for Reichenbach, even though he didn’t think we knew enough yet to judge them. He thought at some point we’d be able to judge of a hypothesis of a type how frequently hypothesis like it would be true. I think it’s a problematic idea, but my point was just to illustrate that some large items are being misrepresented here, and people sold a wrongheaded view. Just in case anyone cares. Sorry to interrupt the conversation (errorstatistics.com)
Do you intend to be replying to me or to Tyrrell McAllister?