When an agent in universe-defined-by-structure-A simulates, or models, or thinks-about, universe-defined-by-structure-B, they do not ‘cause universe B to come into existence’; there is no refcount attached to each structure, to tell the Grand Multiversal Garbage Collection Routine whether that structure is still needed. An agent in A simulating B is not a causal relation from A to B; instead it is a causal relation from B to A! B defines the fact-of-the-matter as to what the result of B’s laws is, and the agent in A will (barring cosmic rays flipping bits) get the result defined by B.
Suppose there are some cosmic rays, and A gets a bit wrong here and there, randomly. A is no longer simulating B, A is simulating B’. Further, assume that chaotic effects ensure that B’ soon radically diverges from B. Do you claim that B’ has an existence separate from the one A is giving it, that the “causal relationship” goes from B’ → A? Are you claiming that all possible mistaken simulations of all possible sets of physical laws somehow exist platonically?
It’s not clear to me what this system you’re describing gains you. What predictions does it cause you to make differently? (i.e., how does it pay rent?)
Are you claiming that all possible mistaken simulations of all possible sets of physical laws somehow exist platonically?
Inasmuch as a mistaken simulation of B is a simulation of “B plus the arbitrary law that ‘foo happens at time t’”, then yes, B’ exists platonically. Consider B = “x″ + x = 0, x(0)=x’(0)=0″, B’ = “x″ + x = δ(x-1), x(0)=x’(0)=0”. These are both coherent mathematical models; they model different things, but B’ still exists platonically. A cosmic ray could indeed make an ostensible model of B model B’.
It’s not clear to me what this system you’re describing gains you. What predictions does it cause you to make differently? (i.e., how does it pay rent?)
It’s observationally equivalent to the hypothesis of manifest reality, but strictly simpler (it removes unnecessary ontological elements, and converts uncertainty about physical law into indexical uncertainty). Like Many Worlds, really.
Inasmuch as a mistaken simulation of B is a simulation of “B plus the arbitrary law that ‘foo happens at time t’”, then yes, B’ exists platonically. Consider B = “x″ + x = 0, x(0)=x’(0)=0″, B’ = “x″ + x = δ(x-1), x(0)=x’(0)=0”. These are both coherent mathematical models; they model different things, but B’ still exists platonically. A cosmic ray could indeed make an ostensible model of B model B’.
Does your model differ from “Everything that could exist, does”? I can imagine setting up a simulator for a universe just like ours, except that every time a planet coalesces, it’s spontaneously replaced with a kangaroo. Does the fact that I can describe such a system imply (to you) that it actually exists? That without me even actually making a simulation of it, multitudes of kangaroos are each experiencing a few brief seconds of asphyxiation around their stars?
It’s observationally equivalent to the hypothesis of manifest reality, but strictly simpler (it removes unnecessary ontological elements, and converts uncertainty about physical law into indexical uncertainty). Like Many Worlds, really.
Does your model differ from “Everything that could exist, does”?
Not quite. Every mathematical structure (strictly, every syntactic language) that could exist, does (and causes its corresponding apparent physical reality to appear to exist) - so the kangaroos do indeed exist (and did so even before you thought of them). After all, how could you have an effect on the kangaroos merely by simulating them? (I maintain that the causal relation runs from the kangaroos to you, not the other way round).
It may well be impossible to devise an example of something that doesn’t exist (because, if we can think about it, it is modellable), but that doesn’t mean to say that things that don’t exist, um, don’t exist… I mean, {X : not exist(X)} need not be empty, it’s just that we can’t exhibit any of its elements. It might be provably empty, but I have no proof here and can’t imagine what form one would take.
Also, you have to be a bit careful about the causal relations; if you start thinking of them as one formal system modelling another, you get into Gödel-space. Hence the Syntacticism post; I think it’s accurate to say that one formal system models a quotation of another, but I’m not sure of that.
Suppose there are some cosmic rays, and A gets a bit wrong here and there, randomly. A is no longer simulating B, A is simulating B’. Further, assume that chaotic effects ensure that B’ soon radically diverges from B. Do you claim that B’ has an existence separate from the one A is giving it, that the “causal relationship” goes from B’ → A? Are you claiming that all possible mistaken simulations of all possible sets of physical laws somehow exist platonically?
It’s not clear to me what this system you’re describing gains you. What predictions does it cause you to make differently? (i.e., how does it pay rent?)
Inasmuch as a mistaken simulation of B is a simulation of “B plus the arbitrary law that ‘foo happens at time t’”, then yes, B’ exists platonically. Consider B = “x″ + x = 0, x(0)=x’(0)=0″, B’ = “x″ + x = δ(x-1), x(0)=x’(0)=0”. These are both coherent mathematical models; they model different things, but B’ still exists platonically. A cosmic ray could indeed make an ostensible model of B model B’.
It’s observationally equivalent to the hypothesis of manifest reality, but strictly simpler (it removes unnecessary ontological elements, and converts uncertainty about physical law into indexical uncertainty). Like Many Worlds, really.
Does your model differ from “Everything that could exist, does”? I can imagine setting up a simulator for a universe just like ours, except that every time a planet coalesces, it’s spontaneously replaced with a kangaroo. Does the fact that I can describe such a system imply (to you) that it actually exists? That without me even actually making a simulation of it, multitudes of kangaroos are each experiencing a few brief seconds of asphyxiation around their stars?
Well, it’s making me think, anyway.
Not quite. Every mathematical structure (strictly, every syntactic language) that could exist, does (and causes its corresponding apparent physical reality to appear to exist) - so the kangaroos do indeed exist (and did so even before you thought of them). After all, how could you have an effect on the kangaroos merely by simulating them? (I maintain that the causal relation runs from the kangaroos to you, not the other way round).
It may well be impossible to devise an example of something that doesn’t exist (because, if we can think about it, it is modellable), but that doesn’t mean to say that things that don’t exist, um, don’t exist… I mean, {X : not exist(X)} need not be empty, it’s just that we can’t exhibit any of its elements. It might be provably empty, but I have no proof here and can’t imagine what form one would take.
Also, you have to be a bit careful about the causal relations; if you start thinking of them as one formal system modelling another, you get into Gödel-space. Hence the Syntacticism post; I think it’s accurate to say that one formal system models a quotation of another, but I’m not sure of that.