Surely can’t be exactly what you mean, as exists(our Univese) and ¬exists(everything else) seems coherent if rather unlikely, and seems consistent at our present state of knowledge with ¬exists(infinite sets).
It seems your ‘exists’ concept is pretty much indistinguishable from ‘logically coherent’, and that that’s the whole point you’re trying to make—that we’re in no position to distinguish these, and should simply abandon the ‘exists’.
Surely can’t be exactly what you mean, as exists(our Univese) and ¬exists(everything else) seems coherent if rather unlikely
I would dispute this, on the grounds that my deductions in formal systems come from somewhere that has a causal relation to my brain—the formal system causes me to be more likely to deduce the things which are valid deductions than the things that aren’t. So, if I ‘exist’, I maintain that the formal systems have to ‘exist’ too, unless you’re happy with ‘existing’ things being causally influenced by ‘non-existing’ things—in which case there’s not a lot of point in asserting that ¬exists(infinite sets). A definition of ‘exists’ which doesn’t satisfy my coherence requirements is, I am attempting to argue, simply a means of sneaking in connotations.
Surely can’t be exactly what you mean, as exists(our Univese) and ¬exists(everything else) seems coherent if rather unlikely, and seems consistent at our present state of knowledge with ¬exists(infinite sets).
It seems your ‘exists’ concept is pretty much indistinguishable from ‘logically coherent’, and that that’s the whole point you’re trying to make—that we’re in no position to distinguish these, and should simply abandon the ‘exists’.
I would dispute this, on the grounds that my deductions in formal systems come from somewhere that has a causal relation to my brain—the formal system causes me to be more likely to deduce the things which are valid deductions than the things that aren’t. So, if I ‘exist’, I maintain that the formal systems have to ‘exist’ too, unless you’re happy with ‘existing’ things being causally influenced by ‘non-existing’ things—in which case there’s not a lot of point in asserting that ¬exists(infinite sets). A definition of ‘exists’ which doesn’t satisfy my coherence requirements is, I am attempting to argue, simply a means of sneaking in connotations.