Lots of warnings, and then it seems you don’t write the actual content, suggest that other people do it, and threaten to remove their examples if they go too far. Hm.
Okay, here are some ideas...
There are crazy people out there, reacting out of proportion. Triggering them on purpose is evil. But even without targeting any specific one—if you speak to a sufficiently large crowd, one of them is likely to hear you. “Only one person in thousand could understand it that way” sounds weakly from outside, if your audience is tens of thousands. (Problem is, you usually don’t grow audience to tens of thousands by speaking moderately.)
Even relatively sane people may have obsessions or phobias, which can be triggered.
Lying, especially when it is difficult to get evidence.
Providing technical knowledge to evil people who lack technical competence. (“Here is the blueprint for doomsday device. This expensive component can actually be replaced by Raspberry Pi.”)
Providing coordination to evil people who until now have been stopped or slowed down by coordination problems.
Now of course, many of these examples are problematic and can be abused. For example, 4 and 5 depend on your definition of “evil”—some people will be happy to use this as a label for any disagreement. Example 3 depends on what is truth. Examples 1 and 2 can lead to “heckler’s veto”. Which means, any of them can… and sooner or later will… be used to suppress harmless but inconvenient speech.
Upvoted for giving “defused examples” so to speak (examples that are described rather than directly used). I think this is a good strategy for avoiding the infohazard.
you don’t write the actual content, suggest that other people do it, and threaten to remove their examples if they go too far
Two things. First, the goal was to refute the claim that words can’t cause harm. I did not (intend to) suggest that others write examples in part because I feel concrete examples are a likely hazard, and in part because I was able to construct an argument without them.
Second, I’m confused about this “examples = content” thing. What’s that about?
But you didn’t refute the claim that words can’t cause harm. To do that, you’d have to provide examples, which you did not do. Given this, what is the substance of this post? I see none.
The idea that concrete examples of harmful words would be a “likely hazard” also strikes me as absurd. I could be convinced otherwise, but for that to happen, I’d have to see some… examples.
I disagree, I think Kithpendragon did successfully refute the argument without providing examples. Their argument is quite simple, as I understand it: words can cause thoughts, thoughts can cause urges to perform actions which are harmful to oneself, such urges can cause actions which are harmful to oneself. There’s no claim that any of these things is particularly likely, just that they’re possible, and if they’re all possible, then it’s possible for words to cause harm (again, perhaps not at all likely, for all Kithpendragon has said, but possible). It borders on a technicality, and elsethread I disputed its practical importance, but for all that it is successful at what it’s trying to do.
I agree that the idea that concrete examples are a “likely hazard” seems a bit excessive, but I can see the reasoning here even if I don’t agree with it: if you think that words have the potential to cause substantial harm, then it makes sense to think that if you put out a long list of words/statements chosen for their potential to be harmful, the likelihood that at least one person will be substantially harmed by at least one entry on the list seems, if not high, then still high enough to warrant caution. Viliam has managed to get around this, because the reasoning only applies if you’re directly mentioning the harmful words/statements, whereas Viliam has described some examples indirectly.
words can cause thoughts, thoughts can cause urges to perform actions which are harmful to oneself, such urges can cause actions which are harmful to oneself. There’s no claim that any of these things is particularly likely, just that they’re possible, and if they’re all possible, then it’s possible for words to cause harm
Without having an object level opinion here (I didn’t read the post and I only skimmed the comments), I note that this argument is incomplete. It may be that the set of “urges that cause harmful actions” is disjoint from the set of “urges which can be caused by thoughts which can be caused by words”.
Their argument is quite simple, as I understand it: […] It borders on a technicality, and elsethread I disputed its practical importance, but for all that it is successful at what it’s trying to do.
It’s worse than a technicality—it’s an equivocation between meanings of “cause”. In ordinary speech we do not speak of one thing “causing” another if, say, the purported “cause” is merely one of several possible (collectively) necessary-but-not-sufficient conditions for the purported “effect” to occur—even though, in a certain sense, such a relationship is “causal”—because if we did, then we would have to reply to “what caused that car accident” with “the laws of physics, plus the initial conditions of the universe”.
So kithpendragon proves that words can “cause harm” in the latter technical sense, but the force of the argument comes from the claim that words can “cause harm” in the former colloquial sense—and that has assuredly not been proven.
(And this is without even getting into the part about “large cascades of massive change” and “downward spiral of self destruction with truly unfortunate consequences” and such things, that can allegedly be caused by “what seems like a tiny thing”—a claim that is presented without any support at all, but without which the injunction that motivates the post simply fails to follow from any of the rest of it!)
How about a concrete example of a benign interaction? Suppose you’re sitting at a table having a meal with someone in your household. You look up and ask “Please pass the salt”, and they do so. I think most people would agree that your asking caused the salt to be passed because the conditions were right for it to do so.
The same can (and does) happen with less benign interactions. To stay in the abstract, threatening, coercion, and bullying come readily to mind. How many people have been threatened into doing terrible things? Or ordered by a superior? This kind of thing happens all the time.
I think most people would agree that your asking caused the salt to be passed because the conditions were right for it to do so.
I do not agree with that.
In the everyday sense of ‘cause’, you didn’t cause the person in question to pass the salt. They chose to pass the salt, after you asked them to do so. They could’ve chosen otherwise. (Indeed, it’s easy to imagine reasons why they would.)
How many people have been threatened into doing terrible things? Or ordered by a superior?
These are examples of causation by actions, not by words. The words in question communicate information about intentions and actions; but the actions (and/or threat/promise thereof) are what cause things to happen.
They might not pass you the salt. But they most probably will not unless you ask. The asking causes your dinner partner to at least consider passing you the salt, where the thought might not have ever come up otherwise. More simply, your words caused the thought in someone else that resulted in your being handed the salt. That’s as much cause as your releasing a catch causing the spring tension to be released and resulting in a lid opening.
You don’t need to actually follow through on a threat for it to be effective, someone need only believe that the threat is genuine. That constitutes a necessary condition and a linguistic trigger.
That’s as much cause as your releasing a catch causing the spring tension to be released and resulting in a lid opening.
A cause of the thought? Sure. A cause of the action? Certainly not.
You don’t need to actually follow through on a threat for it to be effective, someone need only believe that the threat is genuine. That constitutes a necessary condition and a linguistic trigger.
Actions are what cause people to believe in threats. The words communicate intent, they do not themselves cause ‘harm’ or anything else.
Maybe the issue is definition and we should taboo “cause”. I’ll also taboo “words” and “harm” while I’m at it. My core claim is that:
The purpose of symbolic language is to transmit ideas from one mind to another. In the new mind, the idea can prompt or set the stage for (sometimes strong) urges to arise. Humans acting on strong urges can be destructive in lots of ways.
The “core claim” you quote is actually several claims appended to each other, with the connections between them left as implicit additional claims. So when you ask if I disagree that “this” happens, I can’t answer in a binary fashion because you’re asking multiple questions, some of which are unstated (and which I have to infer, with the possibility of inferring incorrectly).
(This is very similar to one of the several ways in which your post itself is flawed.)
I will comment as I am able, however. So:
The purpose of symbolic language is to transmit ideas from one mind to another.
This can reasonably be said to be a purpose of symbolic language (certainly it’s not the only purpose, but it’s a big one).
In the new mind, the idea can prompt or set the stage for (sometimes strong) urges to arise.
I am not quite sure what you mean by “urges” (I can think of multiple possible sense of this word which might be relevant), but clearly you’re referring to some variety of mental states.
Mental states in general arise for various reasons and in various ways. Any given mental state may be capable of arising in any of a variety of ways, “triggered” or immediately preceded by any of a number of precursor mental states or external stimuli etc. Certainly ideas introduced by communication by another person is one possible type of such precursors or triggers.
Does this mean that the communicative act “caused” (“prompted” and “set the stage for” seem to be synonyms for “caused”, with, perhaps, variation in emphasis) the mental state in question? Maybe, maybe not. In the case of overdetermination, the answer would be “not”. (How common is that case? I don’t know. Fairly common, it seems to me.) In other cases, the answer is more ambiguous. It depends on the type of mental state, certainly. Whatever you mean by “urges”, it seems particularly unlikely that mental states that could be described thus (especially those which can reasonably be described as “strong urges”), would be “caused” (in a non-overdetermined way) by communicative acts of others.
[… here we have an apparent gap in the chain of reasoning …]
You jump from “urges” to “humans acting on” those “urges”. This seems like it needs more examination, to say the least. Most people don’t just act on whatever thoughts pop into their heads. Reflexive actions exist, of course, but I’m not sure you have those in mind. If I understand correctly the sort of mental states you refer to, they are such that acting on them, or not doing so, is a choice. People are quite capable of suppressing even very strong emotions, taking no actions whatsoever on their basis.
Humans acting on strong urges can be destructive in lots of ways.
This is literally true, but quite misleading in its implication that “strong urges” are somehow unusual or unique in being mental states which, when humans act on them, result in destructive behavior.
In fact people can be destructive in lots of ways regardless of the nature of the mental state or states which resulted in those destructive actions. A man may strangle a rival in a fit of rage, or strike down a pedestrian with his car while being distracted by a funny picture on his smartphone, or carefully orchestrate a murder while seething with bile and cold hatred, or calmly sign an order that sends thousands to their deaths while taking his morning tea. There is nothing particularly special about any of these mental states. It is simply easy to inflict pain and death and horror, if one is placed in circumstances that permit such actions.
While the commenter (above and below) did not appear satisfied with your answer, the idea of inverting is interesting—how can words cause the opposite of harm seems like something that can be safely established/with examples.
I’m sorry for coming off as particularly harsh in my warnings. I noticed early on just how easy it would be to accidentally fall into some really horrible speech on this topic. I just don’t want to end up with someone falling into the same trap I almost did, so I put up the orange cones.
Lots of warnings, and then it seems you don’t write the actual content, suggest that other people do it, and threaten to remove their examples if they go too far. Hm.
Okay, here are some ideas...
There are crazy people out there, reacting out of proportion. Triggering them on purpose is evil. But even without targeting any specific one—if you speak to a sufficiently large crowd, one of them is likely to hear you. “Only one person in thousand could understand it that way” sounds weakly from outside, if your audience is tens of thousands. (Problem is, you usually don’t grow audience to tens of thousands by speaking moderately.)
Even relatively sane people may have obsessions or phobias, which can be triggered.
Lying, especially when it is difficult to get evidence.
Providing technical knowledge to evil people who lack technical competence. (“Here is the blueprint for doomsday device. This expensive component can actually be replaced by Raspberry Pi.”)
Providing coordination to evil people who until now have been stopped or slowed down by coordination problems.
Now of course, many of these examples are problematic and can be abused. For example, 4 and 5 depend on your definition of “evil”—some people will be happy to use this as a label for any disagreement. Example 3 depends on what is truth. Examples 1 and 2 can lead to “heckler’s veto”. Which means, any of them can… and sooner or later will… be used to suppress harmless but inconvenient speech.
Upvoted for giving “defused examples” so to speak (examples that are described rather than directly used). I think this is a good strategy for avoiding the infohazard.
Agreed. Thanks, Viliam, for pointing at conditions instead of giving direct examples.
Two things. First, the goal was to refute the claim that words can’t cause harm. I did not (intend to) suggest that others write examples in part because I feel concrete examples are a likely hazard, and in part because I was able to construct an argument without them.
Second, I’m confused about this “examples = content” thing. What’s that about?
But you didn’t refute the claim that words can’t cause harm. To do that, you’d have to provide examples, which you did not do. Given this, what is the substance of this post? I see none.
The idea that concrete examples of harmful words would be a “likely hazard” also strikes me as absurd. I could be convinced otherwise, but for that to happen, I’d have to see some… examples.
I disagree, I think Kithpendragon did successfully refute the argument without providing examples. Their argument is quite simple, as I understand it: words can cause thoughts, thoughts can cause urges to perform actions which are harmful to oneself, such urges can cause actions which are harmful to oneself. There’s no claim that any of these things is particularly likely, just that they’re possible, and if they’re all possible, then it’s possible for words to cause harm (again, perhaps not at all likely, for all Kithpendragon has said, but possible). It borders on a technicality, and elsethread I disputed its practical importance, but for all that it is successful at what it’s trying to do.
I agree that the idea that concrete examples are a “likely hazard” seems a bit excessive, but I can see the reasoning here even if I don’t agree with it: if you think that words have the potential to cause substantial harm, then it makes sense to think that if you put out a long list of words/statements chosen for their potential to be harmful, the likelihood that at least one person will be substantially harmed by at least one entry on the list seems, if not high, then still high enough to warrant caution. Viliam has managed to get around this, because the reasoning only applies if you’re directly mentioning the harmful words/statements, whereas Viliam has described some examples indirectly.
Without having an object level opinion here (I didn’t read the post and I only skimmed the comments), I note that this argument is incomplete. It may be that the set of “urges that cause harmful actions” is disjoint from the set of “urges which can be caused by thoughts which can be caused by words”.
That’s a fair objection. I encourage you to look at the Appendix for some abstracted examples if you happen to find yourself interested.
It’s worse than a technicality—it’s an equivocation between meanings of “cause”. In ordinary speech we do not speak of one thing “causing” another if, say, the purported “cause” is merely one of several possible (collectively) necessary-but-not-sufficient conditions for the purported “effect” to occur—even though, in a certain sense, such a relationship is “causal”—because if we did, then we would have to reply to “what caused that car accident” with “the laws of physics, plus the initial conditions of the universe”.
So kithpendragon proves that words can “cause harm” in the latter technical sense, but the force of the argument comes from the claim that words can “cause harm” in the former colloquial sense—and that has assuredly not been proven.
(And this is without even getting into the part about “large cascades of massive change” and “downward spiral of self destruction with truly unfortunate consequences” and such things, that can allegedly be caused by “what seems like a tiny thing”—a claim that is presented without any support at all, but without which the injunction that motivates the post simply fails to follow from any of the rest of it!)
How about a concrete example of a benign interaction? Suppose you’re sitting at a table having a meal with someone in your household. You look up and ask “Please pass the salt”, and they do so. I think most people would agree that your asking caused the salt to be passed because the conditions were right for it to do so.
The same can (and does) happen with less benign interactions. To stay in the abstract, threatening, coercion, and bullying come readily to mind. How many people have been threatened into doing terrible things? Or ordered by a superior? This kind of thing happens all the time.
I do not agree with that.
In the everyday sense of ‘cause’, you didn’t cause the person in question to pass the salt. They chose to pass the salt, after you asked them to do so. They could’ve chosen otherwise. (Indeed, it’s easy to imagine reasons why they would.)
These are examples of causation by actions, not by words. The words in question communicate information about intentions and actions; but the actions (and/or threat/promise thereof) are what cause things to happen.
They might not pass you the salt. But they most probably will not unless you ask. The asking causes your dinner partner to at least consider passing you the salt, where the thought might not have ever come up otherwise. More simply, your words caused the thought in someone else that resulted in your being handed the salt. That’s as much cause as your releasing a catch causing the spring tension to be released and resulting in a lid opening.
You don’t need to actually follow through on a threat for it to be effective, someone need only believe that the threat is genuine. That constitutes a necessary condition and a linguistic trigger.
A cause of the thought? Sure. A cause of the action? Certainly not.
Actions are what cause people to believe in threats. The words communicate intent, they do not themselves cause ‘harm’ or anything else.
Maybe the issue is definition and we should taboo “cause”. I’ll also taboo “words” and “harm” while I’m at it. My core claim is that:
Do you disagree that this happens? If so, why?
The “core claim” you quote is actually several claims appended to each other, with the connections between them left as implicit additional claims. So when you ask if I disagree that “this” happens, I can’t answer in a binary fashion because you’re asking multiple questions, some of which are unstated (and which I have to infer, with the possibility of inferring incorrectly).
(This is very similar to one of the several ways in which your post itself is flawed.)
I will comment as I am able, however. So:
This can reasonably be said to be a purpose of symbolic language (certainly it’s not the only purpose, but it’s a big one).
I am not quite sure what you mean by “urges” (I can think of multiple possible sense of this word which might be relevant), but clearly you’re referring to some variety of mental states.
Mental states in general arise for various reasons and in various ways. Any given mental state may be capable of arising in any of a variety of ways, “triggered” or immediately preceded by any of a number of precursor mental states or external stimuli etc. Certainly ideas introduced by communication by another person is one possible type of such precursors or triggers.
Does this mean that the communicative act “caused” (“prompted” and “set the stage for” seem to be synonyms for “caused”, with, perhaps, variation in emphasis) the mental state in question? Maybe, maybe not. In the case of overdetermination, the answer would be “not”. (How common is that case? I don’t know. Fairly common, it seems to me.) In other cases, the answer is more ambiguous. It depends on the type of mental state, certainly. Whatever you mean by “urges”, it seems particularly unlikely that mental states that could be described thus (especially those which can reasonably be described as “strong urges”), would be “caused” (in a non-overdetermined way) by communicative acts of others.
You jump from “urges” to “humans acting on” those “urges”. This seems like it needs more examination, to say the least. Most people don’t just act on whatever thoughts pop into their heads. Reflexive actions exist, of course, but I’m not sure you have those in mind. If I understand correctly the sort of mental states you refer to, they are such that acting on them, or not doing so, is a choice. People are quite capable of suppressing even very strong emotions, taking no actions whatsoever on their basis.
This is literally true, but quite misleading in its implication that “strong urges” are somehow unusual or unique in being mental states which, when humans act on them, result in destructive behavior.
In fact people can be destructive in lots of ways regardless of the nature of the mental state or states which resulted in those destructive actions. A man may strangle a rival in a fit of rage, or strike down a pedestrian with his car while being distracted by a funny picture on his smartphone, or carefully orchestrate a murder while seething with bile and cold hatred, or calmly sign an order that sends thousands to their deaths while taking his morning tea. There is nothing particularly special about any of these mental states. It is simply easy to inflict pain and death and horror, if one is placed in circumstances that permit such actions.
While the commenter (above and below) did not appear satisfied with your answer, the idea of inverting is interesting—how can words cause the opposite of harm seems like something that can be safely established/with examples.
The article is rather vague but seems to imply/say that words alone can cause harm. Which is not the case in these examples.
I’m sorry for coming off as particularly harsh in my warnings. I noticed early on just how easy it would be to accidentally fall into some really horrible speech on this topic. I just don’t want to end up with someone falling into the same trap I almost did, so I put up the orange cones.
Your examples are well callibrated; thank you.