If we both agree as to what would actually be happening in these hypothetical scenarios, but disagree about what we value, then clauses like “patternists could be wrong” refer to an orthogonal issue.
Patternists/computationalists make the, in principle, falsifiable assertion that if I opt for plastination and am successfully reconstructed, that I will wake up in the future just as I will if I opt for cryonics and am successfully revived without copying/uploading/reconstruction. My assertion is that if I opt for plastination I will die and be replaced by someone hard or impossible to distinguish from me. Since it takes more resources to maintain cryosuspension, and probably a more advanced technology level to thaw and reanimate the patient, if the patternists are right, plastination is a better choice. If I’m right, it is not an acceptable choice at all.
The problem is that, so far, the only being in the universe who could falsify this assertion is the instantiation of me that is writing this post. Perhaps with increased understanding of neuroscience, there will be additional ways to test the patternist hypothesis.
the, in principle, falsifiable assertion that if I opt for plastination that I will wake up in the future with an equal or greater probability than if I opt for cryonics
I’m not sure what you mean here. Probability statements aren’t falsifiable; Popper would have had a rather easier time if they were. Relative frequencies are empirical, and statements about them are falsifiable...
My assertion is that I will die and be replaced by someone hard or impossible to distinguish from me.
At the degree of resolution we’re talking about, talking about you/not-you at all seems like a blegg/rube distinction. It’s just not a useful way of thinking about what’s being contemplated, which in essence is that certain information-processing systems are running, being serialized, stored, loaded, and run again.
Suppose your brain has ceased functioning, been recoverably preserved and scanned, and then revived and copied. The two resulting brains are indistinguishable in the sense that for all possible inputs, they give identical outputs. (Posit that this is a known fact about the processes that generated them in their current states.) What exactly is it that makes the revived brain you and the copied brain not-you?
Patternists/computationalists make the, in principle, falsifiable assertion that if I opt for plastination and am successfully reconstructed, that I will wake up in the future just as I will if I opt for cryonics and am successfully revived without copying/uploading/reconstruction. My assertion is that if I opt for plastination I will die and be replaced by someone hard or impossible to distinguish from me. Since it takes more resources to maintain cryosuspension, and probably a more advanced technology level to thaw and reanimate the patient, if the patternists are right, plastination is a better choice. If I’m right, it is not an acceptable choice at all.
The problem is that, so far, the only being in the universe who could falsify this assertion is the instantiation of me that is writing this post. Perhaps with increased understanding of neuroscience, there will be additional ways to test the patternist hypothesis.
I’m not sure what you mean here. Probability statements aren’t falsifiable; Popper would have had a rather easier time if they were. Relative frequencies are empirical, and statements about them are falsifiable...
At the degree of resolution we’re talking about, talking about you/not-you at all seems like a blegg/rube distinction. It’s just not a useful way of thinking about what’s being contemplated, which in essence is that certain information-processing systems are running, being serialized, stored, loaded, and run again.
Oops, you’re right. I have now revised it.
Suppose your brain has ceased functioning, been recoverably preserved and scanned, and then revived and copied. The two resulting brains are indistinguishable in the sense that for all possible inputs, they give identical outputs. (Posit that this is a known fact about the processes that generated them in their current states.) What exactly is it that makes the revived brain you and the copied brain not-you?