If continuing inner narrative is an illusion, and you find yourself in a simulation, then you could very well realize your dream of meeting a “the real Mickey Mouse.” If we can be accurately simulated, why not living cartoons as well? A lot becomes possible by getting rid of identity-related illusions.
If I’m already in a simulation, that’s a different story. A fait accompli. At the very least I’ll have an empirical answer to the burning question of whether it’s possible for me to exist within the simulation, though I’ll still have no way of knowing whether I am really the same person as whoever I am simulating.
But until I find a glitch that makes objects disappear, render in wireframe, etc. I have no reason to give simulation arguments all that much more credence than heaven and hell.
If continuing inner narrative is an illusion, and you find yourself in a simulation, then you could very well realize your dream of meeting a “the real Mickey Mouse.” If we can be accurately simulated, why not living cartoons as well? A lot becomes possible by getting rid of identity-related illusions.
If I’m already in a simulation, that’s a different story. A fait accompli. At the very least I’ll have an empirical answer to the burning question of whether it’s possible for me to exist within the simulation, though I’ll still have no way of knowing whether I am really the same person as whoever I am simulating.
But until I find a glitch that makes objects disappear, render in wireframe, etc. I have no reason to give simulation arguments all that much more credence than heaven and hell.
I was assuming the shattering of the illusion of continuing inner narrative made the question of “really the same” irrelevant/nonsensical.