Can you recommend an article about what is the difference between the simulation of a person vs. “really” reviving a person? Primarily from the angle of: why should I or anyone would consider someone in the future making a plausible simulation of us is good for “us” ? I am really confused about the identity of a person i.e. when is a simulation is really “me” in the sense of me having a self-interest about that situation. I am heavily influenced by Buddhist ideas saying such an identity does not exist, is illusionary. I currently think the closest thing to this is memories, if I exist at all, I exist as something that remembers what happened to this illusion-me. I see this as a difficult philosophical problem and don’t know how to relate to it.
Can you recommend an article about what is the difference between the simulation of a person vs. “really” reviving a person? … I see this as a difficult philosophical problem and don’t know how to relate to it.
Same here. My own attitude is that we do not currently have software for which the question of it being any more conscious than a rock arises, nor any route to making such software. Therefore I am not going to worry about it. While it may be interesting for philosophers, I relate to the problem by ignoring it, or engaging in it no further than as an idle recreation.
I view it from a practical viewpoint: Even if you believe the Buddhist view, that the self is an illusion etc. you still feel like you have a self for >95% of the time (i.e. whenever you’re not meditating). When you wake up in the morning you feel like you are the same person that went to sleep the evening before. On the other hand, a clone of you would not feel like it is you anymore than one identical twin feels it is the other. So ideally people in the future should create a person/simulation that feels like it went to sleep and woke up again when it “should” have died.
Problems arise mainly when you hit something that only partially feels like it is the same person. I’d say there is still a considerable range of possible people that are sufficiently similar that we say it is the same person, since there is also considerable variation in the normal functioning of human brains.
E.g.:
Human memory is quite inaccurate. Different people with only slightly different memories could be said to be the same people. This may actually go quite far, if we consider the effects of Alzheimer’s disease or other forms of amnesia.
Being heavily intoxicated can to an extent feel like being a different person. Personality and habit changes over the course of your life can make you a different person, we still say it is the same person.
I wonder whether it is possible to find some sort of “core” personality/traits/memories, such that we can say as long as it remains unchanged it is the same person. I suspect there isn’t, as it seems to be a gradient instead of a binary classification.
Can you recommend an article about what is the difference between the simulation of a person vs. “really” reviving a person? Primarily from the angle of: why should I or anyone would consider someone in the future making a plausible simulation of us is good for “us” ? I am really confused about the identity of a person i.e. when is a simulation is really “me” in the sense of me having a self-interest about that situation. I am heavily influenced by Buddhist ideas saying such an identity does not exist, is illusionary. I currently think the closest thing to this is memories, if I exist at all, I exist as something that remembers what happened to this illusion-me. I see this as a difficult philosophical problem and don’t know how to relate to it.
Same here. My own attitude is that we do not currently have software for which the question of it being any more conscious than a rock arises, nor any route to making such software. Therefore I am not going to worry about it. While it may be interesting for philosophers, I relate to the problem by ignoring it, or engaging in it no further than as an idle recreation.
I view it from a practical viewpoint: Even if you believe the Buddhist view, that the self is an illusion etc. you still feel like you have a self for >95% of the time (i.e. whenever you’re not meditating). When you wake up in the morning you feel like you are the same person that went to sleep the evening before. On the other hand, a clone of you would not feel like it is you anymore than one identical twin feels it is the other. So ideally people in the future should create a person/simulation that feels like it went to sleep and woke up again when it “should” have died.
Problems arise mainly when you hit something that only partially feels like it is the same person. I’d say there is still a considerable range of possible people that are sufficiently similar that we say it is the same person, since there is also considerable variation in the normal functioning of human brains.
E.g.:
Human memory is quite inaccurate. Different people with only slightly different memories could be said to be the same people. This may actually go quite far, if we consider the effects of Alzheimer’s disease or other forms of amnesia.
Being heavily intoxicated can to an extent feel like being a different person. Personality and habit changes over the course of your life can make you a different person, we still say it is the same person.
I wonder whether it is possible to find some sort of “core” personality/traits/memories, such that we can say as long as it remains unchanged it is the same person. I suspect there isn’t, as it seems to be a gradient instead of a binary classification.