Interesting idea: we support the underdog because if push came to shove we’d have a better chance of besting them than the top dog? There’s a similar problem I remember from a kids brainteaser book. Three hunters are fighting a duel, with rifles, to the death. Each has one bullet. The first hunter has a 100% chance of making a killing shot, the second a 50% chance, the third a 10% chance. What is the inferior hunter’s best strategy?
The normal answer (fire away from either) only works if we assume the other hunters are vindictive, rather than rational. If we assume they behave rationally, then the third hunter should target the best.
Sure, if you’re acting simultaneously
If you’re taking turns and you kill the best, then the mid-strength hunter will immediately fire on you. However if one of them shoots the other, then you’ll have the first shot against the remaining one.
Interesting idea: we support the underdog because if push came to shove we’d have a better chance of besting them than the top dog? There’s a similar problem I remember from a kids brainteaser book. Three hunters are fighting a duel, with rifles, to the death. Each has one bullet. The first hunter has a 100% chance of making a killing shot, the second a 50% chance, the third a 10% chance. What is the inferior hunter’s best strategy?
The normal answer (fire away from either) only works if we assume the other hunters are vindictive, rather than rational. If we assume they behave rationally, then the third hunter should target the best.
Sure, if you’re acting simultaneously If you’re taking turns and you kill the best, then the mid-strength hunter will immediately fire on you. However if one of them shoots the other, then you’ll have the first shot against the remaining one.
Yes, you’re right. Larks@2009 hadn’t studied any maths.