If I’m reading the link (thanks VincentYu!) correctly, your first impression was right. In the graduate class, total amounts earned were [1.95, 1.90, 2.15, 2.50] in that order for consecutive auctions. In the undergraduate class, [2.30, 2.05, 4.25, 3.50].
The number of people playing (bidding) did decrease (graduate: [5, 3, 4, 2], undergraduate: [6, 4, 3, 2]) in each round, but a selection effect is insufficient to explain the increase in total earnings, since there’s no reason these “selected” people could not have bid equally as much in the first round.
ETA: Note that this is a two-highest-bidders-pay auction, not all-pay, so the increase in total earnings does reflect an average increase in individual bids as well.
Unfortunately, the link seems broken. I would really like to see this study.
Great examples of game theory.
Considerung the evil plutocrat:
What happens if both parties vote “nearly” 50% yes? The bill would fail, and the money depends on rounding issues. In addition, the best solution for both would be a cooperation here. Reject the bill, share the money in some way.
If a party reasons that the other party votes 100% yes, the best option would be just some “yes”, and several “no” votes. The bill passes, but the party gets a better reputation. Therefore, we have no stable equilibrium.
What happens if both parties vote “nearly” 50% yes? The bill would fail, and the money depends on rounding issues. In addition, the best solution for both would be a cooperation here. Reject the bill, share the money in some way.
Indeed, the problem seems to assume that political parties are not the sorts of things that can learn to cooperate with each other against a common foe.
How on Earth?
Read as:
Right, of course. Selection effect.
I think what confused me was that I took that to mean the total amount of money earned, not per-person.
If I’m reading the link (thanks VincentYu!) correctly, your first impression was right. In the graduate class, total amounts earned were [1.95, 1.90, 2.15, 2.50] in that order for consecutive auctions. In the undergraduate class, [2.30, 2.05, 4.25, 3.50].
The number of people playing (bidding) did decrease (graduate: [5, 3, 4, 2], undergraduate: [6, 4, 3, 2]) in each round, but a selection effect is insufficient to explain the increase in total earnings, since there’s no reason these “selected” people could not have bid equally as much in the first round.
ETA: Note that this is a two-highest-bidders-pay auction, not all-pay, so the increase in total earnings does reflect an average increase in individual bids as well.
Unfortunately, the link seems broken. I would really like to see this study.
Great examples of game theory.
Considerung the evil plutocrat:
What happens if both parties vote “nearly” 50% yes? The bill would fail, and the money depends on rounding issues. In addition, the best solution for both would be a cooperation here. Reject the bill, share the money in some way.
If a party reasons that the other party votes 100% yes, the best option would be just some “yes”, and several “no” votes. The bill passes, but the party gets a better reputation. Therefore, we have no stable equilibrium.
Edit: Why does the site steal single line breaks?
The site uses Markdown for formatting—to add a line break to the end of a line, add two spaces at the end. Note the “Show help” button for more info.
Indeed, the problem seems to assume that political parties are not the sorts of things that can learn to cooperate with each other against a common foe.
Google HTML version.
I can’t answer why, but you can prevent that by putting two extra spaces at the end of the line before a single line break (more details).