I’d like to take a break from LW’s tradition of simply down voting and ignoring questions.
Asking to prove if we suffer is like asking us to prove that we ask questions. We point at the experience and say “this is suffering” or “this is the act of asking the question”.
Yes and that works reasonably well for most humans, since we grow up assuming that other humans work similarly to us. But as soon as you ask whether an animal or a computer program or a fetus suffers, intuition stops being very reliable.
Consider:
A) A life-like humanoid robot with a relatively simple control program that makes pained faces and says “ouch” in response to certain stimuli.
B) An uploaded human who is experiencing simulated torture.
C) An actual biological human whose motor nerves have been paralyzed, being tortured. The subject’s face and breathing are placid.
Which of these would a casual outside observer believe were experiencing suffering? How would an expert convince the casual observer otherwise?
Asking a question is an exterior act. It can be objectively verified. I don’t see how that is analogous to suffering. Asking a question is not a qualia.
Actually, chickens can retaliate against those that make them suffer. If they don’t like how they’re being treated, they can run away. So farmers have to either make sure the chickens like how they’re being treated, or make sure to have good fencing. The reason we don’t have contracts with chickens is because chickens don’t have the intelligence to form contracts.
So farmers have to either make sure the chickens like how they’re being treated, or make sure to have good fencing.
It has most likely been easier to accomplish some form of the latter than the former since we first domesticated them. Of course, being kept in fences would be a huge step up for modern farmed chickens.
You suggest that since its possible to mimic pain, it’s impossible to tell if pain is genuine by the signs it leaves, yes?
But that’s giving up rather early. Mimicry is imperfect, in that there is no such thing as an entity which is the same in every way as every other entity, except for having to mimic the feeling of suffering. We can look at people with anti social personality disorder, and notice that, while they do feel pain, lack any feeling of grief, shame or regret. And yet they do mimic the feelings well, other traits betray them, such as impulsiveness, frustration and boredom.
You say a parrot can be trained to say “That makes me sad”, but parrots will also have a physiological signs of suffering.
I can prove to myself that I suffer. I can prove to myself that other people suffer by a preponderance of the evidence, but not in a deductive fashion.
Can you suffer? Can you prove it?
I’d like to take a break from LW’s tradition of simply down voting and ignoring questions.
Asking to prove if we suffer is like asking us to prove that we ask questions. We point at the experience and say “this is suffering” or “this is the act of asking the question”.
Yes and that works reasonably well for most humans, since we grow up assuming that other humans work similarly to us. But as soon as you ask whether an animal or a computer program or a fetus suffers, intuition stops being very reliable.
Consider:
A) A life-like humanoid robot with a relatively simple control program that makes pained faces and says “ouch” in response to certain stimuli.
B) An uploaded human who is experiencing simulated torture.
C) An actual biological human whose motor nerves have been paralyzed, being tortured. The subject’s face and breathing are placid.
Which of these would a casual outside observer believe were experiencing suffering? How would an expert convince the casual observer otherwise?
But this wasn’t the question he asked. He asked if
A) I could suffer
B) I could prove it
To answer your question, I’ll just lazily say that it requires The Hard Problem to be solved first.
Asking a question is an exterior act. It can be objectively verified. I don’t see how that is analogous to suffering. Asking a question is not a qualia.
You can program a simple robot to point at something and say “this is suffering”. Or teach a parrot to say it.
This is not the question you asked.
It was a rhetorical question. You can’t prove you can suffer, because suffering is a qualia.
What you can prove is you have the means to retaliate against people who make you suffer. While a chicken can’t.
And thus a social contract of was eventually created between people, but not between people and chickens.
Actually, chickens can retaliate against those that make them suffer. If they don’t like how they’re being treated, they can run away. So farmers have to either make sure the chickens like how they’re being treated, or make sure to have good fencing. The reason we don’t have contracts with chickens is because chickens don’t have the intelligence to form contracts.
It has most likely been easier to accomplish some form of the latter than the former since we first domesticated them. Of course, being kept in fences would be a huge step up for modern farmed chickens.
You suggest that since its possible to mimic pain, it’s impossible to tell if pain is genuine by the signs it leaves, yes?
But that’s giving up rather early. Mimicry is imperfect, in that there is no such thing as an entity which is the same in every way as every other entity, except for having to mimic the feeling of suffering. We can look at people with anti social personality disorder, and notice that, while they do feel pain, lack any feeling of grief, shame or regret. And yet they do mimic the feelings well, other traits betray them, such as impulsiveness, frustration and boredom.
You say a parrot can be trained to say “That makes me sad”, but parrots will also have a physiological signs of suffering.
Suffering, not pain.
And?
I can prove to myself that I suffer. I can prove to myself that other people suffer by a preponderance of the evidence, but not in a deductive fashion.