I’d argue that in game theory, cooperation is an arbitrary label placed on the rows/columns that the researcher wants to bias the reader for. In some cases, it’s used to indicate the rows which are greater total payout even with lower individual payout for some, again as a bias inducer rather than as a defined term which is part of the analysis.
Regardless, the original post is correct in it’s use. “cooperation” can be among a subgroup, even if it’s antagonistic or lower-value to other subgroups or the naive sum of the whole.
I mean, this isn’t a big deal either way, but I suspect that the exposure of the median LWer to game theory consists primarily of the prisoner’s dilemma, where “cooperate” is the standard name for one of the two actions.
Regardless, the original post is correct in it’s use. “cooperation” can be among a subgroup, even if it’s antagonistic or lower-value to other subgroups or the naive sum of the whole.
I also wondered something like this when reading, but this felt like a bad reason to use the term. But, well, it really just comes down to what you associate with the term.
I think that’s a weird take. A cooperation game typically has actions where you lose, but others gain more (whatever actions others take). Prisoner’s Dilemmas and public goods games are simple examples. The only wrinkle is “what counts as more” if you take seriously the idea that utility is non-comparable across persons. But a weaker criterion is just “everyone would be better off if everyone cooperated”, which again the PD and public goods games satisfy.
You’re right. I didn’t distinguish between the two concepts, because I think cooperation in the colloquial sense – working together for a shared goal – typically involves elements of both.
At its simplest, the internet makes communication easier, especially public communication. That should certainly help to solve coordination problems. It’ll also help solve cooperation problems insofar as (1) communication shapes preferences; (2) people are susceptible to social norms, and communication helps to spread norms, clarify them and make them salient; (3) people can coordinate on structures which enforce cooperation, e.g. punishment for non-cooperators. Examples of (3) might be non-cooperators getting “cancelled”, or e.g. consumer boycotts of firms who exploit labour unethically. And of course, points 1-3 can all also be (ab)used to enable bad kinds of cooperation.
Isn’t this more about coordination rather than cooperation? In game theory, cooperation is specifically about doing a nice thing for someone else.
I’d argue that in game theory, cooperation is an arbitrary label placed on the rows/columns that the researcher wants to bias the reader for. In some cases, it’s used to indicate the rows which are greater total payout even with lower individual payout for some, again as a bias inducer rather than as a defined term which is part of the analysis.
Regardless, the original post is correct in it’s use. “cooperation” can be among a subgroup, even if it’s antagonistic or lower-value to other subgroups or the naive sum of the whole.
I mean, this isn’t a big deal either way, but I suspect that the exposure of the median LWer to game theory consists primarily of the prisoner’s dilemma, where “cooperate” is the standard name for one of the two actions.
I also wondered something like this when reading, but this felt like a bad reason to use the term. But, well, it really just comes down to what you associate with the term.
I think that’s a weird take. A cooperation game typically has actions where you lose, but others gain more (whatever actions others take). Prisoner’s Dilemmas and public goods games are simple examples. The only wrinkle is “what counts as more” if you take seriously the idea that utility is non-comparable across persons. But a weaker criterion is just “everyone would be better off if everyone cooperated”, which again the PD and public goods games satisfy.
You’re right. I didn’t distinguish between the two concepts, because I think cooperation in the colloquial sense – working together for a shared goal – typically involves elements of both.
At its simplest, the internet makes communication easier, especially public communication. That should certainly help to solve coordination problems. It’ll also help solve cooperation problems insofar as (1) communication shapes preferences; (2) people are susceptible to social norms, and communication helps to spread norms, clarify them and make them salient; (3) people can coordinate on structures which enforce cooperation, e.g. punishment for non-cooperators. Examples of (3) might be non-cooperators getting “cancelled”, or e.g. consumer boycotts of firms who exploit labour unethically. And of course, points 1-3 can all also be (ab)used to enable bad kinds of cooperation.