Physics can explain the epistemic component in your brain
Physics can’t say what an epistemic component is. Physics says what particle configurations have more amplitude given a starting state. You can define a bridge law that says “epistemic component = this particle configuration”. But that’s you doing the bridging, not physics. In doing this bridging you are doing cognition about mental processes (“epistemic components”). You’d have to derive/justify/etc whatever theory you’re using for the bridging by relating the mental to the physical.
If you take that data to be the red brain process, that can be explained purely materialistically.
This justificatory chain is not well-founded. Saying “my observations = brain processes” only makes sense if I can conceptualize physics and believe in it (otherwise, how do I know what a brain process is or think it is identical with my observations?). So as a justification for physics, it’s circular.
Here’s a brief statement of my position. “Why believe in physics? Because it explains observations. Whose observations? Those of whoever is considering believing in physics.” Epistemically, these observations can’t be considered “already-physical”, that’s assuming the conclusion.
Insofar as the epistemic component consists of logic, physics can’t say what that logic is ontologically. On the other hand, it can describe how brain states are linked to physical states, which should be sufficient to explain materialistic-observations.
That said, I agree that starting with subjective experience as our initial foundations is in one sense more empirical than starting with the external world as we can derive the external world’s existence from patterns in subjective experience.
Physics doesn’t say what shoppingcentres are..there a difference between being unable to solve a problem in principle , and leaving details to be filled in.
Epistemically, these observations can’t be considered “already-physical”, that’s assuming the conclusion
You also shouldn’t assume they are non physical. In fact, observers and observations can be treated in a neutral way that doesn’t beg any metaphysical questions.
Physics can’t say what an epistemic component is. Physics says what particle configurations have more amplitude given a starting state. You can define a bridge law that says “epistemic component = this particle configuration”. But that’s you doing the bridging, not physics. In doing this bridging you are doing cognition about mental processes (“epistemic components”). You’d have to derive/justify/etc whatever theory you’re using for the bridging by relating the mental to the physical.
This justificatory chain is not well-founded. Saying “my observations = brain processes” only makes sense if I can conceptualize physics and believe in it (otherwise, how do I know what a brain process is or think it is identical with my observations?). So as a justification for physics, it’s circular.
Here’s a brief statement of my position. “Why believe in physics? Because it explains observations. Whose observations? Those of whoever is considering believing in physics.” Epistemically, these observations can’t be considered “already-physical”, that’s assuming the conclusion.
Insofar as the epistemic component consists of logic, physics can’t say what that logic is ontologically. On the other hand, it can describe how brain states are linked to physical states, which should be sufficient to explain materialistic-observations.
Circularity is inevitable (I like the arguments in Where Recursive Justification Hits Bottom), so this isn’t as problematic as it seems.
That said, I agree that starting with subjective experience as our initial foundations is in one sense more empirical than starting with the external world as we can derive the external world’s existence from patterns in subjective experience.
Physics doesn’t say what shoppingcentres are..there a difference between being unable to solve a problem in principle , and leaving details to be filled in.
You also shouldn’t assume they are non physical. In fact, observers and observations can be treated in a neutral way that doesn’t beg any metaphysical questions.