Well, and did we ever “discover [our] mistake”? Is that a thing that happened? Did Bayes fail, and consequently “go out the window”? Did the label of “rationality” ever get reassigned, to something other than “Bayescraft”? When did any of this take place?
This is sort of hard to answer, because I want to be clear that I don’t think Bayes-as-fact or Bayes-as-lens failed; the thing that I think changed is Bayes-as-growth-edge went from likely to unlikely. This is the thing you would expect if Bayes is less rich and complicated than ‘the whole universe’; eventually you grok it and your ‘growth edge’ of mistakes to correct moves somewhere else, with the lens of Bayes following you there.
I also think it’s important that Eliezer mostly doesn’t work on rationality things anymore, most of the technically minded rationalists I know have their noses to the grindstone (in one sense or another), and the continued development of rationality is mostly done by orgs like CFAR and individuals like Scott Alexander, and I don’t think they’ve found the direct reference to Bayes to be particularly useful for any of their goals (while I do think they’ve found habits of mind inspired by Bayes to be useful, as discussed in the parallel branch).
Edit: I do think it’s somewhat surprising that the best pedagogical path CFAR has found doesn’t route through Bayes, but the right thing to do here seems to be to update on evidence. ;)
This is sort of hard to answer, because I want to be clear that I don’t think Bayes-as-fact or Bayes-as-lens failed; the thing that I think changed is Bayes-as-growth-edge went from likely to unlikely. This is the thing you would expect if Bayes is less rich and complicated than ‘the whole universe’; eventually you grok it and your ‘growth edge’ of mistakes to correct moves somewhere else, with the lens of Bayes following you there.
I also think it’s important that Eliezer mostly doesn’t work on rationality things anymore, most of the technically minded rationalists I know have their noses to the grindstone (in one sense or another), and the continued development of rationality is mostly done by orgs like CFAR and individuals like Scott Alexander, and I don’t think they’ve found the direct reference to Bayes to be particularly useful for any of their goals (while I do think they’ve found habits of mind inspired by Bayes to be useful, as discussed in the parallel branch).
Edit: I do think it’s somewhat surprising that the best pedagogical path CFAR has found doesn’t route through Bayes, but the right thing to do here seems to be to update on evidence. ;)