Well, now I 1. am embarrassed at my lack of historical knowledge and 2. am befuddled about how it was possible for something so huge and sweeping and seemingly idealistic to actually get implemented. Like, I cannot imagine America ever doing something like that. (Partly because it already is a democracy, partly because everyone in the government is corrupt and inept.)
Understanding some background is necessary to realize the importance of the recipients of this letter. The Central Committee of the CPSU, Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR had overlapping membership and would have contained practically everyone of serious authority in the Soviet Union.
And since they were, theoretically, supposed to represent every major group, if they approved a course of action there shouldn’t have been any internal forces capable of derailing the plan.
Like spending vast resources on an even more sophisticated version of the Space Shuttle in the waning days of their country just because they couldn’t figure out why the Americans made something so obviously inefficient and thus must have had some secret, nefarious, purpose, and therefore required a Soviet response.
Or spending incredible amounts on weapon systems to counter the mostly paper SDI projects that some smart folks in the Reagan Administration dreamed up. They even launched a demo version of their orbiting laser battlestation. At a time when shortages of consumer goods became the norm...
Naturally, since these projects were done under the tightest secrecy, the common people had difficulty figuring out why the ostensibly mighty Soviet economy with such a huge industrial base couldn’t even keep sausages in stock and so became ever more skeptical.
Since the true details of the black budget in the US are mysterious to me as well, I’d rather not speculate.
But here’s an anecdote involving Kosygin about how detached politics and economics can become, even if everyone of high authority in the country are literally on the same committee. Which may partially answer your question.
“I would say that he [Kosygin] was a man who wanted to engage not in politics, but only in economics. He didn’t like Khrushchev, he didn’t like Brezhnev very much. When I asked him about the program of transition to communism by the year 2000, which is part of the CPSU program, he replied: “It does not concern me, I did not participate in this matter.” But somehow, when we were alone, I asked: “But where did the numbers come from? It should have passed through you, shouldn’t it?” “No,” he says, “I wasn’t consulted.” “But you showed me your report, there are other figures.” And he answers: “Well, it’s clear that we don’t do what’s written.” I say, “So where do these numbers come from?” He silently points his finger at the ceiling.”
The Space Shuttle could pick satellites out of orbit. There was a reference mission that the military demanded the shuttle be capable of, involving grabbing a (possibly enemy) satellite and landing immediately. This mission drove (compromised) the design. There was also the possibility of using the shuttle for rapid first strike capability, destabilizing MAD. The Soviet military was right to be concerned.
I haven’t looked at the USSR’s budget but I’m skeptical that Big Science is the cause of their downfall. There was also the Afghan War, the fundamental weakness of socialist economics, the high costs of autarky and the geographic disadvantages of Russia. I bring this up because Big Science spending is a frequent target in the modern West among people who think “our money is better spent elsewhere.” These types don’t know (or don’t care) that Big Science is tiny fraction of our economy and the government’s budget.
The supposed military mission of a satellite snatcher doesn’t make sense as by the late 70s both sides had the means to monitor all their satellites 24⁄7 and could detect if a satellite was taken or modified somehow, and could supply credible evidence to every other country, the UN, etc., of such an event. Needless to say, this would just lead to an escalation spiral and/or be an embarrassment.
Which is likely why the US never tried to snatch a Soviet/Russian satellite, and the capability remained unused.
Maybe the US Air Force and/or Pentagon knew this already but insisted anyways just so they could get a veto on the project they knew would be unaffordable on a purely civilian basis. i.e. this would imply they sabotaged NASA to preserve their importance.
The more prosaic reason for such an inefficient design is simple pork barrel politics.
Oh.
Well, now I 1. am embarrassed at my lack of historical knowledge and 2. am befuddled about how it was possible for something so huge and sweeping and seemingly idealistic to actually get implemented. Like, I cannot imagine America ever doing something like that. (Partly because it already is a democracy, partly because everyone in the government is corrupt and inept.)
Understanding some background is necessary to realize the importance of the recipients of this letter. The Central Committee of the CPSU, Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR had overlapping membership and would have contained practically everyone of serious authority in the Soviet Union.
And since they were, theoretically, supposed to represent every major group, if they approved a course of action there shouldn’t have been any internal forces capable of derailing the plan.
Like spending vast resources on an even more sophisticated version of the Space Shuttle in the waning days of their country just because they couldn’t figure out why the Americans made something so obviously inefficient and thus must have had some secret, nefarious, purpose, and therefore required a Soviet response.
Or spending incredible amounts on weapon systems to counter the mostly paper SDI projects that some smart folks in the Reagan Administration dreamed up. They even launched a demo version of their orbiting laser battlestation. At a time when shortages of consumer goods became the norm...
Naturally, since these projects were done under the tightest secrecy, the common people had difficulty figuring out why the ostensibly mighty Soviet economy with such a huge industrial base couldn’t even keep sausages in stock and so became ever more skeptical.
How big is this megaproject effect when compared for example the fraction that black budjets grab US attention today?
Since the true details of the black budget in the US are mysterious to me as well, I’d rather not speculate.
But here’s an anecdote involving Kosygin about how detached politics and economics can become, even if everyone of high authority in the country are literally on the same committee. Which may partially answer your question.
“I would say that he [Kosygin] was a man who wanted to engage not in politics, but only in economics. He didn’t like Khrushchev, he didn’t like Brezhnev very much. When I asked him about the program of transition to communism by the year 2000, which is part of the CPSU program, he replied: “It does not concern me, I did not participate in this matter.” But somehow, when we were alone, I asked: “But where did the numbers come from? It should have passed through you, shouldn’t it?” “No,” he says, “I wasn’t consulted.” “But you showed me your report, there are other figures.” And he answers: “Well, it’s clear that we don’t do what’s written.” I say, “So where do these numbers come from?” He silently points his finger at the ceiling.”
T.I. Oyzerman
Fascinating. Perhaps I should read about Soviet history. Seems there’s a lot of lessons to learn here.
The Space Shuttle could pick satellites out of orbit. There was a reference mission that the military demanded the shuttle be capable of, involving grabbing a (possibly enemy) satellite and landing immediately. This mission drove (compromised) the design. There was also the possibility of using the shuttle for rapid first strike capability, destabilizing MAD. The Soviet military was right to be concerned.
I haven’t looked at the USSR’s budget but I’m skeptical that Big Science is the cause of their downfall. There was also the Afghan War, the fundamental weakness of socialist economics, the high costs of autarky and the geographic disadvantages of Russia. I bring this up because Big Science spending is a frequent target in the modern West among people who think “our money is better spent elsewhere.” These types don’t know (or don’t care) that Big Science is tiny fraction of our economy and the government’s budget.
The supposed military mission of a satellite snatcher doesn’t make sense as by the late 70s both sides had the means to monitor all their satellites 24⁄7 and could detect if a satellite was taken or modified somehow, and could supply credible evidence to every other country, the UN, etc., of such an event. Needless to say, this would just lead to an escalation spiral and/or be an embarrassment.
Which is likely why the US never tried to snatch a Soviet/Russian satellite, and the capability remained unused.
Maybe the US Air Force and/or Pentagon knew this already but insisted anyways just so they could get a veto on the project they knew would be unaffordable on a purely civilian basis. i.e. this would imply they sabotaged NASA to preserve their importance.
The more prosaic reason for such an inefficient design is simple pork barrel politics.