So if this is true, what can we do? Well, you could resist the temptation to announce your goal. You can delay the gratification that the social acknowledgment brings, and you can understand that your mind mistakes the talking for the doing. But if you do need to talk about something, you can state it in a way that gives you no satisfaction, such as, “I really want to run this marathon, so I need to train five times a week and kick my ass if I don’t, okay?”
Sounds like he says there is a way to share goals without getting the negative attributes.
Sounds like he says there is a way to share goals without getting the negative attributes.
Right. In other words he is stating that there may be exceptions to the general rule.
By contrast, your position is (apparently) that general rule is that sharing goals is productive and beneficial. And I am again asking you for the evidence which supports your position.
Our findings are also important from an applied perspective.
Given that the effect is limited to committed individuals—those
who are most eager to reach their identity goals—an important
question is how these individuals might try to escape this effect.
Future research might address this question by exploring various
routes. First, might it suffice to increase the need for consistency
(Cialdini & Trost, 1998) by attending to relevant norms?
Or is it also necessary to increase perceived accountability
(Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) by considering relevant attributes of
the audience (e.g., power) or by specifying one’s behavioral intention
in a particular way (e.g., spelling out specific frequency
or quality standards vs. stating only that one wants to do one’s
best; Locke & Latham, 2002) so that the audience can more
easily check on its enactment? Second, might it also be effective
for one to furnish a behavioral intention with a plan for how to
enact it —that is, to form a corresponding implementation intention
(e.g., ‘‘If situation X is encountered, then I will perform
the intended behavior Y’’; Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer &
Sheeran, 2006)? As such if-then plans delegate the control of a
person’s behavior to situational cues, the intended behavior
should be executed when the critical cue arises, whether or not
the expression of the behavioral intention had been acknowledged
by other people. Third, recent research by Fishbach and
her colleagues (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; Koo & Fishbach, 2008)
suggests that interpreting a behavioral performance in terms of
indicating commitment to a goal enhances further goal striving,
whereas conceiving of a performance in terms of progress toward
a goal reduces further goal striving. This implies that a behavioral
intention worded to indicate a strong commitment to the
identity goal (e.g., ‘‘I want to write a paper to become a great
scientist’’) should be less negatively affected by social reality
than a behavioral intention that implies progress toward the
identity goal (e.g., ‘‘I intend to write a paper, as is done by great
scientists’’).
Finally, from a goal-systems (Kruglanski et al., 2002) or goalhierarchy
(Vallacher & Wegner, 1987) perspective on action
control, **it stands to reason that any striving for goals—and not
just identity goals—that can be attained by various behavioral
routes (means) is vulnerable to the negative effects of social
reality on the enactment of behavioral intentions. If a person is
highly committed to a superordinate goal, and if public recognition
of a behavioral intention specifying the use of one route to
the goal engenders a sense of goal attainment, then the enactment
of this very intention should be hampered. Recent research
by Fishbach, Dhar, and Zhang (2006) is in line with this reasoning,
showing that success on a subgoal (e.g., eating healthy
meals) in the service of a superordinate goal (i.e., keeping in
shape) reduces striving for alternative subgoals (e.g., going to
the gym).**
that’s all I got. Future research is needed. But also it matters the environment and how you share.
Umm, that article completely supports my position:
When other people take notice of one’s identity-relevant behavioral intentions, one’s performance of the intended behaviors is compromised. This effect occurs both when the intentions are experimenter supplied and when they are self-generated, and is observed in both immediate performance and performance
measured over a period of 1 week.
If this is the only evidence you have—besides your own logic and common sense—then you may want to rethink your position.
Given that the effect is limited to committed individuals—those who are most eager to reach their identity goals
Future research might address this question
Future research is needed to solve this question. This means that future research is needed to solve the question. Until then; it seems that we can’t resolve this without the future research. I hold a position that is built off of your position as a foundation, using the same sources (and their conclusions), and some reasoning from first principles based on comments in the article.
Given that the effect is limited to committed individuals—those who are most eager to reach their identity goals—an important question is how these individuals might try to escape this effect.
and
Given that: sometimes goal sharing will be bad sometimes goal sharing will be good
I suspect the “mostly good or mostly bad?” will come down to subjective experience. So that’s a pretty ordinary question to be trying to obtain future research for. In which case—the important question is—How might we make (or ensure) goal sharing (is) mostly good and mostly not bad? (or always good)
as in bold above) How might we make (or ensure) goal sharing (is) mostly good and mostly not bad?
Ok, but that’s a different issue. My position is that generally speaking, goal-sharing is counterproductive. Your position is that generally speaking, goal sharing is beneficial and productive. The evidence supports my position. You have offered no evidence to support your position and instead you have attempted to change the subject.
I’m gonna tap out of this. I would suggest re-reading that evidence. Especially that paper and the conclusion of that paper where it doesn’t actually say that.
It says things like this:
Other people’s taking notice of one’s identity-relevant intentions apparently engenders a premature sense of completeness regarding the identity goal.
An identity-relevant intention is potentially different to a goal or a plan. To make the most use of this research it would be wise to identify the difference and make use of the right mechanisms.
I’m gonna tap out of this. I would suggest re-reading that evidence. Especially that paper and the conclusion of that paper where it doesn’t actually say that.
Doesn’t actually say what? Never mind, because it seems you don’t have a clear understanding of what you are talking about.
An identity-relevant intention is potentially different to a goal or a plan
Then perhaps your evidence is irrelevant to both your position and mine. If so, it’s your problem not mine. Because it wouldn’t change the fact that all of the evidence supports my position and you haven’t cited any evidence to support your own.
Ok.
Not sure how you get that. Pretty clearly he is saying that in general it’s better not to share your goals.
Anyway, please answer my question:
What is the evidence which supports your position?
I quote from the last 40 seconds of the video:
Sounds like he says there is a way to share goals without getting the negative attributes.
Right. In other words he is stating that there may be exceptions to the general rule.
By contrast, your position is (apparently) that general rule is that sharing goals is productive and beneficial. And I am again asking you for the evidence which supports your position.
http://www.psych.nyu.edu/gollwitzer/09_Gollwitzer_Sheeran_Seifert_Michalski_When_Intentions_.pdf
Our findings are also important from an applied perspective. Given that the effect is limited to committed individuals—those who are most eager to reach their identity goals—an important question is how these individuals might try to escape this effect. Future research might address this question by exploring various routes. First, might it suffice to increase the need for consistency (Cialdini & Trost, 1998) by attending to relevant norms? Or is it also necessary to increase perceived accountability (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) by considering relevant attributes of the audience (e.g., power) or by specifying one’s behavioral intention in a particular way (e.g., spelling out specific frequency or quality standards vs. stating only that one wants to do one’s best; Locke & Latham, 2002) so that the audience can more easily check on its enactment? Second, might it also be effective for one to furnish a behavioral intention with a plan for how to enact it —that is, to form a corresponding implementation intention (e.g., ‘‘If situation X is encountered, then I will perform the intended behavior Y’’; Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006)? As such if-then plans delegate the control of a person’s behavior to situational cues, the intended behavior should be executed when the critical cue arises, whether or not the expression of the behavioral intention had been acknowledged by other people. Third, recent research by Fishbach and her colleagues (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; Koo & Fishbach, 2008) suggests that interpreting a behavioral performance in terms of indicating commitment to a goal enhances further goal striving, whereas conceiving of a performance in terms of progress toward a goal reduces further goal striving. This implies that a behavioral intention worded to indicate a strong commitment to the identity goal (e.g., ‘‘I want to write a paper to become a great scientist’’) should be less negatively affected by social reality than a behavioral intention that implies progress toward the identity goal (e.g., ‘‘I intend to write a paper, as is done by great scientists’’). Finally, from a goal-systems (Kruglanski et al., 2002) or goalhierarchy (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987) perspective on action control, **it stands to reason that any striving for goals—and not just identity goals—that can be attained by various behavioral routes (means) is vulnerable to the negative effects of social reality on the enactment of behavioral intentions. If a person is highly committed to a superordinate goal, and if public recognition of a behavioral intention specifying the use of one route to the goal engenders a sense of goal attainment, then the enactment of this very intention should be hampered. Recent research by Fishbach, Dhar, and Zhang (2006) is in line with this reasoning, showing that success on a subgoal (e.g., eating healthy meals) in the service of a superordinate goal (i.e., keeping in shape) reduces striving for alternative subgoals (e.g., going to
the gym).**
that’s all I got. Future research is needed. But also it matters the environment and how you share.
Umm, that article completely supports my position:
If this is the only evidence you have—besides your own logic and common sense—then you may want to rethink your position.
Like I said:
Future research is needed to solve this question. This means that future research is needed to solve the question. Until then; it seems that we can’t resolve this without the future research. I hold a position that is built off of your position as a foundation, using the same sources (and their conclusions), and some reasoning from first principles based on comments in the article.
Exactly what question?
and
is goal sharing mostly good or mostly bad?
So this is the question which requires “future research” according to you?
is a line from the conclusion of that paper.
I suspect the “mostly good or mostly bad?” will come down to subjective experience. So that’s a pretty ordinary question to be trying to obtain future research for. In which case—the important question is—How might we make (or ensure) goal sharing (is) mostly good and mostly not bad? (or always good)
Umm, does that mean “yes” or “no”?
Please just state the question which requires “future research” so that I can understand what you are saying.
(as in bold above) How might we make (or ensure) goal sharing (is) mostly good and mostly not bad?
Ok, but that’s a different issue. My position is that generally speaking, goal-sharing is counterproductive. Your position is that generally speaking, goal sharing is beneficial and productive. The evidence supports my position. You have offered no evidence to support your position and instead you have attempted to change the subject.
I’m gonna tap out of this. I would suggest re-reading that evidence. Especially that paper and the conclusion of that paper where it doesn’t actually say that.
It says things like this:
An identity-relevant intention is potentially different to a goal or a plan. To make the most use of this research it would be wise to identify the difference and make use of the right mechanisms.
Good luck with your future in the goal-space.
Doesn’t actually say what? Never mind, because it seems you don’t have a clear understanding of what you are talking about.
Then perhaps your evidence is irrelevant to both your position and mine. If so, it’s your problem not mine. Because it wouldn’t change the fact that all of the evidence supports my position and you haven’t cited any evidence to support your own.
Thanks you too.