I think Bayesian justice would result in a larger percentage of defendants being found guilty at trial, because instead of “guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”, the prosecution would only have to prove “expected value of conviction > expected value of no conviction”.
EDIT: On the other hand, if someone committed an awful crime, but can convince you that they won’t do it again; or if they might, but they pay a lot of taxes; let them go.
If the standard used is value to society, then if the defendant is judged to have no value to society, and executions are cheap, then convict and execute if p(defendent will commit more crime) > 0. If the defendant has a net cost to society, execute regardless.
If government functions via redistribution of taxation, then most people have a negative value to society, since most of the government’s income comes from the top 10% or so. Therefore, execute the bottom 90%. Tax, and redistribute among the survivors. Again, the bottom 90% has negative value. Execute. Repeat. You eventually converge on a single citizen, whose expected contribution to society (minus his cost to society) is zero by some measures. At that point, flip a coin.
There is still a whole bag of philosophical problems to be solved regarding punishment.
Do you punish to prevent the same person from doing something again, do you punish as retribution for the victims (then it doesnt make sense to tax those to provide prisons), or do you want to set a sign against others for not doing crime.
Atm there are many inconsistent terms put on various charges, which merit resolving.
I read a few times that the legal system works because most people are aware of punishment, not because it punishes most punishworthy deeds, or because its particularly fair. In that case a bayesian system might have very little practical difference from the current (except for all those not guilty).
A decent reform would include some liability for attorneys to withhold evidence, or threaten the accused and such. Maybe someone will put up a whole thought out concept.
The precedential value must be taken into account as these EV’s. Someone who can convince you that they won’t do it again who gets off will encourage others who are convincing to use their one-murder-free card. That’s bad policy.
I agree with Jack. You are also conflating tax receipts, the “exchange value” of a citizen, with intrinsic worth, the “use value” of a citizen. In so far as it exists as a real phenomenon, society doesn’t value citizens because they pay taxes; society values citizens because society is a construct set up by and for the benefit of citizens.
Also, much government spending is not fairly characterizable as mere redistribution; once you killed off, say, the bottom 40%, you would find that all citizens produced at least some net surplus, some of which would be confiscated to spend on public goods. Some remaining citizens would not contribute as much surplus as others, but an evil government that maximized total tax receipts (as opposed to average tax receipts, which is just a really weird goal) would not feel any urge to execute those citizens.
you would find that all citizens produced at least some net surplus, some of which would be confiscated to spend on public goods.
I’m assuming that governments don’t have surpluses in the long run. This is, historically, true without exception AFAIK. Too bad—if they did, the country could retire and live off its savings.
I think Bayesian justice would result in a larger percentage of defendants being found guilty at trial, because instead of “guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”, the prosecution would only have to prove “expected value of conviction > expected value of no conviction”.
EDIT: On the other hand, if someone committed an awful crime, but can convince you that they won’t do it again; or if they might, but they pay a lot of taxes; let them go.
If the standard used is value to society, then if the defendant is judged to have no value to society, and executions are cheap, then convict and execute if p(defendent will commit more crime) > 0. If the defendant has a net cost to society, execute regardless.
If government functions via redistribution of taxation, then most people have a negative value to society, since most of the government’s income comes from the top 10% or so. Therefore, execute the bottom 90%. Tax, and redistribute among the survivors. Again, the bottom 90% has negative value. Execute. Repeat. You eventually converge on a single citizen, whose expected contribution to society (minus his cost to society) is zero by some measures. At that point, flip a coin.
I think you’re conflating Bayesian justice with utilitarian justice.
I think you’re right.
There is still a whole bag of philosophical problems to be solved regarding punishment. Do you punish to prevent the same person from doing something again, do you punish as retribution for the victims (then it doesnt make sense to tax those to provide prisons), or do you want to set a sign against others for not doing crime. Atm there are many inconsistent terms put on various charges, which merit resolving. I read a few times that the legal system works because most people are aware of punishment, not because it punishes most punishworthy deeds, or because its particularly fair. In that case a bayesian system might have very little practical difference from the current (except for all those not guilty). A decent reform would include some liability for attorneys to withhold evidence, or threaten the accused and such. Maybe someone will put up a whole thought out concept.
The precedential value must be taken into account as these EV’s. Someone who can convince you that they won’t do it again who gets off will encourage others who are convincing to use their one-murder-free card. That’s bad policy.
I agree with Jack. You are also conflating tax receipts, the “exchange value” of a citizen, with intrinsic worth, the “use value” of a citizen. In so far as it exists as a real phenomenon, society doesn’t value citizens because they pay taxes; society values citizens because society is a construct set up by and for the benefit of citizens.
Also, much government spending is not fairly characterizable as mere redistribution; once you killed off, say, the bottom 40%, you would find that all citizens produced at least some net surplus, some of which would be confiscated to spend on public goods. Some remaining citizens would not contribute as much surplus as others, but an evil government that maximized total tax receipts (as opposed to average tax receipts, which is just a really weird goal) would not feel any urge to execute those citizens.
I’m assuming that governments don’t have surpluses in the long run. This is, historically, true without exception AFAIK. Too bad—if they did, the country could retire and live off its savings.