Maybe we shouldn’t; I was just disputing komponisto’s insinuation that there’s some unappreciated, general mapping between Bayesianism and the existing justice system.
I agree that the necessity of a mapping has not been shown, although that’s not what I read into komponisto’s comment.
Even when it allows so much relative weight to be given to sociological “evidence” (“she had a wild sex life”) compared to physical evidence?
No. But that would be best corrected by sanity and education, not by changing the law. A jury of people interested primarily in the physical evidence would not be distracted by trivia about countercultural tendencies on the parts of relevant persons.
that would be best corrected by sanity and education, not by changing the law. A jury of people interested primarily in the physical evidence would not be distracted by trivia about countercultural tendencies on the parts of relevant persons.
But I think it would make a big (positive) difference if everything had to be phrased in terms of likelihood ratios against a prior and guilt threshold.
Individual pieces of evidence are not independent. If Mortimer Q. Snodgrass is shown to have left his home at 11:50, arrived at the scene of the crime at midnight, and returned home fifteen minutes later is damning if the victim died at midnight and exculpatory if the victim died three hours later. There’s a combinatorial explosion trying to describe the effects of every piece of evidence separately.
Sure, but at least each side can draw its theorized causal diagram, how the evidence fits in, how the likelihood ratios interplay (per Pearl’s method of separating inferential and causal evidence flows), and what probability that justifies. It would still lend a clarity of thought not currently present among the mouthbreathers on juries that haven’t been exposed to any of this, even if you had to train them in it first.
(And that would be easy if the trainers really understood [at Level 2 at least] causal diagrams and read my forthcoming article on guidelines for explaining...)
Thanks, but I don’t see how much the points being discussed here hinge on it.
Are you saying that you’re skeptical that Pearl’s networks and Bayesian inference can be quickly (e.g. over a day or so) explained to random people selected for jury duty, but might be convinced of the ease of such training after seeing my exposition of how to enhance your explanatory abilities?
Hm, now that I think about it, that by itself should be evidence I have some abnormally high explanatory mojo—if I could explain your position to you better than you could explain it to yourself. :-P
I agree that the necessity of a mapping has not been shown, although that’s not what I read into komponisto’s comment.
No. But that would be best corrected by sanity and education, not by changing the law. A jury of people interested primarily in the physical evidence would not be distracted by trivia about countercultural tendencies on the parts of relevant persons.
But I think it would make a big (positive) difference if everything had to be phrased in terms of likelihood ratios against a prior and guilt threshold.
Individual pieces of evidence are not independent. If Mortimer Q. Snodgrass is shown to have left his home at 11:50, arrived at the scene of the crime at midnight, and returned home fifteen minutes later is damning if the victim died at midnight and exculpatory if the victim died three hours later. There’s a combinatorial explosion trying to describe the effects of every piece of evidence separately.
Sure, but at least each side can draw its theorized causal diagram, how the evidence fits in, how the likelihood ratios interplay (per Pearl’s method of separating inferential and causal evidence flows), and what probability that justifies. It would still lend a clarity of thought not currently present among the mouthbreathers on juries that haven’t been exposed to any of this, even if you had to train them in it first.
(And that would be easy if the trainers really understood [at Level 2 at least] causal diagrams and read my forthcoming article on guidelines for explaining...)
Please make this come forth promptly. I plan to explain some pretty complicated stuff to a bunch of people soon, and could use the help!
I’ll do my best.
I’ll put off judgment until after your article, then.
Thanks, but I don’t see how much the points being discussed here hinge on it.
Are you saying that you’re skeptical that Pearl’s networks and Bayesian inference can be quickly (e.g. over a day or so) explained to random people selected for jury duty, but might be convinced of the ease of such training after seeing my exposition of how to enhance your explanatory abilities?
Related: maybe you just suck at explaining
LOL, you have no idea how many times I’ve thought that about people who claim something’s hard to explain …
Yes. Edit: That’s probably a better summary of my thoughts than I could give at the moment, even.
Can I call ’em or what? ;-)
I aim to be predictable. (-:
Hm, now that I think about it, that by itself should be evidence I have some abnormally high explanatory mojo—if I could explain your position to you better than you could explain it to yourself. :-P
Don’t promote the hypothesis excessively—you’re comparing yourself to The Worst Debater In The World with sleep deprivation. (-;
Damn I’m good B-)