I think proponents of the fine-tuning arguments for design are saying there doesn’t need to be a reliable way to assign a prior. You can assign any prior you deem reasonable. Nonetheless, after considering our seemingly unlikely existence, the probability would greatly shift towards a teleological conclusion that the universe is designed for life.
So unless you are willing to commit that not only there is no reliable way to assign a prior, but also assigning a probability in this situation is invalid in itself, it doesn’t counter their argument per se. It would be just pointing out even with the probability shift we should still be skeptical that the universe is designed due to the unknowns (but less skeptical than before considering fine-tuning). Are you saying what I think you are saying?
Just to be clear, I am not against the invalidity of probability in this situation. In fact, I probably support it more than you would like. I just choose to counter the proposed probability update because that is more direct.
So unless you are willing to commit that not only there is no reliable way to assign a prior, but also assigning a probability in this situation is invalid in itself
Indeed. If you have no way to assign a prior, probability is meaningless. And if you try, you end up with something as ridiculous as the Doomsday argument.
Very interesting...
I think proponents of the fine-tuning arguments for design are saying there doesn’t need to be a reliable way to assign a prior. You can assign any prior you deem reasonable. Nonetheless, after considering our seemingly unlikely existence, the probability would greatly shift towards a teleological conclusion that the universe is designed for life.
So unless you are willing to commit that not only there is no reliable way to assign a prior, but also assigning a probability in this situation is invalid in itself, it doesn’t counter their argument per se. It would be just pointing out even with the probability shift we should still be skeptical that the universe is designed due to the unknowns (but less skeptical than before considering fine-tuning). Are you saying what I think you are saying?
Just to be clear, I am not against the invalidity of probability in this situation. In fact, I probably support it more than you would like. I just choose to counter the proposed probability update because that is more direct.
Indeed. If you have no way to assign a prior, probability is meaningless. And if you try, you end up with something as ridiculous as the Doomsday argument.
Well, in that case, our arguments actually have a lot in common. My position regarding anthropics is that perspectives are axiomatic in reasoning. So a valid argument/notion must be formulated from one single perspective. This postulate refutes the probability shift in fine-tuning. It also invalidates the notion of self-locating probabilities like in the case of the doomsday argument.