I mostly think of conflict theory as a worldview characterized by (a) assuming that bad things mostly happen because of bad people, and (b) assuming that the solution is mostly to punish them and/or move power away from them. I think of mistake theory as a worldview characterized by assuming that people do not intend to be evil (although they can still have bad incentives).
Why not integrate both perspectives: people make genuine mistakes due to cognitive limitations, and they also genuinely have different values that are in conflict with each other, and the right way to frame these problems is “bargaining by bounded rationalists” where “bargaining” can include negotiation, politics, and war. (I made a 2012 post suggesting this frame, but maybe should have given it a catchy name...)
Personally, my view is that mechanism design is more-or-less-always the right way to think about these kinds of problems. Sometimes that will lead to the conclusion that someone is making an honest mistake, sometimes it will lead to the conclusion that punishment is an efficient strategy, and often it will lead to other conclusions.
(I wrote the above before seeing this part.) I guess “mechanism design” is similar to “bargaining by bounded rationalists” so you seem to have reached a similar conclusion, but “mechanism design” kind of assumes there’s a disinterested third party who has the power to impose a “mechanism” that is designed to be socially optimal, but often you’re one of the involved parties and “bargaining” is a more general framing that also makes sense in that case.
Why not integrate both perspectives: people make genuine mistakes due to cognitive limitations, and they also genuinely have different values that are in conflict with each other, and the right way to frame these problems is “bargaining by bounded rationalists” where “bargaining” can include negotiation, politics, and war. (I made a 2012 post suggesting this frame, but maybe should have given it a catchy name...)
(I wrote the above before seeing this part.) I guess “mechanism design” is similar to “bargaining by bounded rationalists” so you seem to have reached a similar conclusion, but “mechanism design” kind of assumes there’s a disinterested third party who has the power to impose a “mechanism” that is designed to be socially optimal, but often you’re one of the involved parties and “bargaining” is a more general framing that also makes sense in that case.