I think the whole “mistake theory vs conflict theory” thing needs to be examined and explained in greater detail, because there is a lot of potential to get confused about things (at least for me). For example:
Both “mistake statements” and “conflict statements” can be held sincerely, or can be lies strategically used against an enemy. For example, I may genuinely believe that X is racist, and then I would desire to make people aware of a danger X poses. The fact that I do not waste time explaining and examining specific details of X’s beliefs is simply because time is a scarce resource, and warning people against a dangerous person is a priority. Or, I may knowingly falsely accuse X of being racist, because I assume that gives me higher probability of winning the tribal fight, compared to a honest debate about our opinions. (Note: The fact that I assume my opponent would win a debate doesn’t necessarily imply that I believe he it right. Maybe his opinions are simply more viral; more compatible with existing biases and prejudices of listeners.) Same goes for the mistake theory: I can sincerely explain how most people are not evil and yet Moloch devours everything; or I may be perfectly aware that the people of my tribe are at this moment fighting for our selfish collective interest, and yet present an ad-hoc theory to confuse the nerds of the opposing tribe into inaction.
Plus, there is always a gray zone between knowingly lying and beliefs sincerely held. Unconscious biases, plausible deniability, all this “this person seems to be genuinely mistaken, but at the same time they resist all attempts to explain” which seems to be the behavior of most people most of the time. This balancing at “aware on some level, but unaware on another level” which allows us to navigate towards achieving our selfish goals while maintaining the image of innocence (including the self-image).
Then, we have different levels of meta. For example, suppose that Alice takes Bob’s apple and eats it. This is a factual description. On the first level, Charlie the conflict theorist might say “she knowingly stole the apple”, while Diana the mistake theorist might say “she just made a mistake and believed the apple was actually hers”. Now on the second level, a conflict theorist could say “of course Charlie accuses Alice of acting badly; he is a misogynist” (conflict explanation of conflict explanation), or “of course Diana would defend Alice; women have a strong in-group bias” (conflict explanation of mistake explanation). A mistake theorist could say “Charlie is a victim of illusion of transparency, just because he noticed the apple belongs to Bob, doesn’t mean Alice had to notice it, too” (mistake explanation of conflict explanation), or “Diana seems to be a nice person who would never steal, and she projects her attitude on Alice” (mistake explanation of mistake explanation). On the third level… well, it gets complicated quickly. And yet, people make models of each other, and make models of models other people have about them, so the higher levels will get constructed.
By the way, notice that “mistake theorists” and “conflict theorists” are not two opposing tribes, in the sense of tribal conflict. The same political tribe may contain both of them: some people believe their opponents are evil, others believe they are making a tragic mistake; both believe the opponents have to be stopped, by force if necessary. There may be conflict theorists on both sides: both explaining why the other side is making a power grab and needs to be stopped; or mistake theorists on both sides: both explaining why the other side is deluded.
...and I feel pretty sure there are other complications that I forgot at the moment.
EDIT:
For example, the conflict theory can be expressed in a mistake-theory lingo. Instead of saying “my evil opponent is just trying to get more power”, say “my uneducated opponent is unaware of his unconscious biases that make him believe that things that get him more power are the right ones”. You accused him of pretty much the same thing, but it makes your statement acceptable among mistake theorists.
I might be missing the forest for the trees, but all of those still feel like they end up making some kinds of predictions based on the model, even if they’re not trivial to test. Something like:
If Alice were informed by some neutral party that she took Bob’s apple, Charlie would predict that she would not show meaningful remorse or try to make up for the damage done beyond trivial gestures like an off-hand “sorry” as well as claiming that some other minor extraction of resources is likely to follow, while Diana would predict that Alice would treat her overreach more seriously when informed of it. Something similar can be done on the meta-level.
None of these are slamdunks, and there are a bunch of reasons why the predictions might turn out exactly as laid out by Charlie or Diana, but that just feels like how Bayesian cookies crumble, and I would definitely expect evidence to accumulate over time in one direction or the other.
Strong opinion weakly held: it feels like an iterated version of this prediction-making and tracking over time is how our native bad actor detection algorithms function. It seems to me that shining more light on this mechanism would be good.
I think the whole “mistake theory vs conflict theory” thing needs to be examined and explained in greater detail, because there is a lot of potential to get confused about things (at least for me). For example:
Both “mistake statements” and “conflict statements” can be held sincerely, or can be lies strategically used against an enemy. For example, I may genuinely believe that X is racist, and then I would desire to make people aware of a danger X poses. The fact that I do not waste time explaining and examining specific details of X’s beliefs is simply because time is a scarce resource, and warning people against a dangerous person is a priority. Or, I may knowingly falsely accuse X of being racist, because I assume that gives me higher probability of winning the tribal fight, compared to a honest debate about our opinions. (Note: The fact that I assume my opponent would win a debate doesn’t necessarily imply that I believe he it right. Maybe his opinions are simply more viral; more compatible with existing biases and prejudices of listeners.) Same goes for the mistake theory: I can sincerely explain how most people are not evil and yet Moloch devours everything; or I may be perfectly aware that the people of my tribe are at this moment fighting for our selfish collective interest, and yet present an ad-hoc theory to confuse the nerds of the opposing tribe into inaction.
Plus, there is always a gray zone between knowingly lying and beliefs sincerely held. Unconscious biases, plausible deniability, all this “this person seems to be genuinely mistaken, but at the same time they resist all attempts to explain” which seems to be the behavior of most people most of the time. This balancing at “aware on some level, but unaware on another level” which allows us to navigate towards achieving our selfish goals while maintaining the image of innocence (including the self-image).
Then, we have different levels of meta. For example, suppose that Alice takes Bob’s apple and eats it. This is a factual description. On the first level, Charlie the conflict theorist might say “she knowingly stole the apple”, while Diana the mistake theorist might say “she just made a mistake and believed the apple was actually hers”. Now on the second level, a conflict theorist could say “of course Charlie accuses Alice of acting badly; he is a misogynist” (conflict explanation of conflict explanation), or “of course Diana would defend Alice; women have a strong in-group bias” (conflict explanation of mistake explanation). A mistake theorist could say “Charlie is a victim of illusion of transparency, just because he noticed the apple belongs to Bob, doesn’t mean Alice had to notice it, too” (mistake explanation of conflict explanation), or “Diana seems to be a nice person who would never steal, and she projects her attitude on Alice” (mistake explanation of mistake explanation). On the third level… well, it gets complicated quickly. And yet, people make models of each other, and make models of models other people have about them, so the higher levels will get constructed.
By the way, notice that “mistake theorists” and “conflict theorists” are not two opposing tribes, in the sense of tribal conflict. The same political tribe may contain both of them: some people believe their opponents are evil, others believe they are making a tragic mistake; both believe the opponents have to be stopped, by force if necessary. There may be conflict theorists on both sides: both explaining why the other side is making a power grab and needs to be stopped; or mistake theorists on both sides: both explaining why the other side is deluded.
...and I feel pretty sure there are other complications that I forgot at the moment.
EDIT:
For example, the conflict theory can be expressed in a mistake-theory lingo. Instead of saying “my evil opponent is just trying to get more power”, say “my uneducated opponent is unaware of his unconscious biases that make him believe that things that get him more power are the right ones”. You accused him of pretty much the same thing, but it makes your statement acceptable among mistake theorists.
I might be missing the forest for the trees, but all of those still feel like they end up making some kinds of predictions based on the model, even if they’re not trivial to test. Something like:
If Alice were informed by some neutral party that she took Bob’s apple, Charlie would predict that she would not show meaningful remorse or try to make up for the damage done beyond trivial gestures like an off-hand “sorry” as well as claiming that some other minor extraction of resources is likely to follow, while Diana would predict that Alice would treat her overreach more seriously when informed of it. Something similar can be done on the meta-level.
None of these are slamdunks, and there are a bunch of reasons why the predictions might turn out exactly as laid out by Charlie or Diana, but that just feels like how Bayesian cookies crumble, and I would definitely expect evidence to accumulate over time in one direction or the other.
Strong opinion weakly held: it feels like an iterated version of this prediction-making and tracking over time is how our native bad actor detection algorithms function. It seems to me that shining more light on this mechanism would be good.