People do not have the ability to fully simulate a person-level mind inside their own mind. Attempts to simulate minds are accomplished by a combination of two methods:
“Blunt” pattern matching, as one would do for any non-human object; noticing what tends to happen, and extrapolating both inner and outer patterns.
“Slotting in” elements of their own type of thinking, into the pattern they’re working with, using their own mind as a base.
(There’s also space in between these two, such as pattern-matching from one’s own type of thinking, inserting pattern-results into one’s own thinking-style, or balancing the outputs of the two approaches.)
Insofar as the first method is used, the result is not detailed enough to be a real person. Insofar as the second is used, it is not a distinct person from the person doing the thinking. You can simulate a character’s pain by either feeling it yourself and using your own mind’s output, or by using a less-than-person rough pattern, and neither of these come with moral quandaries.
What about dissociative identities? What is their ontology compare to the ego of a non-dissociated individual?
Since they apparently can have:
changes in behavior, attitudes, and memories. These personalities may have unique names, ages, genders, voices, and mannerisms, and may have different likes and dislikes, strengths and weaknesses, and ways of interacting with others.
They don’t seem to be fundamentally different from our non-dissociated egos.
People do not have the ability to fully simulate a person-level mind inside their own mind. Attempts to simulate minds are accomplished by a combination of two methods:
“Blunt” pattern matching, as one would do for any non-human object; noticing what tends to happen, and extrapolating both inner and outer patterns.
“Slotting in” elements of their own type of thinking, into the pattern they’re working with, using their own mind as a base.
(There’s also space in between these two, such as pattern-matching from one’s own type of thinking, inserting pattern-results into one’s own thinking-style, or balancing the outputs of the two approaches.)
Insofar as the first method is used, the result is not detailed enough to be a real person. Insofar as the second is used, it is not a distinct person from the person doing the thinking. You can simulate a character’s pain by either feeling it yourself and using your own mind’s output, or by using a less-than-person rough pattern, and neither of these come with moral quandaries.
What about dissociative identities? What is their ontology compare to the ego of a non-dissociated individual?
Since they apparently can have:
They don’t seem to be fundamentally different from our non-dissociated egos.