The point I’m trying to express (and clearly failing at) isn’t conceptualism or solipsism, at least not in the way my own semantic modeling interprets them. As I interpret them, the idealism of, say, Berkeley, Buddhism et al amounts to a re-branding of reality from being “out there” to “in my mind” (or “God’s mind”). I mean it differently, but because I refer constantly to our mental models, I can see why my argument looks a lot like that. Ironically, my failure may be a sort of illustration of the point itself. Namely, the limits of using language to discuss the limitations of language.
In fact, the point I’m trying to get to is not so much about “the nature of reality” but about the profound limitations of language. And that our semantic models tend to fool us into assigning a power to language that it doesn’t have. Specifically, we can’t use the language game to transcend the language game. Our theories of ontology and epistomology can’t coherently claim to refer to things beyond human language when these theories are wholly expressed in human language. Whatever model of reality we have, it’s still a model.
The objection of realism is that our models are not created in isolation, but by “actual reality” interacting with our modeling apparatus. My response is: that is a very useful way to model our modeling, but like all models, it has limitations. That is, I can make a mental model called “realism” in which there are mental models on the one hand and “real reality” on the other. I can further imagine the two interact in such a way that my models “carve reality at the joints”, or “identify clusters in thingspace”. But all of that is itself manifestly a mental model. So if I then want to coherently claim a particular model is more than just a model, I have to create a larger model in which the first model is imagined to be so. That can be fine as far as it goes. But realism – the claim of a “reality” independent of ANY model—commits one to an infinite nesting of mental models, each trying to escape their nature as mental models.
This situation is a close analog to the notion of “truth” in mathematics. Here the language game is explicitly limited to theorem-proving within formal systems. But we know there are unprovable statements within any formal system. So if I want a particular unprovable statement to count as “true”, I need a larger meta-system that makes it so. That’s fine as far as that goes. But to use the language game of formal systems to claim an unprovable statement is true independent of ANY proof, I would need an infinite nesting of meta-systems. That’s clearly incoherent, so when mathematicians want to claim “truth” in this way they have to exit the language game of formal systems – i.e. appeal to informal language and the philosophy of Platonism.
Personally I’m not a fan of Platonism, but it works as a philosophy of mathematics in so far as it passes the buck from formal to informal language. But that’s also where the buck stops. The sum of formal and informal language has no other system to appeal to, at least not one that can be expressed in language. To sum it all up with another metaphor: the semantic modeling behind the philosophy of realism overloads the word “reality” with more weight than the human language game can carry.
The point I’m trying to express (and clearly failing at) isn’t conceptualism or solipsism, at least not in the way my own semantic modeling interprets them. As I interpret them, the idealism of, say, Berkeley, Buddhism et al amounts to a re-branding of reality from being “out there” to “in my mind” (or “God’s mind”). I mean it differently, but because I refer constantly to our mental models, I can see why my argument looks a lot like that.
That’s your objection to solipsism. What’s your objection to conceptualism?
And that our semantic models tend to fool us into assigning a power to language that it doesn’t have.
Who’s “us”? Some philosophers? All philosophers? Some laypeople? All laypeople?
Our theories of ontology and epistomology can’t coherently claim to refer to things beyond human language
Except that you just did. Well, you did in general. Theres a problem in referring to specific things behind our language. But who’s doing that? Kant isn’t. He keeps saying that the thing in itself is unknowable. So what’s the problem with Kantian conceptualism?
Whatever model of reality we have, it’s still a model.
Whatever reality is, it’s still reality. You still haven’t said how the two are related.
But all of that is itself manifestly a mental model.
A model of something real. “Is a model” doesn’t mean “is false”.
So if I then want to coherently claim a particular model is more than just a model, I have to create a larger model in which the first model is imagined to be so.
Does “more than a model” mean “true”?
But realism – the claim of a “reality” independent of ANY model—commits one to an infinite nesting of mental models, each trying to escape their nature as mental models.
I don’t see why. And if you reject realism, you have solipsism, which you also reject.
So if I want a particular unprovable statement to count as “true”, I need a larger meta-system that makes it so
You can do that with larger systems, adding the theorem as an axiom, but you can also do that with different systems.
But that’s all rather beside the point… minimally realism requires some things to be true, and truth to be something to do with the territory.
Personally I’m not a fan of Platonism, but it works as a philosophy of mathematics in so far as it passes the buck from formal to informal language
Theres no reason why meaning and truth in maths have to work like meaning and truth in not-maths, or vice versa.
To sum it all up with another metaphor: the semantic modeling behind the philosophy of realism overloads the word “reality” with more weight than the human language game can carry.
You need to notice the difference between truth and justifcation/proof. Truth, even realistic truth, is so easy to obtain that you can a certain amount by ransoming guessing. The tricky thing is knowing why it is true...justification.
The point I’m trying to express (and clearly failing at) isn’t conceptualism or solipsism, at least not in the way my own semantic modeling interprets them. As I interpret them, the idealism of, say, Berkeley, Buddhism et al amounts to a re-branding of reality from being “out there” to “in my mind” (or “God’s mind”). I mean it differently, but because I refer constantly to our mental models, I can see why my argument looks a lot like that. Ironically, my failure may be a sort of illustration of the point itself. Namely, the limits of using language to discuss the limitations of language.
In fact, the point I’m trying to get to is not so much about “the nature of reality” but about the profound limitations of language. And that our semantic models tend to fool us into assigning a power to language that it doesn’t have. Specifically, we can’t use the language game to transcend the language game. Our theories of ontology and epistomology can’t coherently claim to refer to things beyond human language when these theories are wholly expressed in human language. Whatever model of reality we have, it’s still a model.
The objection of realism is that our models are not created in isolation, but by “actual reality” interacting with our modeling apparatus. My response is: that is a very useful way to model our modeling, but like all models, it has limitations. That is, I can make a mental model called “realism” in which there are mental models on the one hand and “real reality” on the other. I can further imagine the two interact in such a way that my models “carve reality at the joints”, or “identify clusters in thingspace”. But all of that is itself manifestly a mental model. So if I then want to coherently claim a particular model is more than just a model, I have to create a larger model in which the first model is imagined to be so. That can be fine as far as it goes. But realism – the claim of a “reality” independent of ANY model—commits one to an infinite nesting of mental models, each trying to escape their nature as mental models.
This situation is a close analog to the notion of “truth” in mathematics. Here the language game is explicitly limited to theorem-proving within formal systems. But we know there are unprovable statements within any formal system. So if I want a particular unprovable statement to count as “true”, I need a larger meta-system that makes it so. That’s fine as far as that goes. But to use the language game of formal systems to claim an unprovable statement is true independent of ANY proof, I would need an infinite nesting of meta-systems. That’s clearly incoherent, so when mathematicians want to claim “truth” in this way they have to exit the language game of formal systems – i.e. appeal to informal language and the philosophy of Platonism.
Personally I’m not a fan of Platonism, but it works as a philosophy of mathematics in so far as it passes the buck from formal to informal language. But that’s also where the buck stops. The sum of formal and informal language has no other system to appeal to, at least not one that can be expressed in language. To sum it all up with another metaphor: the semantic modeling behind the philosophy of realism overloads the word “reality” with more weight than the human language game can carry.
That’s your objection to solipsism. What’s your objection to conceptualism?
Who’s “us”? Some philosophers? All philosophers? Some laypeople? All laypeople?
Except that you just did. Well, you did in general. Theres a problem in referring to specific things behind our language. But who’s doing that? Kant isn’t. He keeps saying that the thing in itself is unknowable. So what’s the problem with Kantian conceptualism?
Whatever reality is, it’s still reality. You still haven’t said how the two are related.
A model of something real. “Is a model” doesn’t mean “is false”.
Does “more than a model” mean “true”?
I don’t see why. And if you reject realism, you have solipsism, which you also reject.
You can do that with larger systems, adding the theorem as an axiom, but you can also do that with different systems.
But that’s all rather beside the point… minimally realism requires some things to be true, and truth to be something to do with the territory.
Theres no reason why meaning and truth in maths have to work like meaning and truth in not-maths, or vice versa.
You need to notice the difference between truth and justifcation/proof. Truth, even realistic truth, is so easy to obtain that you can a certain amount by ransoming guessing. The tricky thing is knowing why it is true...justification.