I never could understand why people made such a fuss about whether the tree made a sound or not.
Because the sense in which this question is being used as an example here is not the real question that bishop Berkeley had in mind.
It’s really a question about epistemology. It’s related to the “grue” paradox, which is a bit easier to explain. The grue paradox first notes that ordinarily we have good reason to believe that certain things (grass, green paint, copper flames) are green and will continue to be green after (say) 1 January 2009. It then notes that every piece of evidence we have supporting that belief also supports the belief that these things are “grue”, which is defined as being green before 2009 and being blue after that date. On the face of it, we should be equally confident that green paint etc will be blue after 2009.
Much has been written, but the important point is that nobody has ever experienced 2009 (except you lurkers who read posts from previous years. Just change 2009 to a date that’s still in your future, or have they forgotten how to do that in the future?)
A similar condition applies with Berkeley’s paradox. Tautologically, nobody has ever heard a tree fall that nobody heard. (Planting a tape recorder or radio transmitter and listening to that counts as hearing it) So when we guess that the falling tree makes a sound, we are extrapolating. There is no way to test that extrapolation, so how can it be justified?
I recommend David Deutsch’s Four threads of reality for some intelligent and not too wordy comments on how, among other interesting topics he covers.
Because the sense in which this question is being used as an example here is not the real question that bishop Berkeley had in mind.
It’s really a question about epistemology. It’s related to the “grue” paradox, which is a bit easier to explain. The grue paradox first notes that ordinarily we have good reason to believe that certain things (grass, green paint, copper flames) are green and will continue to be green after (say) 1 January 2009. It then notes that every piece of evidence we have supporting that belief also supports the belief that these things are “grue”, which is defined as being green before 2009 and being blue after that date. On the face of it, we should be equally confident that green paint etc will be blue after 2009.
Much has been written, but the important point is that nobody has ever experienced 2009 (except you lurkers who read posts from previous years. Just change 2009 to a date that’s still in your future, or have they forgotten how to do that in the future?)
A similar condition applies with Berkeley’s paradox. Tautologically, nobody has ever heard a tree fall that nobody heard. (Planting a tape recorder or radio transmitter and listening to that counts as hearing it) So when we guess that the falling tree makes a sound, we are extrapolating. There is no way to test that extrapolation, so how can it be justified?
I recommend David Deutsch’s Four threads of reality for some intelligent and not too wordy comments on how, among other interesting topics he covers.