Then we’ll pick one of the methods that does. Evolution only finds local maximums. It’s unlikely that it hit upon the global maximum.
Even on the off chance that it did, we can still improve upon the current method. Humans have only just evolved civilization. We could improve with more time.
Even if we’re at the ideal for our ancestral environment, our environment has changed. Being fluent in a programming language was never useful before, but it is now. It used to be hard to find enough calories to sustain the brain. That is no longer a problem.
For all we know, there are fundamental constraints to consciousness, such that it can only operate so fast. No doubt you can find some incremental improvements, but if we drop electronic consciousness from the list of possibilities then it is no longer obvious that order-of-magnitude speedups are available. You ought not to reason from what is clear in a case that has been assumed away, to the substitutes that remain.
For all we know, there are fundamental constraints to consciousness, such that it can only operate so fast.
Yes, but it’s not likely we’re close to it. Either we’d reach it before creating a civilization, or we’d create a civilization and still be nowhere near it.
You ought not to reason from what is clear in a case that has been assumed away, to the substitutes that remain.
I don’t understand that sentence. Can you rephrase it?
Then we won’t replicate it in silicon. We’ll replicate it using another method.
That other method might not have a speedup over carbon, though.
Then we’ll pick one of the methods that does. Evolution only finds local maximums. It’s unlikely that it hit upon the global maximum.
Even on the off chance that it did, we can still improve upon the current method. Humans have only just evolved civilization. We could improve with more time.
Even if we’re at the ideal for our ancestral environment, our environment has changed. Being fluent in a programming language was never useful before, but it is now. It used to be hard to find enough calories to sustain the brain. That is no longer a problem.
For all we know, there are fundamental constraints to consciousness, such that it can only operate so fast. No doubt you can find some incremental improvements, but if we drop electronic consciousness from the list of possibilities then it is no longer obvious that order-of-magnitude speedups are available. You ought not to reason from what is clear in a case that has been assumed away, to the substitutes that remain.
Yes, but it’s not likely we’re close to it. Either we’d reach it before creating a civilization, or we’d create a civilization and still be nowhere near it.
I don’t understand that sentence. Can you rephrase it?