Thanks. I think I see something about Pascal’s Mugging that is confusing me, then, but I’ll try to build out the logic step by step so that if I go wrong I’ll better know where.
Even if someone has a value system that can be made to accept multiple types of Simpleton Gambits, they can still only be made to accept one Simpleton Gambit that has, as a requirement for accepting that type of gambit, not accepting any other Simpleton Gambits.
It doesn’t appear to matter that not accepting those other types of Simpleton Gambits goes against their previous value system: Once they accept that gambit, they are now a Simpleton and don’t get to decide.
A similar problem occurs with them giving up the 5 dollars at all: Once they do that, that limits their ability to make future decisions (that might require them to pay), even if they want to, in those circumstances. Not as much as a Simpleton Gambit, of course.
In both cases, agreeing to the threat now limits your options later, right?
Perhaps, but performing every action to prepare for Pascal’s mugging hardly counts as avoiding Pascal’s mugging. Quite the opposite: now you’re constraining everything you do even if nobody threatens you.
There’s actually a larger problem. If you don’t have some way of avoiding Pascal’s mugging, your expected utility is almost certainly divergent. You can find a risk with expected value of arbitrarily high magnitude in either direction.
Thank you! This makes me glad that I had been going through my logic item by Item, because I had not not been considering that Pascal’s mugging had mathematical similarities to the St. Petersburg Paradox.
It still works.
Thanks. I think I see something about Pascal’s Mugging that is confusing me, then, but I’ll try to build out the logic step by step so that if I go wrong I’ll better know where.
Even if someone has a value system that can be made to accept multiple types of Simpleton Gambits, they can still only be made to accept one Simpleton Gambit that has, as a requirement for accepting that type of gambit, not accepting any other Simpleton Gambits.
It doesn’t appear to matter that not accepting those other types of Simpleton Gambits goes against their previous value system: Once they accept that gambit, they are now a Simpleton and don’t get to decide.
A similar problem occurs with them giving up the 5 dollars at all: Once they do that, that limits their ability to make future decisions (that might require them to pay), even if they want to, in those circumstances. Not as much as a Simpleton Gambit, of course.
In both cases, agreeing to the threat now limits your options later, right?
Perhaps, but performing every action to prepare for Pascal’s mugging hardly counts as avoiding Pascal’s mugging. Quite the opposite: now you’re constraining everything you do even if nobody threatens you.
There’s actually a larger problem. If you don’t have some way of avoiding Pascal’s mugging, your expected utility is almost certainly divergent. You can find a risk with expected value of arbitrarily high magnitude in either direction.
Thank you! This makes me glad that I had been going through my logic item by Item, because I had not not been considering that Pascal’s mugging had mathematical similarities to the St. Petersburg Paradox.