We don’t have to understand the universe completely to be very confident that it contains no contradictions.
Where is the proof of concept for this?
I have severalresources which point to extreme inconsistency with the current and past behaviors of particle and astro physics. Beyond natural sciences, there are inconsistencies in the way that political systems are organized and interacted with even on a local level—yet most find them acceptable enough to continue to work with.
You argue that inconsistency alone is enough to reject a theory. The point I make is that understanding that a process may work differently under different circumstances is not necessarily inconsistent and does not “guarantee” it being wrong. That is the point behind chaotic modeling.
There can still be valuable achievements that come from better understanding how the seemingly inconsistent theories work and I argue would not be wholly acceptable as a sole reason for rejection as you seem to advocate.
I still am not convinced that all systems must be consistent to exist—however that is a much different discussion.
“Inconsistencies” in the enactment of politics aren’t real contradictions. If this is the kind of example you find relevant, I must have no idea at all what you’re talking about.
It wouldn’t mean anything for the universe to contain contradictions, really, because this isn’t the kind of thing that might be. If we had square circles or if it were the case that both P and ~P, then we’d have contradictions, but this is the sort of thing that can be said and not imagined.
I don’t we disagree but I think we can make this point more strongly. It isn’t just that the universe never could have contradiction or that we can’t imagine a contradictory universe. Rather, universes just aren’t the sorts of things that are contradictory or not contradictory. Its like saying that most coffee cups hate Nietzsche. A piece of language can be contradictory because the semantic content of one part of the piece doesn’t constrain the semantic content of another part. But the universe doesn’t have any semantic content at all.
So contradictory theories aren’t wrong because the universe is consistent and (therefore) “inconsistency brings with it the guarantee of being wrong in at least one place”. Rather they are bad because a self-contradictory theory can be made to show anything. There is nothing it can’t predict or explain. Thus, we can reject them on purely formal, analytic grounds. Contradictions don’t say anything at all because they say everything.
Those two books look excellent … but I don’t see how they are relevant to this philosophical question. Both appear to discuss the problem of justifying inconsistent theories, not justifying an inconsistent universe. I think it is perfectly obvious that a superior and consistent theory would still be preferred by either of these philosophers.
Where is the proof of concept for this?
I have several resources which point to extreme inconsistency with the current and past behaviors of particle and astro physics. Beyond natural sciences, there are inconsistencies in the way that political systems are organized and interacted with even on a local level—yet most find them acceptable enough to continue to work with.
You argue that inconsistency alone is enough to reject a theory. The point I make is that understanding that a process may work differently under different circumstances is not necessarily inconsistent and does not “guarantee” it being wrong. That is the point behind chaotic modeling.
There can still be valuable achievements that come from better understanding how the seemingly inconsistent theories work and I argue would not be wholly acceptable as a sole reason for rejection as you seem to advocate.
I still am not convinced that all systems must be consistent to exist—however that is a much different discussion.
“Inconsistencies” in the enactment of politics aren’t real contradictions. If this is the kind of example you find relevant, I must have no idea at all what you’re talking about.
I actually have no idea what it could possibly mean for the universe to contain contradictions. This looks like a category error.
It wouldn’t mean anything for the universe to contain contradictions, really, because this isn’t the kind of thing that might be. If we had square circles or if it were the case that both P and ~P, then we’d have contradictions, but this is the sort of thing that can be said and not imagined.
I don’t we disagree but I think we can make this point more strongly. It isn’t just that the universe never could have contradiction or that we can’t imagine a contradictory universe. Rather, universes just aren’t the sorts of things that are contradictory or not contradictory. Its like saying that most coffee cups hate Nietzsche. A piece of language can be contradictory because the semantic content of one part of the piece doesn’t constrain the semantic content of another part. But the universe doesn’t have any semantic content at all.
So contradictory theories aren’t wrong because the universe is consistent and (therefore) “inconsistency brings with it the guarantee of being wrong in at least one place”. Rather they are bad because a self-contradictory theory can be made to show anything. There is nothing it can’t predict or explain. Thus, we can reject them on purely formal, analytic grounds. Contradictions don’t say anything at all because they say everything.
Those two books look excellent … but I don’t see how they are relevant to this philosophical question. Both appear to discuss the problem of justifying inconsistent theories, not justifying an inconsistent universe. I think it is perfectly obvious that a superior and consistent theory would still be preferred by either of these philosophers.