Hopefully this conversation doesn’t separate into decoherence—though we may well have already jumped the shark. :)
First of all, I want to clarify something: do you agree that duplicating myself with a magical cloning booth for the $50 of mineral extracts is sensible, while disagreeing with the same tactic using Everett branches?
Secondly, could you explain how measure in the mathematical sense relates to moral value in unknowable realites (I confess, I remember only half of my calculus).
Thirdly, following up on the second, I was under the “semipopular (i.e., still fake) version of QM” idea that differing Everett branches were as unreal as something outside of my light cone. (This is a great link regarding relativity—sorry I don’t know how to html: http://www.theculture.org/rich/sharpblue/ )
For the record, I’m not entirely certain that differeing Everett branches of myself have 0 value; I wouldn’t want them to suffer but if one of the two of us stopped existing, the only concern I could justify to myself would be concern over my long-suffering mother. I can’t prove that they have zero value, but I can’t think of why they wouldn’t.
could you explain how measure in the mathematical sense relates to moral value in unknowable realites
Well, I know that different things are going to happen to different future versions of me across the many worlds. I don’t want to say that I only care about some versions of me, because I anticipate being all of them. I would seem to need some sort of weighing scheme. You’ve said you don’t want your analogues to suffer, but you don’t mind them ceasing to exist, but I don’t think you can do that consistently. The real world is continuous and messy: there’s no single bright line between life and death, between person and not-a-person. If you’re okay with half of your selves across the many worlds suddenly dying, are you okay with them gradually dropping into a coma? &c.
“Well, I know that different things are going to happen to different future versions of me across the many worlds.”
From what I understand, the many-worlds occur due to subatomic processes; while we’re certain to find billions of examples along the evolutionary chain that went A or B due to random-decaying-netronium-thing (most if not all of which will alter the present day), contemporary history will likely remain unchanged; for there to be multiple future-histories where the Nazis won (not Godwin’s law!), there’d have to be trillions of possible realities, each of which is differentiated by a reaction here on earth; and even if these trillions do exist, then it still won’t matter for the small subset in which I exist.
The googleplex of selves which exist down all of these lines will be nearly identical; the largest difference will will be that one set had a microwave ‘ping’ a split-second earlier than the other.
I don’t know that two googleplexes of these are inherently better than a single googleplex.
As for coma—is it immediate, spontaneous coma, with no probability of ressurection? If so, then it’s basically equivalent to painless death.
It just seems kind of oddly discontinuous to care about what happens to your analogues except death. I mention comas only in an attempt to construct a least convenient possible world with which to challenge your quantum immortalist position. I mean—are you okay with your scientist-stage-magician wiping out 99.999% of your analogues, as long as one copy of you exists somewhere? But decoherence is continuous: what does it even mean, to speak of exactly one copy of you? Cf. Nick Bostrom’s “Quantity of Experience” (PDF).
Hopefully this conversation doesn’t separate into decoherence—though we may well have already jumped the shark. :)
First of all, I want to clarify something: do you agree that duplicating myself with a magical cloning booth for the $50 of mineral extracts is sensible, while disagreeing with the same tactic using Everett branches?
Secondly, could you explain how measure in the mathematical sense relates to moral value in unknowable realites (I confess, I remember only half of my calculus).
Thirdly, following up on the second, I was under the “semipopular (i.e., still fake) version of QM” idea that differing Everett branches were as unreal as something outside of my light cone. (This is a great link regarding relativity—sorry I don’t know how to html: http://www.theculture.org/rich/sharpblue/ )
For the record, I’m not entirely certain that differeing Everett branches of myself have 0 value; I wouldn’t want them to suffer but if one of the two of us stopped existing, the only concern I could justify to myself would be concern over my long-suffering mother. I can’t prove that they have zero value, but I can’t think of why they wouldn’t.
Well, I know that different things are going to happen to different future versions of me across the many worlds. I don’t want to say that I only care about some versions of me, because I anticipate being all of them. I would seem to need some sort of weighing scheme. You’ve said you don’t want your analogues to suffer, but you don’t mind them ceasing to exist, but I don’t think you can do that consistently. The real world is continuous and messy: there’s no single bright line between life and death, between person and not-a-person. If you’re okay with half of your selves across the many worlds suddenly dying, are you okay with them gradually dropping into a coma? &c.
“Well, I know that different things are going to happen to different future versions of me across the many worlds.”
From what I understand, the many-worlds occur due to subatomic processes; while we’re certain to find billions of examples along the evolutionary chain that went A or B due to random-decaying-netronium-thing (most if not all of which will alter the present day), contemporary history will likely remain unchanged; for there to be multiple future-histories where the Nazis won (not Godwin’s law!), there’d have to be trillions of possible realities, each of which is differentiated by a reaction here on earth; and even if these trillions do exist, then it still won’t matter for the small subset in which I exist.
The googleplex of selves which exist down all of these lines will be nearly identical; the largest difference will will be that one set had a microwave ‘ping’ a split-second earlier than the other.
I don’t know that two googleplexes of these are inherently better than a single googleplex.
As for coma—is it immediate, spontaneous coma, with no probability of ressurection? If so, then it’s basically equivalent to painless death.
It just seems kind of oddly discontinuous to care about what happens to your analogues except death. I mention comas only in an attempt to construct a least convenient possible world with which to challenge your quantum immortalist position. I mean—are you okay with your scientist-stage-magician wiping out 99.999% of your analogues, as long as one copy of you exists somewhere? But decoherence is continuous: what does it even mean, to speak of exactly one copy of you? Cf. Nick Bostrom’s “Quantity of Experience” (PDF).