A is not bad because torturing a person and then restoring their initial state has precisely same consequences as forging own memory of torturing a person and restoring their initial state.
From a virtue-ethics point of view, it seems reasonable to judge anybody who would do this.
Good people would not want to remember committing torture, even if they didn’t do it, because this would result in their future selves being wracked with unearned guilt, which is doing an injustice to that future self.
Put the other way: Anybody who would want to falsely remember being a torturer would probably be the sort of person who enjoys the idea of being a torturer—which is to say, a bad person.
A is not bad because torturing a person and then restoring their initial state has precisely same consequences as forging own memory of torturing a person and restoring their initial state.
From a virtue-ethics point of view, it seems reasonable to judge anybody who would do this.
Good people would not want to remember committing torture, even if they didn’t do it, because this would result in their future selves being wracked with unearned guilt, which is doing an injustice to that future self.
Put the other way: Anybody who would want to falsely remember being a torturer would probably be the sort of person who enjoys the idea of being a torturer—which is to say, a bad person.